at the same time assign to us this object as the sole determining
principle of the will。 Now； since this concept had not any practical a
priori law for its standard； the criterion of good or evil could not
be placed in anything but the agreement of the object with our feeling
of pleasure or pain； and the use of reason could only consist in
determining in the first place this pleasure or pain in connexion with
all the sensations of my existence； and in the second place the
means of securing to myself the object of the pleasure。 Now； as
experience alone can decide what conforms to the feeling of
pleasure； and by hypothesis the practical law is to be based on this
as a condition； it follows that the possibility of a priori
practical laws would be at once excluded； because it was imagined to
be necessary first of all to find an object the concept of which； as a
good； should constitute the universal though empirical principle of
determination of the will。 But what it was necessary to inquire
first of all was whether there is not an a priori determining
principle of the will （and this could never be found anywhere but in a
pure practical law； in so far as this law prescribes to maxims
merely their form without regard to an object）。 Since； however； we
laid the foundation of all practical law in an object determined by
our conceptions of good and evil； whereas without a previous law
that object could not be conceived by empirical concepts； we have
deprived ourselves beforehand of the possibility of even conceiving
a pure practical law。 On the other hand； if we had first
investigated the latter analytically； we should have found that it
is not the concept of good as an object that determines the moral
law and makes it possible； but that； on the contrary； it is the
moral law that first determines the concept of good and makes it
possible； so far as it deserves the name of good absolutely。
This remark； which only concerns the method of ultimate ethical
inquiries； is of importance。 It explains at once the occasion of all
the mistakes of philosophers with respect to the supreme principle
of morals。 For they sought for an object of the will which they
could make the matter and principle of a law （which consequently could
not determine the will directly； but by means of that object
referred to the feeling of pleasure or pain； whereas they ought
first to have searched for a law that would determine the will a
priori and directly； and afterwards determine the object in accordance
with the will）。 Now； whether they placed this object of pleasure；
which was to supply the supreme conception of goodness； in
happiness； in perfection； in moral ＇feeling＇； or in the will of God；
their principle in every case implied heteronomy； and they must
inevitably e upon empirical conditions of a moral law； since
their object； which was to be the immediate principle of the will；
could not be called good or bad except in its immediate relation to
feeling； which is always empirical。 It is only a formal law… that
is； one which prescribes to reason nothing more than the form of its
universal legislation as the supreme condition of its maxims… that can
be a priori a determining principle of practical reason。 The
ancients avowed this error without concealment by directing all
their moral inquiries to the determination of the notion of the summum
bonum； which they intended afterwards to make the determining
principle of the will in the moral law； whereas it is only far
later； when the moral law has been first established for itself； and
shown to be the direct determining principle of the will； that this
object can be presented to the will； whose form is now determined a
priori； and this we shall undertake in the Dialectic of the pure
practical reason。 The moderns； with whom the question of the summum
bonum has gone out of fashion； or at least seems to have bee a
secondary matter； hide the same error under vague （expressions as in
many other cases）。 It shows itself； nevertheless； in their systems； as
it always produces heteronomy of practical reason； and from this can
never be derived a moral law giving universal mands。
Now； since the notions of good and evil； as consequences of the a
priori determination of the will； imply also a pure practical
principle； and therefore a causality of pure reason； hence they do not
originally refer to objects （so as to be； for instance； special
modes of the synthetic unity of the manifold of given intuitions in
one consciousness） like the pure concepts of the understanding or
categories of reason in its theoretic employment； on the contrary；
they presuppose that objects are given； but they are all modes
（modi） of a single category； namely； that of causality； the
determining principle of which consists in the rational conception
of a law； which as a law of freedom reason gives to itself； thereby
a priori proving itself practical。 However； as the actions on the
one side e under a law which is not a physical law； but a law of
freedom； and consequently belong to the conduct of beings in and
consequently the consequently belong to the beings in the world of
intelligence； yet on the other side as events in the world of sense
they belong to phenomena； hence the determinations of a practical
reason are only possible in reference to the latter and； therefore； in
accordance with the categories of the understanding； not indeed with a
view to any theoretic employment of it； i。e。； so as to bring the
manifold of （sensible） intuition under one consciousness a priori； but
only to subject the manifold of desires to the unity of
consciousness of a practical reason； giving it mands in the moral
law； i。e。； to a pure will a priori。
These categories of freedom… for so we choose to call them in
contrast to those theoretic categories which are categories of
physical nature… have an obvious advantage over the latter； inasmuch
as the latter are only forms of thought which designate objects in
an indefinite manner by means of universal concept of every possible
intuition； the former； on the contrary； refer to the determination
of a free elective will （to which indeed no exactly corresponding
intuition can be assigned； but which has as its foundation a pure
practical a priori law； which is not the case with any concepts
belonging to the theoretic use of our cognitive faculties）； hence；
instead of the form of intuition （space and time）； which does not
lie in reason itself； but has to be drawn from another source； namely；
the sensibility； these being elementary practical concepts have as
their foundation the form of a pure will； which is given in reason
and； therefore； in the thinking faculty itself。 From this it happens
that as all precepts of pure practical reason have to do only with the
determination of the will； not with the physical conditions （of
practical ability） of the execution of one's purpose； the practical
a priori principles in relation to the supreme principle of freedom
are at once cognitions； and have not to wait for intuitions in order
to acquire significance； and that for this remarkable reason；
because they themselves produce the reality of that to which they
refer （the intention of the will）； which is not the case with
theoretical concepts。 Only we must be careful to observe that these
categories only apply to the practical reason； and thus they proceed
in order from those which are as yet subject to sensible conditions
and morally indeterminate to those which are free from sensible
conditions and determined merely by the moral law。
Table of the Categories of Freedom relatively to the Notions of Good
and Evil。
I。 QUANTITY。
Subjective； according to maxims （practical opinions of the
individual）
Objective； according to principles （Precepts）
A priori both objective and subjective principles of freedom
（laws）
II。 QUALITY。
Practical rules of action （praeceptivae）
Practical rules of omission （prohibitivae）
Practical rules of exceptions （exceptivae）
III。 RELATION。
To personality To the condition of the person。
Reciprocal； of one person to the others of the others。
IV。 MODALITY。
The Permitted and the Forbidden
Duty and the contrary to duty。
Perfect and imperfect duty。
It will at once be observed that in this table freedom is considered
as a sort of causality not subject to empirical principles of
determination； in regard to actions possible by it； which are
phenomena in the world of sense； and that consequently it is
referred to the categories which concern its physical possibility；
whilst yet each category is taken so universally that the
determining principle of that causality can be placed outside the
world of sense in freedom as a property of a being in the world of
intelligence； and finally the categories of modality introduce the
transition from practical principles generally to those of morality；
but only problematically。 These can be established dogmatically only
by the moral law。
I add nothing further here in explanation of the present table；
since it is intelligib