lish the affirmative； but in 1789 Congress formally decided that； as the President was responsible for his actions； he ought not to be forced to employ agents who had forfeited his esteem。 See Kent's 〃Commentaries； vol。 i。 p。 289。＇ ＇Footnote r： ＇This comparison applied to the Constitutional King of France and to the powers he held under the Charter of 1830； till the overthrow of the monarchy in 1848。 … Translator's Note。＇＇
Nevertheless； the supremacy of public opinion is no less above the head of the one than of the other。 This power is less definite； less evident； and less sanctioned by the laws in France than in America； but in fact it exists。 In America； it acts by elections and decrees； in France it proceeds by revolutions； but notwithstanding the different constitutions of these two countries； public opinion is the predominant authority in both of them。 The fundamental principle of legislation … a principle essentially republican … is the same in both countries； although its consequences may be different； and its results more or less extensive。 Whence I am led to conclude that France with its King is nearer akin to a republic than the Union with its President is to a monarchy。
In what I have been saying I have only touched upon the main points of distinction； and if I could have entered into details； the contrast would have been rendered still more striking。 I have remarked that the authority of the President in the United States is only exercised within the limits of a partial sovereignty； whilst that of the King in France is undivided。 I might have gone on to show that the power of the King's government in France exceeds its natural limits； however extensive they may be； and penetrates in a thousand different ways into the administration of private interests。 Amongst the examples of this influence may be quoted that which results from the great number of public functionaries； who all derive their appointments from the Government。 This number now exceeds all previous limits； it amounts to 138；000 *s nominations； each of which may be considered as an element of power。 The President of the United States has not the exclusive right of making any public appointments； and their whole number scarcely exceeds 12；000。 *t
＇Footnote s： The sums annually paid by the State to these officers amount to 200；000；000 fr。 （40；000；000）。＇
＇Footnote t： This number is extracted from the 〃National Calendar〃 for 1833。 The 〃National Calendar〃 is an American almanac which contains the names of all the Federal officers。 It results from this comparison that the King of France has eleven times as many places at his disposal as the President； although the population of France is not much more than double that of the Union。
＇I have not the means of ascertaining the number of appointments now at the disposal of the President of the United States； but his patronage and the abuse of it have largely increased since 1833。 … Translator's Note； 1875。＇＇
Accidental Causes Which May Increase The Influence Of The Executive Government
External security of the Union … Army of six thousand men … Few ships … The President has no opportunity of exercising his great prerogatives … In the prerogatives he exercises he is weak。
If the executive government is feebler in America than in France； the cause is more attributable to the circumstances than to the laws of the country。
It is chiefly in its foreign relations that the executive power of a nation is called upon to exert its skill and its vigor。 If the existence of the Union were perpetually threatened； and if its chief interests were in daily connection with those of other powerful nations； the executive government would assume an increased importance in proportion to the measures expected of it； and those which it would carry into effect。 The President of the United States is the commander…in…chief of the army； but of an army composed of only six thousand men； he commands the fleet； but the fleet reckons but few sail； he conducts the foreign relations of the Union； but the United States are a nation without neighbors。 Separated from the rest of the world by the ocean； and too weak as yet to aim at the dominion of the seas； they have no enemies； and their interests rarely come into contact with those of any other nation of the globe。
The practical part of a Government must not be judged by the theory of its constitution。 The President of the United States is in the possession of almost royal prerogatives； which he has no opportunity of exercising； and those privileges which he can at present use are very circumscribed。 The laws allow him to possess a degree of influence which circumstances do not permit him to employ。
On the other hand； the great strength of the royal prerogative in France arises from circumstances far more than from the laws。 There the executive government is constantly struggling against prodigious obstacles； and exerting all its energies to repress them； so that it increases by the extent of its achievements； and by the importance of the events it controls； without modifying its constitution。 If the laws had made it as feeble and as circumscribed as it is in the Union； its influence would very soon become still more preponderant。
Why The President Of The United States Does Not Require The Majority Of The Two Houses In Order To Carry On The Government It is an established axiom in Europe that a constitutional King cannot persevere in a system of government which is opposed by the two other branches of the legislature。 But several Presidents of the United States have been known to lose the majority in the legislative body without being obliged to abandon the supreme power； and without inflicting a serious evil upon society。 I have heard this fact quoted as an instance of the independence and the power of the executive government in America： a moment's reflection will convince us； on the contrary； that it is a proof of its extreme weakness。
A King in Europe requires the support of the legislature to enable him to perform the duties imposed upon him by the Constitution； because those duties are enormous。 A constitutional King in Europe is not merely the executor of the law； but the execution of its provisions devolves so completely upon him that he has the power of paralyzing its influence if it opposes his designs。 He requires the assistance of the legislative assemblies to make the law； but those assemblies stand in need of his aid to execute it： these two authorities cannot subsist without each other； and the mechanism of government is stopped as soon as they are at variance。
In America the President cannot prevent any law from being passed； nor can he evade the obligation of enforcing it。 His sincere and zealous co…operation is no doubt useful； but it is not indispensable； in the carrying on of public affairs。 All his important acts are directly or indirectly submitted to the legislature； and of his own free authority he can do but little。 It is therefore his weakness； and not his power； which enables him to remain in opposition to Congress。 In Europe； harmony must reign between the Crown and the other branches of the legislature； because a collision between them may prove serious； in America； this harmony is not indispensable； because such a collision is impossible。
Election Of The President
Dangers of the elective system increase in proportion to the extent of the prerogative … This system possible in America because no powerful executive authority is required … What circumstances are favorable to the elective system … Why the election of the President does not cause a deviation from the principles of the Government … Influence of the election of the President on secondary functionaries。
The dangers of the system of election applied to the head of the executive government of a great people have been sufficiently exemplified by experience and by history； and the remarks I am about to make refer to America alone。 These dangers may be more or less formidable in proportion to the place which the executive power occupies； and to the importance it possesses in the State； and they may vary according to the mode of election and the circumstances in which the electors are placed。 The most weighty argument against the election of a chief magistrate is； that it offers so splendid a lure to private ambition； and is so apt to inflame men in the pursuit of power； that when legitimate means are wanting force may not unfrequently seize what right denied。
It is clear that the greater the privileges of the executive authority are； the greater is the temptation； the more the ambition of the candidates is excited； the more warmly are their interests espoused by a throng of partisans who hope to share the power when their patron has won the prize。 The dangers of the elective system increase； therefore； in the exact ratio of the influence exercised by the executive power in the affairs of State。 The revolutions of Poland were not solely attributable to the elective system in general； but to the fact that the elected monarch was the sovereign of a powerful kingdom。 Before we can discuss the absolute advantages of the elective system we must ma