poverty of language； in consequence of which they admit a double
sense； and； therefore； inevitably bring the practical laws into
ambiguity； and philosophy； which in employing them bees aware of
the different meanings in the same word； but can find no special
expressions for them； is driven to subtile distinctions about which
there is subsequently no unanimity； because the distinction could
not be directly marked by any suitable expression。*
*Besides this； the expression sub ratione boni is also ambiguous。
For it may mean： 〃We represent something to ourselves as good； when
and because we desire （will） it〃； or 〃We desire something because we
represent it to ourselves as good；〃 so that either the desire
determines the notion of the object as a good； or the notion of good
determines the desire （the will）； so that in the first case sub
ratione boni would mean； 〃We will something under the idea of the
good〃； in the second； 〃In consequence of this idea；〃 which； as
determining the volition； must precede it。
The German language has the good fortune to possess expressions
which do not allow this difference to be overlooked。 It possesses
two very distinct concepts and especially distinct expressions for
that which the Latins express by a single word； bonum。 For bonum it
has das Gute ＇good＇； and das Wohl ＇well； weal＇； for malum das Bose
＇evil＇； and das Ubel ＇ill； bad＇； or das Well ＇woe＇。 So that we express
two quite distinct judgements when we consider in an action the good
and evil of it； or our weal and woe （ill）。 Hence it already follows
that the above quoted psychological proposition is at least very
doubtful if it is translated： 〃We desire nothing except with a view to
our weal or woe〃； on the other hand； if we render it thus： 〃Under
the direction of reason we desire nothing except so far as we esteem
it good or evil；〃 it is indubitably certain and at the same time quite
clearly expressed。
Well or ill always implies only a reference to our condition； as
pleasant or unpleasant； as one of pleasure or pain； and if we desire
or avoid an object on this account； it is only so far as it is
referred to our sensibility and to the feeling of pleasure or pain
that it produces。 But good or evil always implies a reference to the
will； as determined by the law of reason； to make something its
object； for it is never determined directly by the object and the idea
of it； but is a faculty of taking a rule of reason for or motive of an
action （by which an object may be realized）。 Good and evil therefore
are properly referred to actions； not to the sensations of the person；
and if anything is to be good or evil absolutely （i。e。； in every
respect and without any further condition）； or is to be so esteemed；
it can only be the manner of acting； the maxim of the will； and
consequently the acting person himself as a good or evil man that
can be so called； and not a thing。
However； then； men may laugh at the Stoic； who in the severest
paroxysms of gout cried out： 〃Pain； however thou tormentest me； I will
never admit that thou art an evil （kakov； malum）〃： he was right。 A bad
thing it certainly was； and his cry betrayed that； but that any evil
attached to him thereby； this he bad no reason whatever to admit；
for pain did not in the least diminish the worth of his person； but
only that of his condition。 If he had been conscious of a single
lie； it would have lowered his pride； but pain served only to raise
it； when he was conscious that he had not deserved it by any
unrighteous action by which he had rendered himself worthy of
punishment。
What we call good must be an object of desire in the judgement of
every rational man； and evil an object of aversion in the eyes of
everyone； therefore； in addition to sense； this judgement requires
reason。 So it is with truthfulness； as opposed to lying； so with
justice； as opposed to violence； &c。 But we may call a thing a bad ＇or
ill） thing； which yet everyone must at the same time acknowledge to be
good； sometimes directly； sometimes indirectly。 The man who submits to
a surgical operation feels it no doubt as a bad thing； but by their
reason he and everyone acknowledge it to be good。 If a man who
delights in annoying and vexing peaceable people at last receives a
right good beating； this is no doubt a bad thing； but everyone
approves it and regards it as a good thing； even though nothing else
resulted from it； nay； even the man who receives it must in his reason
acknowledge that he has met justice； because he sees the proportion
between good conduct and good fortune； which reason inevitably
places before him； here put into practice。
No doubt our weal and woe are of very great importance in the
estimation of our practical reason； and as far as our nature as
sensible beings is concerned； our happiness is the only thing of
consequence； provided it is estimated as reason especially requires；
not by the transitory sensation； but by the influence that this has on
our whole existence； and on our satisfaction therewith； but it is
not absolutely the only thing of consequence。 Man is a being who； as
belonging to the world of sense； has wants； and so far his reason
has an office which it cannot refuse； namely； to attend to the
interest of his sensible nature； and to form practical maxims； even
with a view to the happiness of this life； and if possible even to
that of a future。 But he is not so pletely an animal as to be
indifferent to what reason says on its own account； and to use it
merely as an instrument for the satisfaction of his wants as a
sensible being。 For the possession of reason would not raise his worth
above that of the brutes； if it is to serve him only for the same
purpose that instinct serves in them； it would in that case be only
a particular method which nature had employed to equip man for the
same ends for which it has qualified brutes； without qualifying him
for any higher purpose。 No doubt once this arrangement of nature has
been made for him he requires reason in order to take into
consideration his weal and woe； but besides this he possesses it for a
higher purpose also； namely； not only to take into consideration
what is good or evil in itself； about which only pure reason；
uninfluenced by any sensible interest； can judge； but also to
distinguish this estimate thoroughly from the former and to make it
the supreme condition thereof。
In estimating what is good or evil in itself； as distinguished
from what can be so called only relatively； the following points are
to be considered。 Either a rational principle is already conceived； as
of itself the determining principle of the will； without regard to
possible objects of desire （and therefore by the more legislative form
of the maxim）； and in that case that principle is a practical a priori
law； and pure reason is supposed to be practical of itself。 The law in
that case determines the will directly； the action conformed to it
is good in itself； a will whose maxim always conforms to this law is
good absolutely in every respect and is the supreme condition of all
good。 Or the maxim of the will is consequent on a determining
principle of desire which presupposes an object of pleasure or pain；
something therefore that pleases or displeases； and the maxim of
reason that we should pursue the former and avoid the latter
determines our actions as good relatively to our inclination； that is；
good indirectly； i。e。； relatively to a different end to which they are
means）； and in that case these maxims can never be called laws； but
may be called rational practical precepts。 The end itself； the
pleasure that we seek； is in the latter case not a good but a welfare；
not a concept of reason； but an empirical concept of an object of
sensation； but the use of the means thereto； that is； the action； is
nevertheless called good （because rational deliberation is required
for it）； not however； good absolutely； but only relatively to our
sensuous nature； with regard to its feelings of pleasure and
displeasure； but the will whose maxim is affected thereby is not a
pure will； this is directed only to that in which pure reason by
itself can be practical。
This is the proper place to explain the paradox of method in a
critique of practical reason； namely； that the concept of good and
evil must not be determined before the moral law （of which it seems as
if it must be the foundation）； but only after it and by means of it。
In fact； even if we did not know that the principle of morality is a
pure a priori law determining the will； yet； that we may not assume
principles quite gratuitously； we must； at least at first； leave it
undecided； whether the will has merely empirical principles of
determination； or whether it has not also pure a priori principles；
for it is contrary to all rules of philosophical method to assume as
decided that which is the very point in question。 Supposing that we
wished to begin with the concept of good； in order to deduce from it
the laws of the will； then this concept of an object （as a good） would
at the same time assign to us this object as the sole determining
principle of the will。 Now； since this concept had not any p