not a memory； it is a condition； something passively accepted： there is another faculty that was aware of the enjoyment and retains the memory of what has happened。 This is confirmed by the fact that many satisfactions which the desiring faculty has enjoyed are not retained in the memory： if memory resided in the desiring faculty； such forgetfulness could not be。 29。 Are we； then； to refer memory to the perceptive faculty and so make one principle of our nature the seat of both awareness and remembrance？ Now supposing the very Shade； as we were saying in the case of Hercules； has memory； then the perceptive faculty is twofold。 ＇（And if （on the same supposition） the faculty that remembers is not the faculty that perceives； but some other thing； then the remembering faculty is twofold。＇ And further if the perceptive faculty ＇= the memory＇ deals with matters learned ＇as well as with matters of observation and feeling＇ it will be the faculty for the processes of reason also： but these two orders certainly require two separate faculties。 Must we then suppose a common faculty of apprehension ＇one covering both sense perceptions and ideas＇ and assign memory in both orders to this？ The solution might serve if there were one and the same percipient for objects of sense and objects of the Intellectual…Kind； but if these stand in definite duality； then； for all we can say or do； we are left with two separate principles of memory； and； supposing each of the two orders of soul to possess both principles； then we have four。 And； on general grounds； what compelling reason is there that the principle by which we perceive should be the principle by which we remember； that these two acts should be vested in the one faculty？ Why must the seat of our intellectual action be also the seat of our remembrance of that action？ The most powerful thought does not always go with the readiest memory； people of equal perception are not equally good at remembering； some are especially gifted in perception； others； never swift to grasp； are strong to retain。 But； once more； admitting two distinct principles； something quite separate remembering what sense…perception has first known… still this something must have felt what it is required to remember？ No； we may well conceive that where there is to be memory of a sense…perception； this perception becomes a mere presentment； and that to this image…grasping power； a distinct thing； belongs the memory； the retention of the object： for in this imaging faculty the perception culminates； the impression passes away but the vision remains present to the imagination。 By the fact of harbouring the presentment of an object that has disappeared； the imagination is； at once； a seat of memory： where the persistence of the image is brief； the memory is poor； people of powerful memory are those in whom the image…holding power is firmer； not easily allowing the record to be jostled out of its grip。 Remembrance； thus； is vested in the imaging faculty； and memory deals with images。 Its differing quality or degree from man to man； we would explain by difference or similarity in the strength of the individual powers； by conduct like or unlike； by bodily conditions present or absent； producing change and disorder or not… a point this； however； which need not detain us here。 30。 But what of the memory of mental acts： do these also fall under the imaging faculty？ If every mental act is accompanied by an image we may well believe that this image； fixed and like a picture of the thought； would explain how we remember the object of knowledge once entertained。 But if there is no such necessary image； another solution must be sought。 Perhaps memory would be the reception； into the image…taking faculty； of the Reason…Principle which accompanies the mental conception： this mental conception… an indivisible thing； and one that never rises to the exterior of the consciousness… lies unknown below； the Reason…Principle the revealer； the bridge between the concept and the image…taking faculty exhibits the concept as in a mirror； the apprehension by the image…taking faculty would thus constitute the enduring presence of the concept； would be our memory of it。 This explains； also； another fact： the soul is unfailingly intent upon intellection； only when it acts upon this image…taking faculty does its intellection become a human perception： intellection is one thing； the perception of an intellection is another： we are continuously intuitive but we are not unbrokenly aware： the reason is that the recipient in us receives from both sides； absorbing not merely intellections but also sense…perceptions。 31。 But if each of the two phases of the soul； as we have said； possesses memory； and memory is vested in the imaging faculty； there must be two such faculties。 Now that is all very well as long as the two souls stand apart； but； when they are at one in us； what becomes of the two faculties； and in which of them is the imaging faculty vested？ If each soul has its own imaging faculty the images must in all cases be duplicated； since we cannot think that one faculty deals only with intellectual objects； and the other with objects of sense； a distinction which inevitably implies the co…existence in man of two life…principles utterly unrelated。 And if both orders of image act upon both orders of soul； what difference is there in the souls； and how does the fact escape our knowledge？ The answer is that； when the two souls chime each with each； the two imaging faculties no longer stand apart； the union is dominated by the more powerful of the faculties of the soul； and thus the image perceived is as one： the less powerful is like a shadow attending upon the dominant； like a minor light merging into a greater： when they are in conflict； in discord； the minor is distinctly apart； a self…standing thing… though its isolation is not perceived； for the simple reason that the separate being of the two souls escapes observation。 The two have run into a unity in which； yet； one is the loftier： this loftier knows all； when it breaks from the union； it retains some of the experiences of its companion； but dismisses others； thus we accept the talk of our less valued associates； but； on a change of company； we remember little from the first set and more from those in whom we recognize a higher quality。 32。 But the memory of friends； children； wife？ Country too； and all that the better sort of man may reasonably remember？ All these； the one ＇the lower man＇ retains with emotion； the authentic man passively： for the experience； certainly； was first felt in that lower phase from which； however； the best of such impressions pass over to the graver soul in the degree in which the two are in communication。 The lower soul must be always striving to attain to memory of the activities of the higher： this will be especially so when it is itself of a fine quality； for there will always be some that are better from the beginning and bettered here by the guidance of the higher。 The loftier； on the contrary； must desire to come to a happy forgetfulness of all that has reached it through the lower： for one reason； there is always the possibility that the very excellence of the lower prove detrimental to the higher； tending to keep it down by sheer force of vitality。 In any case the more urgent the intention towards the Supreme； the more extensive will be the soul's forgetfulness； unless indeed； when the entire living has； even here； been such that memory has nothing but the noblest to deal with： in this world itself； all is best when human interests have been held aloof； so； therefore； it must be with the memory of them。 In this sense we may truly say that the good soul is the forgetful。 It flees multiplicity； it seeks to escape the unbounded by drawing all to unity； for only thus is it free from entanglement； light…footed； self…conducted。 Thus it is that even in this world the soul which has the desire of the other is putting away； amid its actual life； all that is foreign to that order。 It brings there very little of what it has gathered here； as long as it is in the heavenly regions only； it will have more than it can retain。 The Hercules of the heavenly regions would still tell of his feats： but there is the other man to whom all of that is trivial； he has been translated to a holier place； he has won his way to the Intellectual Realm； he is more than Hercules； proven in the combats in which the combatants are the wise。 FOURTH TRACTATE。
PROBLEMS OF THE SOUL （2）。
1。 What； then； will be the Soul's discourse； what its memories in the Intellectual Realm； when at last it has won its way to that Essence？ Obviously from what we have been saying； it will be in contemplation of that order； and have its Act upon the things among which it now is； failing such Contemplation and Act； its being is not there。 Of things of earth it will know nothing； it will not； for example； remember an act of philosophic virtue； or even that in its earthly career it had contemplation of the Supreme。 When we seize anything in the direct intellectual act there is room for