the six enneads- 第177部分

ies　in　priority：　　　　　To　the　lowest　of　things　the　good　is　its　immediate　higher；　each　step　represents　the　good　to　what　stands　lower　so　long　as　the　movement　does　not　tend　awry　but　advances　continuously　towards　the　superior：　thus　there　is　a　halt　at　the　Ultimate；　beyond　which　no　ascent　is　possible：　that　is　the　First　Good；　the　authentic；　the　supremely　sovereign；　the　source　of　good　to　the　rest　of　things。　　　　　Matter　would　have　Forming…Idea　for　its　good；　since；　were　it　conscious；　it　would　welcome　that；　body　would　look　to　soul；　without　which　it　could　not　be　or　endure；　soul　must　look　to　virtue；　still　higher　stands　Intellectual…Principle；　above　that　again　is　the　principle　we　call　the　Primal。　Each　of　these　progressive　priors　must　have　act　upon　those　minors　to　which　they　are；　respectively；　the　good：　some　will　confer　order　and　place；　others　life；　others　wisdom　and　the　good　life：　Intellectual…Principle　will　draw　upon　the　Authentic　Good　which　we　hold　to　be　coterminous　with　it；　both　as　being　an　Activity　put　forth　from　it　and　as　even　now　taking　light　from　it。　This　good　we　will　define　later。　　　　　26。　Any　conscious　being；　if　the　good　come　to　him；　will　know　the　good　and　affirm　his　possession　of　it。　　　　　But　what　if　one　be　deceived？　　　　　In　that　case　there　must　be　some　resemblance　to　account　for　the　error：　the　good　will　be　the　original　which　the　delusion　counterfeited　and　whenever　the　true　presents　itself　we　turn　from　the　spurious。　　　　　All　the　striving；　all　the　pain；　show　that　to　everything　something　is　a　good：　the　lifeless　finds　its　share　in　something　outside　itself；　where　there　is　life　the　longing　for　good　sets　up　pursuit；　the　very　dead　are　cared　for　and　mourned　for　by　the　living；　the　living　plan　for　their　own　good。　The　witness　of　attainment　is　betterment；　cleaving　to　state；　satisfaction；　settlement；　suspension　of　pursuit。　Here　pleasure　shows　itself　inadequate；　its　choice　does　not　hold；　repeated；　it　is　no　longer　the　same；　it　demands　endless　novelty。　The　good；　worthy　of　the　name；　can　be　no　such　tasting　of　the　casual；　anyone　that　takes　this　kind　of　thing　for　the　good　goes　empty；　carrying　away　nothing　but　an　emotion　which　the　good　might　have　produced。　No　one　could　be　content　to　take　his　pleasure　thus　in　an　emotion　over　a　thing　not　possessed　any　more　than　over　a　child　not　there；　I　cannot　think　that　those　setting　their　good　in　bodily　satisfactions　find　table…pleasure　without　the　meal；　or　love…pleasure　without　intercourse　with　their　chosen；　or　any　pleasure　where　nothing　is　done。　　　　　27。　But　what　is　that　whose　entry　supplies　every　such　need？　　　　　Some　Idea；　we　maintain。　There　is　a　Form　to　which　Matter　aspires：　to　soul；　moral　excellence　is　this　Form。　　　　　But　is　this　Form　a　good　to　the　thing　as　being　apt　to　it；　does　the　striving　aim　at　the　apt？　　　　　No：　the　aptest　would　be　the　most　resemblant　to　the　thing　itself；　but　that；　however　sought　and　welcomed；　does　not　suffice　for　the　good：　the　good　must　be　something　more：　to　be　a　good　to　another　a　thing　must　have　something　beyond　aptness；　that　only　can　be　adopted　as　the　good　which　represents　the　apt　in　its　better　form　and　is　best　to　what　is　best　in　the　quester's　self；　to　that　which　the　quester　tends　potentially　to　be。　　　　　A　thing　is　potentially　that　to　which　its　nature　looks；　this；　obviously；　it　lacks；　what　it　lacks；　of　its　better；　is　its　good。　Matter　is　of　all　that　most　in　need；　its　next　is　the　lowest　Form；　Form　at　lowest　is　just　one　grade　higher　than　Matter。　If　a　thing　is　a　good　to　itself；　much　more　must　its　perfection；　its　Form；　its　better；　be　a　good　to　it；　this　better；　good　in　its　own　nature；　must　be　good　also　to　the　quester　whose　good　it　procures。　　　　　But　why　should　the　Form　which　makes　a　thing　good　be　a　good　to　that　thing？　As　being　most　appropriate？　　　　　No：　but　because　it　is；　itself；　a　portion　of　the　Good。　This　is　why　the　least　alloyed　and　nearest　to　the　good　are　most　at　peace　within　themselves。　　　　　It　is　surely　out　of　place　to　ask　why　a　thing　good　in　its　own　nature　should　be　a　good；　we　can　hardly　suppose　it　dissatisfied　with　its　own　goodness　so　that　it　must　strain　outside　its　essential　quality　to　the　good　which　it　effectually　is。　　　　　There　remains　the　question　with　regard　to　the　Simplex：　where　there　is　utter　absence　of　distinction　does　this　self…aptness　constitute　the　good　to　that　Simplex？　　　　　If　thus　far　we　have　been　right；　the　striving　of　the　lower　possesses　itself　of　the　good　as　of　a　thing　resident　in　a　certain　Kind；　and　it　is　not　the　striving　that　constitutes　the　good　but　the　good　that　calls　out　the　striving：　where　the　good　is　attained　something　is　acquired　and　on　this　acquisition　there　follows　pleasure。　But　the　thing　must　be　chosen　even　though　no　pleasure　ensued；　it　must　be　desirable　for　its　own　sake。　　　　　28。　Now　to　see　what　all　this　reasoning　has　established：　　　　　Universally；　what　approaches　as　a　good　is　a　Form；　Matter　itself　contains　this　good　which　is　Form：　are　we　to　conclude　that；　if　Matter　had　will；　it　would　desire　to　be　Form　unalloyed？　　　　　No：　that　would　be　desiring　its　own　destruction；　for　the　good　seeks　to　subject　everything　to　itself。　But　perhaps　Matter　would　not　wish　to　remain　at　its　own　level　but　would　prefer　to　attain　Being　and；　this　acquired；　to　lay　aside　its　evil。　　　　　If　we　are　asked　how　the　evil　thing　can　have　tendency　towards　the　good；　we　answer　that　we　have　not　attributed　tendency　to　Matter；　our　argument　needed　the　hypothesis　of　sensation　in　Matter…　in　so　far　as　possible　consistently　with　retention　of　its　character…　and　we　asserted　that　the　entry　of　Form；　that　dream　of　the　Good；　must　raise　it　to　a　nobler　order。　If　then　Matter　is　Evil；　there　is　no　more　to　be　said；　if　it　is　something　else…　a　wrong　thing；　let　us　say…　then　in　the　hypothesis　that　its　essence　acquire　sensation　would　not　the　appropriate　upon　the　next　or　higher　plane　be　its　good；　as　in　the　other　cases？　But　not　what　is　evil　in　Matter　would　be　the　quester　of　good　but　that　element　in　it　＇lowest　Form＇　which　in　it　is　associated　with　evil。　　　　　But　if　Matter　by　very　essence　is　evil　how　could　it　choose　the　good？　　　　　This　question　implies　that　if　Evil　were　self…conscious　it　would　admire　itself：　but　how　can　the　unadmirable　be　admired；　and　did　we　not　discover　that　the　good　must　be　apt　to　the　nature？　　　　　There　that　question　may　rest。　But　if　universally　the　good　is　Form　and　the　higher　the　ascent　the　more　there　is　of　Form…Soul　more　truly　Form　than　body　is　and　phases　of　soul　progressively　of　higher　Form　and　Intellectual…Principle　standing　as　Form　to　soul　collectively…　then　the　Good　advances　by　the　opposite　of　Matter　and；　therefore；　by　a　cleansing　and　casting　away　to　the　utmost　possible　at　each　stage：　and　the　greatest　good　must　be　there　where　all　that　is　of　Matter　has　disappeared。　The　Principle　of　Good　rejecting　Matter　entirely…　or　rather　never　having　come　near　it　at　any　point　or　in　any　way…　must　hold　itself　aloft　with　that　Formless　in　which　Primal　Form　takes　its　origin。　But　we　will　return　to　this。　　　　　29。　Suppose；　however；　that　pleasure　did　not　result　from　the　good　but　there　were　something　preceding　pleasure　and　accounting　for　it；　would　not　this　be　a　thing　to　be　embraced？　　　　　But　when　we　say　〃to　be　embraced〃　we　say　〃pleasure。〃　　　　　But　what　if　accepting　its　existence；　we　think　of　that　existence　as　leaving　still　the　possibility　that　it　were　not　a　thing　to　be　embraced？　　　　　This　would　mean　the　good　being　present　and　the　sentient　possessor　failing；　nonetheless；　to　perceive　it。　　　　　It　would　seem　possible；　however；　to　perceive　and　yet　be　unmoved　by　the　possession；　this　is　quite　likely　in　the　case　of　the　wiser　and　least　dependent…　and　indeed　it　is　so　with　the　First；　immune　not　merely　because　simplex；　but　because　pleasure　by　acquisition　implies　lack。　　　　　But　all　this　will　become　clear　on　the　solution　of　our　remaining　difficulties　and　the　rebuttal　of　the　argument　brought　up　against　us。　This　takes　the　form　of　the　question：　〃What　gain　is　there　in　the　Good　to　one　who；　fully　conscious；　feels　nothing　when　he　hears　of　these　things；　whether　because　he　has　no　grasp　of　them　but　takes　merely　the　words　or　because　he　holds　to　false　values；　perhaps　being　all　in　search　of　sense；　finding　his　good　in　money　or　such　things？〃　　　　　The　answer　is　that　even　in　his　disregard　of　the　good　proposed　he　is　with　us　in　setting　a　good　before　him　but　fails　to　see　how　the　good　we　define　fits　into　his　own　conception。　It　is　impossible　to　say　〃Not　that〃　if　one　is　utterly　without　experience　or　conception　of　the　〃That〃；　there　will　generally　have　been；　even；　some　inkling　of　the　good　beyond　Intellection。　Besides；　one　attaining　or　approaching　the　good；　but　not　recognising　it；　may　assure　himself　in　the　light　of　its　contraries；　otherwise　he　will　not　even　hold　ignorance　an　evil　though　everyone　prefers　to　know　and　is　proud　of　knowing　so　that　our　very　sensations　seek　to　ripen　into　knowledge。　　　　　If　the　knowing　principle…　and　specially　primal　Intellectual…Principle…　is　valuable　and　beautiful；　what　must　be　present　to　those　of　power　to　see　the　Author　and　Father　of　Intellect？　Anyone　thinking　slightingly　of　this　principle　of　Life　and　Being　brings　evidence　against　himself　and　all　his　state：　of　course；　distaste　for　the　life　that　is　mingled　with　death　does　not　touch　that　Life　Authentic。　　　　　30。　Whether　pleasure　must　enter　into　the　good；　so　that　life　in　the　contemplation　of　the　divine　things　and　especially　of　their　source