the six enneads- 第138部分

meless；　time　attaching　to　it　only　in　so　far　as　it　happens　to　have　such　and　such　an　extension。　　　　　Timeless　change　is　sanctioned　in　the　expression；　〃as　if　change　could　not　take　place　all　at　once〃；　if　then　change　is　timeless；　why　not　Motion　also？…　Change；　be　it　noted；　is　here　distinguished　from　the　result　of　change；　the　result　being　unnecessary　to　establish　the　change　itself。　　　　　17。　We　may　be　told　that　neither　Act　nor　Motion　requires　a　genus　for　itself；　but　that　both　revert　to　Relation；　Act　belonging　to　the　potentially　active；　Motion　to　the　potentially　motive。　Our　reply　is　that　Relation　produces　relatives　as　such；　and　not　the　mere　reference　to　an　external　standard；　given　the　existence　of　a　thing；　whether　attributive　or　relative；　it　holds　its　essential　character　prior　to　any　relationship：　so　then　must　Act　and　Motion；　and　even　such　an　attribute　as　habit；　they　are　not　prevented　from　being　prior　to　any　relationship　they　may　occupy；　or　from　being　conceivable　in　themselves。　Otherwise；　everything　will　be　relative；　for　anything　you　think　of…　even　Soul…　bears　some　relationship　to　something　else。　　　　　But；　to　return　to　activity　proper　and　the　action；　is　there　any　reason　why　these　should　be　referred　to　Relation？　They　must　in　every　instance　be　either　Motion　or　Act。　　　　　If　however　activity　is　referred　to　Relation　and　the　action　made　a　distinct　genus；　why　is　not　Motion　referred　to　Relation　and　the　movement　made　a　distinct　genus？　Why　not　bisect　the　unity；　Motion；　and　so　make　Action　and　Passion　two　species　of　the　one　thing；　ceasing　to　consider　Action　and　Passion　as　two　genera？　　　　　18。　There　are　other　questions　calling　for　consideration：　　　　　First：　Are　both　Acts　and　motions　to　be　included　in　the　category　of　Action；　with　the　distinction　that　Acts　are　momentary　while　Motions；　such　as　cutting；　are　in　time？　Or　will　both　be　regarded　as　motions　or　as　involving　Motion？　　　　　Secondly：　Will　all　activities　be　related　to　passivity；　or　will　some…　for　example；　walking　and　speaking…　be　considered　as　independent　of　it？　　　　　Thirdly：　Will　all　those　related　to　passivity　be　classed　as　motions　and　the　independent　as　Acts；　or　will　the　two　classes　overlap？　Walking；　for　instance；　which　is　an　independent；　would；　one　supposes；　be　a　motion；　thinking；　which　also　does　not　essentially　involve　〃passivity；〃　an　Act：　otherwise　we　must　hold　that　thinking　and　walking　are　not　even　actions。　But　if　they　are　not　in　the　category　of　Action；　where　then　in　our　classification　must　they　fall？　　　　　It　may　perhaps　be　urged　that　the　act　of　thinking；　together　with　the　faculty　of　thought；　should　be　regarded　as　relative　to　the　thought　object；　for　is　not　the　faculty　of　sensation　treated　as　relative　to　the　sensible　object？　If　then；　we　may　ask；　in　the　analogue　the　faculty　of　sensation　is　treated　as　relative　to　the　sensible　object；　why　not　the　sensory　act　as　well？　The　fact　is　that　even　sensation；　though　related　to　an　external　object；　has　something　besides　that　relation：　it　has；　namely；　its　own　status　of　being　either　an　Act　or　a　Passion。　Now　the　Passion　is　separable　from　the　condition　of　being　attached　to　some　object　and　caused　by　some　object：　so；　then；　is　the　Act　a　distinct　entity。　Walking　is　similarly　attached　and　caused；　and　yet　has　besides　the　status　of　being　a　motion。　It　follows　that　thought；　in　addition　to　its　relationship；　will　have　the　status　of　being　either　a　motion　or　an　Act。　　　　　19。　We　have　to　ask　ourselves　whether　there　are　not　certain　Acts　which　without　the　addition　of　a　time…element　will　be　thought　of　as　imperfect　and　therefore　classed　with　motions。　Take　for　instance　living　and　life。　The　life　of　a　definite　person　implies　a　certain　adequate　period；　just　as　his　happiness　is　no　merely　instantaneous　thing。　Life　and　happiness　are；　in　other　words；　of　the　nature　ascribed　to　Motion：　both　therefore　must　be　treated　as　motions；　and　Motion　must　be　regarded　as　a　unity；　a　single　genus；　besides　the　quantity　and　quality　belonging　to　Substance　we　must　take　count　of　the　motion　manifested　in　it。　　　　　We　may　further　find　desirable　to　distinguish　bodily　from　psychic　motions　or　spontaneous　motions　from　those　induced　by　external　forces；　or　the　original　from　the　derivative；　the　original　motions　being　activities；　whether　externally　related　or　independent；　while　the　derivative　will　be　Passions。　　　　　But　surely　the　motions　having　external　tendency　are　actually　identical　with　those　of　external　derivation：　the　cutting　issuing　from　the　cutter　and　that　effected　in　the　object　are　one；　though　to　cut　is　not　the　same　as　to　be　cut。　　　　　Perhaps　however　the　cutting　issuing　from　the　cutter　and　that　which　takes　place　in　the　cut　object　are　in　fact　not　one；　but　〃to　cut〃　implies　that　from　a　particular　Act　and　motion　there　results　a　different　motion　in　the　object　cut。　Or　perhaps　the　difference　＇between　Action　and　Passion＇　lies　not　in　the　fact　of　being　cut；　but　in　the　distinct　emotion　supervening；　pain　for　example：　passivity　has　this　connotation　also。　　　　　But　when　there　is　no　pain；　what　occurs？　Nothing；　surely；　but　the　Act　of　the　agent　upon　the　patient　object：　this　is　all　that　is　meant　in　such　cases　by　Action。　Action；　thus；　becomes　twofold：　there　is　that　which　occurs　in　the　external；　and　that　which　does　not。　The　duality　of　Action　and　Passion；　suggested　by　the　notion　that　Action　＇always＇　takes　place　in　an　external；　is　abandoned。　　　　　Even　writing；　though　taking　place　upon　an　external　object；　does　not　call　for　passivity；　since　no　effect　is　produced；　upon　the　tablet　beyond　the　Act　of　the　writer；　nothing　like　pain；　we　may　be　told　that　the　tablet　has　been　inscribed；　but　this　does　not　suffice　for　passivity。　　　　　Again；　in　the　case　of　walking　there　is　the　earth　trodden　upon；　but　no　one　thinks　of　it　as　having　experienced　Passion　＇or　suffering＇。　Treading　on　a　living　body；　we　think　of　suffering；　because　we　reflect　not　upon　the　walking　but　upon　the　ensuing　pain：　otherwise　we　should　think　of　suffering　in　the　case　of　the　tablet　as　well。　　　　　It　is　so　in　every　case　of　Action：　we　cannot　but　think　of　it　as　knit　into　a　unity　with　its　opposite；　Passion。　Not　that　this　later　〃Passion〃　is　the　opposite　of　Action　in　the　way　in　which　being　burned　is　the　opposite　of　burning：　by　Passion　in　this　sense　we　mean　the　effect　supervening　upon　the　combined　facts　of　the　burning　and　the　being　burned；　whether　this　effect　be　pain　or　some　such　process　as　withering。　　　　　Suppose　this　Passion　to　be　treated　as　of　itself　producing　pain：　have　we　not　still　the　duality　of　agent　and　patient；　two　results　from　the　one　Act？　The　Act　may　no　longer　include　the　will　to　cause　pain；　but　it　produces　something　distinct　from　itself；　a　pain…causing　medium　which　enters　into　the　object　about　to　experience　pain：　this　medium；　while　retaining　its　individuality；　produces　something　yet　different；　the　feeling　of　pain。　　　　　What　does　this　suggest？　Surely　that　the　very　medium…　the　act　of　hearing；　for　instance…　is；　even　before　it　produces　pain　or　without　producing　pain　at　all；　a　Passion　of　that　into　which　it　enters。　　　　　But　hearing；　with　sensation　in　general；　is　in　fact　not　a　Passion。　Yet　to　feel　pain　is　to　experience　a　Passion…　a　Passion　however　which　is　not　opposed　to　Action。　　　　　20。　But　though　not　opposed；　it　is　still　different　from　Action　and　cannot　belong　to　the　same　genus　as　activity；　though　if　they　are　both　Motion；　it　will　so　belong；　on　the　principle　that　alteration　must　be　regarded　as　qualitative　motion。　　　　　Does　it　follow　that　whenever　alteration　proceeds　from　Quality；　it　will　be　activity　and　Action；　the　quale　remaining　impassive？　It　may　be　that　if　the　quale　remains　impassive；　the　alteration　will　be　in　the　category　of　Action；　whereas　if；　while　its　energy　is　directed　outwards；　it　also　suffers…　as　in　beating…　it　will　cease　to　belong　to　that　category：　or　perhaps　there　is　nothing　to　prevent　its　being　in　both　categories　at　one　and　the　same　moment。　　　　　If　then　an　alteration　be　conditioned　by　Passivity　alone；　as　is　the　case　with　rubbing；　on　what　ground　is　it　assigned　to　Action　rather　than　to　Passivity？　Perhaps　the　Passivity　arises　from　the　fact　that　a　counter…rubbing　is　involved。　But　are　we；　in　view　of　this　counter…motion；　to　recognize　the　presence　of　two　distinct　motions？　No：　one　only。　　　　　How　then　can　this　one　motion　be　both　Action　and　Passion？　We　must　suppose　it　to　be　Action　in　proceeding　from　an　object；　and　Passion　in　being　directly　upon　another…　though　it　remains　the　same　motion　throughout。　　　　　Suppose　however　Passion　to　be　a　different　motion　from　Action：　how　then　does　its　modification　of　the　patient　object　change　that　patient's　character　without　the　agent　being　affected　by　the　patient？　For　obviously　an　agent　cannot　be　passive　to　the　operation　it　performs　upon　another。　Can　it　be　that　the　fact　of　motion　existing　elsewhere　creates　the　Passion；　which　was　not　Passion　in　the　agent？　　　　　If　the　whiteness　of　the　swan；　produced　by　its　Reason…Principle；　is　given　at　its　birth；　are　we　to　affirm　Passion　of　the　swan　on　its　passing　into　being？　If；　on　the　contrary；　the　swan　grows　white　after　birth；　and　if　there　is　a　cause　of　that　growth　and　the　corresponding　result；　are　we　to　say　that　the　growth　is　a　Passion？　Or　must　we　confine　Passion　to　purely　qualitative　change？　　　　　One　thing　confers　beauty　and　another　takes　it：　is　that　which　takes　beauty　to　be　regarded　as　patient？　If　then　the　source　of　beauty…　tin；　suppose…　should　deteriorate