day。 True； the logical rules； such as those of definition； classification； and
inference are now generally recognised to be inadequate for speculative science。
Perhaps it is nearer the mark to say that the inadequacy of the rules has been felt
rather than recognised； because they have been counted as mere fetters； and
thrown aside to make room for free speech from the heart； fancy and random
intuition。 But when reflection and relations of thought were required； people
unconsciously fell back upon the old…fashioned method of inference and formal
reasoning。 In my Science of Logic I have developed the nature of speculative
science in detail。 Hence in this treatise an explanation of method will be added
only here and there。 In a work which is concrete； and presents such a diversity of
phases； we may safely neglect to display at every turn the logical process； and
may take for granted an acquaintance with the scientific procedure。 Besides； it
may readily be observed that the work as a whole； and also the construction of
the parts； rest upon the logical spirit。 From this standpoint； especially； is it that I
would like this treatise to be understood and judged。 In such a work as this we
are dealing with a science； and in a science the matter must not be separated from
the form。
Some； who are thought to be taking a profound view； are heard to say that
everything turns upon the subject…matter； and that the form may be ignored。 The
business of any writer； and especially of the philosopher； is； as they say； to
discover； utter； and diffuse truth and adequate conceptions。 In actual practice this
business usually consists in warming up and distributing on all sides the same old
cabbage。 Perhaps the result of this operation may be to fashion and arouse the
feelings； though even this small merit may be regarded as superfluous； for 〃they
have Moses and the prophets： let them hear them。〃 Indeed； we have great cause
to be amazed at the pretentious tone of those who take this view。 They seem to
suppose that up till now the dissemination of truth throughout the world has been
feeble。 They think that the warmed…up cabbage contains new truths； especially to
be laid to heart at the present time。 And yet we see that what is on one side
announced as true； is driven out and swept away by the same kind of worn…out
truth。 Out of this hurly…burly of opinions； that which is neither new nor old； but
permanent； cannot be rescued and preserved except by science。
Further； as to rights； ethical life； and the state； the truth is as old as that in which
it is openly displayed and recognised； namely； the law； morality； and religion。 But
as the thinking spirit is not satisfied with possessing the truth in this simple way； it
must conceive it； and thus acquire a rational form for a content which is already
rational implicitly。 In this way the substance is justified before the bar of free
thought。 Free thought cannot be satisfied with what is given to it； whether by the
external positive authority of the state or human agreement； or by the authority of
internal feelings； the heart； and the witness of the spirit； which coincides
unquestioningly with the heart。 It is the nature of free thought rather to proceed
out of its own self； and hence to demand that it should know itself as thoroughly
one with truth。
The ingenuous mind adheres with simple conviction to the truth which is publicly
acknowledged。 On this foundation it builds its conduct and way of life。 In
opposition to this naive view of things rises the supposed difficulty of detecting
amidst the endless differences of opinion anything of universal application。 This
trouble may easily be supposed to spring from a spirit of earnest inquiry。 But in
point of fact those who pride themselves upon the existence of this obstacle are in
the plight of him who cannot see the woods for the trees。 The confusion is all of
their own making。 Nay； more： this confusion is an indication。 that they are in fact
not seeking for what is universally valid in right and the ethical order。 If they were
at pains to find that out； and refused to busy themselves with empty opinion and
minute detail； they would adhere to and act in accordance with substantive right；
namely the commands of the state and the claims of society。 But a further
difficulty lies in the fact that man thinks； and seeks freedom and a basis for
conduct in thought。 Divine as his right to act in this way is； it becomes a wrong；
when it takes the place of thinking。 Thought then regards itself as free only when
it is conscious of being at variance with what is generally recognised； and of
setting itself up as something original。
The idea that freedom of thought and mind is indicated only by deviation from； or
even hostility to what is everywhere recognised； is most persistent with regard to
the state。 The essential task of a philosophy of the state would thus seem to be
the discovery and publication of a new and original theory。
When we examine this idea and the way it is applied； we are almost led to think
that no state or constitution has ever existed； or now exists。 We are tempted to
suppose that we must now begin and keep on beginning afresh for ever。 We are
to fancy that the founding of the social order has depended upon present devices
and discoveries。 As to nature； philosophy； it is admitted； has to understand it as it
is。 The philosophers' stone must be concealed somewhere； we say； in nature
itself； as nature is in itself rational。 Knowledge must； therefore； examine；
apprehend and conceive the reason actually present in nature。 Not with the
superficial shapes and accidents of nature； but with its eternal harmony； that is to
say； its inherent law and essence； knowledge has to cope。 But the ethical world or
the state； which is in fact reason potently and permanently actualised in
self…consciousness； is not permitted to enjoy the happiness of being reason at all。
Footnote There are two kinds of laws； laws of nature and laws of right。 The laws of nature are
simply there； and are valid as they are。 They cannot be gainsaid； although in certain cases they may
be transgressed。 In order to know laws of nature； we must get to work to ascertain them。 for they
are true； and only our ideas of them can be false。 Of these laws the measure is outside of us。 Our
knowledge adds nothing to them； and does not further their operation。 Only our knowledge of
them expands。 The knowledge of right is partly of the same nature and partly different。 The laws of
right also are simply there； and we have to become acquainted with them。 In this way the citizen
has a more or less firm hold of them as they are given to him； and the jurist also abides by the
same standpoint。 But there is also a distinction。 In connection with the laws of right the spirit of
investigation is stirred up； and our attention is turned to the fact that the laws； because they are
different； are not absolute。 Laws of right are established and handed down by men。 The inner
voice must necessarily collide or agree with them。 Man cannot be limited to what is presented to
him； but maintains that he has the standard of right within himself。 He may be subject to the
necessity and force of external authority； but not in the same way as he is to the necessity of
nature； for always his inner being says to him how a thing ought to be； and within himself he finds
the confirmation or lack of confirmation of what is generally accepted。 In nature the highest truth is
that a law is。 In right a thing is not valid because it is； since every one demands that it shall conform
to his standard。 Hence arises a possible conflict between what is and what ought to be； between
absolute unchanging right and the arbitrary decision of what ought to be right。 Such division and
strife occur only on the soil of the spirit。 Thus the unique privilege of the spirit would appear to
lead to discontent and unhappiness； and frequently we are directed to nature in contrast with the
fluctuations of life。 But it is exactly in the opposition arising between absolute right； and that which
the arbitrary will seeks to make right； that the need lies of knowing thoroughly what right is。 Men
must openly meet and face their reason； and consider the rationality of right。 This is the
subject…matter of our science in contrast with jurisprudence； which often has to do merely with
contradictions。 Moreover the world of today has an imperative need to make this investigation In
ancient times； respect and reverence for the law were universal。 But now the fashion of the time
has taken another turn； and thought confronts everything which has been approved。 Theories now
set themselves in opposition to reality； and make as though they were absolutely true and
necessary。 And there is now more pressing need to know and conceive the thoughts upon right。
Since thought has exalted itself …is the essential form； we must now be careful to apprehend right
also as thought。 It would look as though the door were thrown open for every casual opinion；
when thought is thus made to supervene upon right。 But true thought of a thing is not an opinion；
but the conception of the thing itself。 T