the six enneads- 第180部分

e；　in　his　Intellection　or　in　himself。　If　in　the　Intellection；　he　has　no　worth　or　the　less　worth；　if　in　himself；　he　is　perfect　before　the　Intellection；　not　perfected　by　it。　We　may　be　told　that　he　must　have　Intellection　because　he　is　an　Act；　not　a　potentiality。　Now　if　this　means　that　he　is　an　essence　eternally　intellective；　he　is　represented　as　a　duality…　essence　and　Intellective　Act…　he　ceases　to　be　a　simplex；　an　external　has　been　added：　it　is　just　as　the　eyes　are　not　the　same　as　their　sight；　though　the　two　are　inseparable。　If　on　the　other　hand　by　this　actualization　it　is　meant　that　he　is　Act　and　Intellection；　then　as　being　Intellection　he　does　not　exercise　it；　just　as　movement　is　not　itself　in　motion。　　　　　But　do　not　we　ourselves　assert　that　the　Beings　There　are　essence　and　Act？　　　　　The　Beings；　yes；　but　they　are　to　us　manifold　and　differentiated：　the　First　we　make　a　simplex；　to　us　Intellection　begins　with　the　emanant　in　its　seeking　of　its　essence；　of　itself；　of　its　author；　bent　inward　for　this　vision　and　having　a　present　thing　to　know；　there　is　every　reason　why　it　should　be　a　principle　of　Intellection；　but　that　which；　never　coming　into　being；　has　no　prior　but　is　ever　what　it　is；　how　could　that　have　motive　to　Intellection？　As　Plato　rightly　says；　it　is　above　Intellect。　　　　　An　Intelligence　not　exercising　Intellection　would　be　unintelligent；　where　the　nature　demands　knowing；　not　to　know　is　to　fail　of　intelligence；　but　where　there　is　no　function；　why　import　one　and　declare　a　defect　because　it　is　not　performed？　We　might　as　well　complain　because　the　Supreme　does　not　act　as　a　physician。　He　has　no　task；　we　hold；　because　nothing　can　present　itself　to　him　to　be　done；　he　is　sufficient；　he　need　seek　nothing　beyond　himself；　he　who　is　over　all；　to　himself　and　to　all　he　suffices　by　simply　being　what　he　is。　　　　　38。　And　yet　this　〃He　Is〃　does　not　truly　apply：　the　Supreme　has　no　need　of　Being：　even　〃He　is　good〃　does　not　apply　since　it　indicates　Being：　the　〃is〃　should　not　suggest　something　predicated　of　another　thing；　it　is　to　state　identity。　The　word　〃good〃　used　of　him　is　not　a　predicate　asserting　his　possession　of　goodness；　it　conveys　an　identification。　It　is　not　that　we　think　it　exact　to　call　him　either　good　or　The　Good：　it　is　that　sheer　negation　does　not　indicate；　we　use　the　term　The　Good　to　assert　identity　without　the　affirmation　of　Being。　　　　　But　how　admit　a　Principle　void　of　self…knowledge；　self…awareness；　surely　the　First　must　be　able　to　say　〃I　possess　Being？〃　　　　　But　he　does　not　possess　Being。　　　　　Then；　at　least　he　must　say　〃I　am　good？〃　　　　　No：　once　more；　that　would　be　an　affirmation　of　Being。　　　　　But　surely　he　may　affirm　merely　the　goodness；　adding　nothing：　the　goodness　would　be　taken　without　the　being　and　all　duality　avoided？　　　　　No：　such　self…awareness　as　good　must　inevitably　carry　the　affirmation　〃I　am　the　Good〃；　otherwise　there　would　be　merely　the　unattached　conception　of　goodness　with　no　recognition　of　identity；　any　such　intellection　would　inevitably　include　the　affirmation　〃I　am。〃　　　　　If　that　intellection　were　the　Good；　then　the　intellection　would　not　be　self…intellection　but　intellection　of　the　Good；　not　the　Supreme　but　that　intellection　would　be　the　Good：　if　on　the　contrary　that　intellection　of　the　Good　is　distinct　from　the　Good；　at　once　the　Good　exists　before　its　knowing；　all…sufficiently　good　in　itself；　it　needs　none　of　that　knowing　of　its　own　nature。　　　　　Thus　the　Supreme　does　not　know　itself　as　Good。　　　　　As　what　then？　　　　　No　such　foreign　matter　is　present　to　it：　it　can　have　only　an　immediate　intuition　self…directed。　　　　　39。　Since　the　Supreme　has　no　interval；　no　self…differentiation　what　can　have　this　intuitional　approach　to　it　but　itself？　Therefore　it　quite　naturally　assumes　difference　at　the　point　where　Intellectual…Principle　and　Being　are　differentiated。　　　　　Intellect；　to　act　at　all；　must　inevitably　comport　difference　with　identity；　otherwise　it　could　not　distinguish　itself　from　its　object　by　standing　apart　from　it；　nor　could　it　ever　be　aware　of　the　realm　of　things　whose　existence　demands　otherness；　nor　could　there　be　so　much　as　a　duality。　　　　　Again；　if　the　Supreme　is　to　have　intellection　it　cannot　know　only　itself；　that　would　not　be　intellection；　for；　if　it　did　know　itself；　nothing　could　prevent　it　knowing　all　things；　but　this　is　impossible。　With　self…intellection　it　would　no　longer　be　simplex；　any　intellection；　even　in　the　Supreme；　must　be　aware　of　something　distinct；　as　we　have　been　saying；　the　inability　to　see　the　self　as　external　is　the　negation　of　intellection。　That　act　requires　a　manifold…agent；　object；　movement　and　all　the　other　conditions　of　a　thinking　principle。　Further　we　must　remember　what　has　been　indicated　elsewhere　that；　since　every　intellectual　act　in　order　to　be　what　it　must　be　requires　variety；　every　movement　simple　and　the　same　throughout；　though　it　may　comport　some　form　of　contact；　is　devoid　of　the　intellective。　　　　　It　follows　that　the　Supreme　will　know　neither　itself　nor　anything　else　but　will　hold　an　august　repose。　All　the　rest　is　later；　before　them　all；　This　was　what　This　was；　any　awareness　of　that　other　would　be　acquired；　the　shifting　knowledge　of　the　instable。　Even　in　knowing　the　stable　he　would　be　manifold；　for　it　is　not　possible　that；　while　in　the　act　of　knowing　the　laters　possess　themselves　of　their　object；　the　Supreme　should　know　only　in　some　unpossessing　observation。　　　　　As　regards　Providence；　that　is　sufficiently　saved　by　the　fact　that　This　is　the　source　from　which　all　proceeds；　the　dependent　he　cannot　know　when　he　has　no　knowledge　of　himself　but　keeps　that　august　repose。　Plato　dealing　with　essential　Being　allows　it　intellection　but　not　this　august　repose：　intellection　then　belongs　to　Essential　Being；　this　august　repose　to　the　Principle　in　which　there　is　no　intellection。　Repose；　of　course；　is　used　here　for　want　of　a　fitter　word；　we　are　to　understand　that　the　most　august；　the　truly　so；　is　That　which　transcends　＇the　movement　of＇　Intellection。　　　　　40。　That　there　can　be　no　intellection　in　the　First　will　be　patent　to　those　that　have　had　such　contact；　but　some　further　confirmation　is　desirable；　if　indeed　words　can　carry　the　matter；　we　need　overwhelming　persuasion。　　　　　It　must　be　borne　in　mind　that　all　intellection　rises　in　some　principle　and　takes　cognisance　of　an　object。　But　a　distinction　is　to　be　made：　　　　　There　is　the　intellection　that　remains　within　its　place　of　origin；　it　has　that　source　as　substratum　but　becomes　a　sort　of　addition　to　it　in　that　it　is　an　activity　of　that　source　perfecting　the　potentiality　there；　not　by　producing　anything　but　as　being　a　completing　power　to　the　principle　in　which　it　inheres。　There　is　also　the　intellection　inbound　with　Being…　Being's　very　author…　and　this　could　not　remain　confined　to　the　source　since　there　it　could　produce　nothing；　it　is　a　power　to　production；　it　produces　therefore　of　its　own　motion　and　its　act　is　Real…Being　and　there　it　has　its　dwelling。　In　this　mode　the　intellection　is　identical　with　Being；　even　in　its　self…intellection　no　distinction　is　made　save　the　logical　distinction　of　thinker　and　thought　with；　as　we　have　often　observed；　the　implication　of　plurality。　　　　　This　is　a　first　activity　and　the　substance　it　produces　is　Essential　Being；　it　is　an　image；　but　of　an　original　so　great　that　the　very　copy　stands　a　reality。　If　instead　of　moving　outward　it　remained　with　the　First；　it　would　be　no　more　than　some　appurtenance　of　that　First；　not　a　self…standing　existent。　　　　　At　the　earliest　activity　and　earliest　intellection；　it　can　be　preceded　by　no　act　or　intellection：　if　we　pass　beyond　this　being　and　this　intellection　we　come　not　to　more　being　and　more　intellection　but　to　what　overpasses　both；　to　the　wonderful　which　has　neither；　asking　nothing　of　these　products　and　standing　its　unaccompanied　self。　　　　　That　all…transcending　cannot　have　had　an　activity　by　which　to　produce　this　activity…　acting　before　act　existed…　or　have　had　thought　in　order　to　produce　thinking…　applying　thought　before　thought　exists…　all　intellection；　even　of　the　Good；　is　beneath　it。　　　　　In　sum；　this　intellection　of　the　Good　is　impossible：　I　do　not　mean　that　it　is　impossible　to　have　intellection　of　the　Good…　we　may　admit　the　possibility　but　there　can　be　no　intellection　by　The　Good　itself；　for　this　would　be　to　include　the　inferior　with　the　Good。　　　　　If　intellection　is　the　lower；　then　it　will　be　bound　up　with　Being；　if　intellection　is　the　higher；　its　object　is　lower。　Intellection；　then；　does　not　exist　in　the　Good；　as　a　lesser；　taking　its　worth　through　that　Good；　it　must　stand　apart　from　it；　leaving　the　Good　unsoiled　by　it　as　by　all　else。　Immune　from　intellection　the　Good　remains　incontaminably　what　it　is；　not　impeded　by　the　presence　of　the　intellectual　act　which　would　annul　its　purity　and　unity。　　　　　Anyone　making　the　Good　at　once　Thinker　and　Thought　identifies　it　with　Being　and　with　the　Intellection　vested　in　Being　so　that　it　must　perform　that　act　of　intellection：　at　once　it　becomes　necessary　to　find　another　principle；　one　superior　to　that　Good：　for　either　this　act；　this　intellection；　is　a　completing　power　of　some　such　principle；　serving　as　its　ground；　or　it　points；　by　that　duality；　to　a　prior　principle　having　intellection　as　a　characteristic。　It　is　because　there　is　something　before　it　that　it　has　an　object　o