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¡¡¡¡Table¡¡of¡¡the¡¡Categories¡¡of¡¡Freedom¡¡relatively¡¡to¡¡the¡¡Notions¡¡of¡¡Good
and¡¡Evil¡£

¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡I¡£¡¡QUANTITY¡£
¡¡¡¡¡¡Subjective£»¡¡according¡¡to¡¡maxims¡¡£¨practical¡¡opinions¡¡of¡¡the
¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡individual£©
¡¡¡¡¡¡Objective£»¡¡according¡¡to¡¡principles¡¡£¨Precepts£©
¡¡¡¡¡¡A¡¡priori¡¡both¡¡objective¡¡and¡¡subjective¡¡principles¡¡of¡¡freedom
¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡£¨laws£©

¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡II¡£¡¡QUALITY¡£
¡¡¡¡¡¡Practical¡¡rules¡¡of¡¡action¡¡£¨praeceptivae£©
¡¡¡¡¡¡Practical¡¡rules¡¡of¡¡omission¡¡£¨prohibitivae£©
¡¡¡¡¡¡Practical¡¡rules¡¡of¡¡exceptions¡¡£¨exceptivae£©

¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡III¡£¡¡RELATION¡£
¡¡¡¡¡¡To¡¡personality¡¡To¡¡the¡¡condition¡¡of¡¡the¡¡person¡£
¡¡¡¡¡¡Reciprocal£»¡¡of¡¡one¡¡person¡¡to¡¡the¡¡others¡¡of¡¡the¡¡others¡£

¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡IV¡£¡¡MODALITY¡£
¡¡¡¡¡¡The¡¡Permitted¡¡and¡¡the¡¡Forbidden
¡¡¡¡¡¡Duty¡¡and¡¡the¡¡contrary¡¡to¡¡duty¡£
¡¡¡¡¡¡Perfect¡¡and¡¡imperfect¡¡duty¡£

¡¡¡¡It¡¡will¡¡at¡¡once¡¡be¡¡observed¡¡that¡¡in¡¡this¡¡table¡¡freedom¡¡is¡¡considered
as¡¡a¡¡sort¡¡of¡¡causality¡¡not¡¡subject¡¡to¡¡empirical¡¡principles¡¡of
determination£»¡¡in¡¡regard¡¡to¡¡actions¡¡possible¡¡by¡¡it£»¡¡which¡¡are
phenomena¡¡in¡¡the¡¡world¡¡of¡¡sense£»¡¡and¡¡that¡¡consequently¡¡it¡¡is
referred¡¡to¡¡the¡¡categories¡¡which¡¡concern¡¡its¡¡physical¡¡possibility£»
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determining¡¡principle¡¡of¡¡that¡¡causality¡¡can¡¡be¡¡placed¡¡outside¡¡the
world¡¡of¡¡sense¡¡in¡¡freedom¡¡as¡¡a¡¡property¡¡of¡¡a¡¡being¡¡in¡¡the¡¡world¡¡of
intelligence£»¡¡and¡¡finally¡¡the¡¡categories¡¡of¡¡modality¡¡introduce¡¡the
transition¡¡from¡¡practical¡¡principles¡¡generally¡¡to¡¡those¡¡of¡¡morality£»
but¡¡only¡¡problematically¡£¡¡These¡¡can¡¡be¡¡established¡¡dogmatically¡¡only
by¡¡the¡¡moral¡¡law¡£
¡¡¡¡I¡¡add¡¡nothing¡¡further¡¡here¡¡in¡¡explanation¡¡of¡¡the¡¡present¡¡table£»
since¡¡it¡¡is¡¡intelligib
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