the six enneads- 第29部分

of　being　a　recipient　of　Magnitude…　though　of　course　only　in　the　visible　object。　　　　　In　the　order　of　things　without　Mass；　all　that　is　Ideal…Principle　possesses　delimitation；　each　entity　for　itself；　so　that　the　conception　of　Mass　has　no　place　in　them：　Matter；　not　delimited；　having　in　its　own　nature　no　stability；　swept　into　any　or　every　form　by　turns；　ready　to　go　here；　there　and　everywhere；　becomes　a　thing　of　multiplicity：　driven　into　all　shapes；　becoming　all　things；　it　has　that　much　of　the　character　of　mass。　　　　　12。　It　is　the　corporeal；　then；　that　demands　magnitude：　the　Ideal…Forms　of　body　are　Ideas　installed　in　Mass。　　　　　But　these　Ideas　enter；　not　into　Magnitude　itself　but　into　some　subject　that　has　been　brought　to　Magnitude。　For　to　suppose　them　entering　into　Magnitude　and　not　into　Matter…　is　to　represent　them　as　being　either　without　Magnitude　and　without　Real…Existence　＇and　therefore　undistinguishable　from　the　Matter＇　or　not　Ideal…Forms　＇apt　to　body＇　but　Reason…Principles　＇utterly　removed＇　whose　sphere　could　only　be　Soul；　at　this；　there　would　be　no　such　thing　as　body　＇i。e。；　instead　of　Ideal…Forms　shaping　Matter　and　so　producing　body；　there　would　be　merely　Reason…Principles　dwelling　remote　in　Soul。＇　　　　　The　multiplicity　here　must　be　based　upon　some　unity　which；　since　it　has　been　brought　to　Magnitude；　must　be；　itself；　distinct　from　Magnitude。　Matter　is　the　base　of　Identity　to　all　that　is　composite：　once　each　of　the　constituents　comes　bringing　its　own　Matter　with　it；　there　is　no　need　of　any　other　base。　No　doubt　there　must　be　a　container；　as　it　were　a　place；　to　receive　what　is　to　enter；　but　Matter　and　even　body　precede　place　and　space；　the　primal　necessity；　in　order　to　the　existence　of　body；　is　Matter。　　　　　There　is　no　force　in　the　suggestion　that；　since　production　and　act　are　immaterial；　corporeal　entities　also　must　be　immaterial。　　　　　Bodies　are　compound；　actions　not。　Further；　Matter　does　in　some　sense　underlie　action；　it　supplies　the　substratum　to　the　doer：　it　is　permanently　within　him　though　it　does　not　enter　as　a　constituent　into　the　act　where；　indeed；　it　would　be　a　hindrance。　Doubtless；　one　act　does　not　change　into　another…　as　would　be　the　case　if　there　were　a　specific　Matter　of　actions…　but　the　doer　directs　himself　from　one　act　to　another　so　that　he　is　the　Matter；　himself；　to　his　varying　actions。　　　　　Matter；　in　sum；　is　necessary　to　quality　and　to　quantity；　and；　therefore；　to　body。　　　　　It　is；　thus；　no　name　void　of　content；　we　know　there　is　such　a　base；　invisible　and　without　bulk　though　it　be。　　　　　If　we　reject　it；　we　must　by　the　same　reasoning　reject　qualities　and　mass：　for　quality；　or　mass；　or　any　such　entity；　taken　by　itself　apart；　might　be　said　not　to　exist。　But　these　do　exist；　though　in　an　obscure　existence：　there　is　much　less　ground　for　rejecting　Matter；　however　it　lurk；　discerned　by　none　of　the　senses。　　　　　It　eludes　the　eye；　for　it　is　utterly　outside　of　colour：　it　is　not　heard；　for　it　is　no　sound：　it　is　no　flavour　or　savour　for　nostrils　or　palate：　can　it；　perhaps；　be　known　to　touch？　No：　for　neither　is　it　corporeal；　and　touch　deals　with　body；　which　is　known　by　being　solid；　fragile；　soft；　hard；　moist；　dry…　all　properties　utterly　lacking　in　Matter。　　　　　It　is　grasped　only　by　a　mental　process；　though　that　not　an　act　of　the　intellective　mind　but　a　reasoning　that　finds　no　subject；　and　so　it　stands　revealed　as　the　spurious　thing　it　has　been　called。　No　bodiliness　belongs　to　it；　bodiliness　is　itself　a　phase　of　Reason…Principle　and　so　is　something　different　from　Matter；　as　Matter；　therefore；　from　it：　bodiliness　already　operative　and　so　to　speak　made　concrete　would　be　body　manifest　and　not　Matter　unelaborated。　　　　　13。　Are　we　asked　to　accept　as　the　substratum　some　attribute　or　quality　present　to　all　the　elements　in　common？　　　　　Then；　first；　we　must　be　told　what　precise　attribute　this　is　and；　next；　how　an　attribute　can　be　a　substratum。　　　　　The　elements　are　sizeless；　and　how　conceive　an　attribute　where　there　is　neither　base　nor　bulk？　　　　　Again；　if　the　quality　possesses　determination；　it　is　not　Matter　the　undetermined；　and　anything　without　determination　is　not　a　quality　but　is　the　substratum…　the　very　Matter　we　are　seeking。　　　　　It　may　be　suggested　that　perhaps　this　absence　of　quality　means　simply　that；　of　its　own　nature；　it　has　no　participation　in　any　of　the　set　and　familiar　properties；　but　takes　quality　by　this　very　non…participation；　holding　thus　an　absolutely　individual　character；　marked　off　from　everything　else；　being　as　it　were　the　negation　of　those　others。　Deprivation；　we　will　be　told；　comports　quality：　a　blind　man　has　the　quality　of　his　lack　of　sight。　If　then…　it　will　be　urged…　Matter　exhibits　such　a　negation；　surely　it　has　a　quality；　all　the　more　so；　assuming　any　deprivation　to　be　a　quality；　in　that　here　the　deprivation　is　all　comprehensive。　　　　　But　this　notion　reduces　all　existence　to　qualified　things　or　qualities：　Quantity　itself　becomes　a　Quality　and　so　does　even　Existence。　Now　this　cannot　be：　if　such　things　as　Quantity　and　Existence　are　qualified；　they　are；　by　that　very　fact；　not　qualities：　Quality　is　an　addition　to　them；　we　must　not　commit　the　absurdity　of　giving　the　name　Quality　to　something　distinguishable　from　Quality；　something　therefore　that　is　not　Quality。　　　　　Is　it　suggested　that　its　mere　Alienism　is　a　quality　in　Matter？　　　　　If　this　Alienism　is　difference…absolute　＇the　abstract　entity＇　it　possesses　no　Quality：　absolute　Quality　cannot　be　itself　a　qualified　thing。　　　　　If　the　Alienism　is　to　be　understood　as　meaning　only　that　Matter　is　differentiated；　then　it　is　different　not　by　itself　＇since　it　is　certainly　not　an　absolute＇　but　by　this　Difference；　just　as　all　identical　objects　are　so　by　virtue　of　Identicalness　＇the　Absolute　principle　of　Identity＇。　　　　　An　absence　is　neither　a　Quality　nor　a　qualified　entity；　it　is　the　negation　of　a　Quality　or　of　something　else；　as　noiselessness　is　the　negation　of　noise　and　so　on。　A　lack　is　negative；　Quality　demands　something　positive。　The　distinctive　character　of　Matter　is　unshape；　the　lack　of　qualification　and　of　form；　surely　then　it　is　absurd　to　pretend　that　it　has　Quality　in　not　being　qualified；　that　is　like　saying　that　sizelessness　constitutes　a　certain　size。　　　　　The　distinctive　character　of　Matter；　then；　is　simply　its　manner　of　being…　not　something　definite　inserted　in　it　but；　rather　a　relation　towards　other　things；　the　relation　of　being　distinct　from　them。　　　　　Other　things　possess　something　besides　this　relation　of　Alienism：　their　form　makes　each　an　entity。　Matter　may　with　propriety　be　described　as　merely　alien；　perhaps；　even；　we　might　describe　it　as　〃The　Aliens；〃　for　the　singular　suggests　a　certain　definiteness　while　the　plural　would　indicate　the　absence　of　any　determination。　　　　　14。　But　is　Absence　this　privation　itself；　or　something　in　which　this　Privation　is　lodged？　　　　　Anyone　maintaining　that　Matter　and　Privation　are　one　and　the　same　in　substratum　but　stand　separable　in　reason　cannot　be　excused　from　assigning　to　each　the　precise　principle　which　distinguishes　it　in　reason　from　the　other：　that　which　defines　Matter　must　be　kept　quite　apart　from　that　defining　the　Privation　and　vice　versa。　　　　　There　are　three　possibilities：　Matter　is　not　in　Privation　and　Privation　is　not　in　Matter；　or　each　is　in　each；　or　each　is　in　itself　alone。　　　　　Now　if　they　should　stand　quite　apart；　neither　calling　for　the　other；　they　are　two　distinct　things：　Matter　is　something　other　than　Privation　even　though　Privation　always　goes　with　it：　into　the　principle　of　the　one；　the　other　cannot　enter　even　potentially。　　　　　If　their　relation　to　each　other　is　that　of　a　snubnose　to　snubness；　here　also　there　is　a　double　concept；　we　have　two　things。　　　　　If　they　stand　to　each　other　as　fire　to　heat…　heat　in　fire；　but　fire　not　included　in　the　concept　of　heat…　if　Matter　is　Privation　in　the　way　in　which　fire　is　heat；　then　the　Privation　is　a　form　under　which　Matter　appears　but　there　remains　a　base　distinct　from　the　Privation　and　this　base　must　be　the　Matter。　Here；　too；　they　are　not　one　thing。　　　　　Perhaps　the　identity　in　substance　with　differentiation　in　reason　will　be　defended　on　the　ground　that　Privation　does　not　point　to　something　present　but　precisely　to　an　absence；　to　something　absent；　to　the　negation　or　lack　of　Real…being：　the　case　would　be　like　that　of　the　affirmation　of　non…existence；　where　there　is　no　real　predication　but　simply　a　denial。　　　　　Is；　then；　this　Privation　simply　a　non…existence？　　　　　If　a　non…existence　in　the　sense　that　it　is　not　a　thing　of　Real…being；　but　belongs　to　some　other　Kind　of　existent；　we　have　still　two　Principles；　one　referring　directly　to　the　substratum；　the　other　merely　exhibiting　the　relation　of　the　Privation　to　other　things。　　　　　Or　we　might　say　that　the　one　concept　defines　the　relation　of　substratum　to　what　is　not　substratum；　while　that　of　Privation；　in　bringing　out　the　indeterminateness　of　Matter；　applies　to　the　Matter　in　itself：　but　this　still　makes　Privation　and　Matter　two　in　reason　though　one　in　substratum。　　　　　Now　if　Matter　possesses　an　identity…　though　only　the　identity　of　being　indeterminate；　unfixed　and　without　quality…　how　can　we　bring　it　so　under　two　principles？　　　　　15。　The　further　question；　therefore；　is　raised　whether　boundlessness　and　indetermination　are　things　lodging　in　something　other　than　thems