of the pure practical law as a motive； but only the resistance to
motives of the sensibility。 But since the same law is objectively；
that is； in the conception of pure reason； an immediate principle of
determination of the will； and consequently this humiliation takes
place only relatively to the purity of the law； hence； the lowering of
the pretensions of moral self…esteem； that is； humiliation on the
sensible side； is an elevation of the moral； i。e。； practical； esteem
for the law itself on the intellectual side； in a word； it is
respect for the law； and therefore； as its cause is intellectual； a
positive feeling which can be known a priori。 For whatever
diminishes the obstacles to an activity furthers this activity itself。
Now the recognition of the moral law is the consciousness of an
activity of practical reason from objective principles； which only
fails to reveal its effect in actions because subjective
（pathological） causes hinder it。 Respect for the moral law then must
be regarded as a positive； though indirect； effect of it on feeling；
inasmuch as this respect weakens the impeding influence of
inclinations by humiliating selfesteem； and hence also as a subjective
principle of activity； that is； as a motive to obedience to the law；
and as a principle of the maxims of a life conformable to it。 From the
notion of a motive arises that of an interest； which can never be
attributed to any being unless it possesses reason； and which
signifies a motive of the will in so far as it is conceived by the
reason。 Since in a morally good will the law itself must be the
motive； the moral interest is a pure interest of practical reason
alone； independent of sense。 On the notion of an interest is based
that of a maxim。 This； therefore； is morally good only in case it
rests simply on the interest taken in obedience to the law。 All
three notions； however； that of a motive； of an interest； and of a
maxim； can be applied only to finite beings。 For they all suppose a
limitation of the nature of the being； in that the subjective
character of his choice does not of itself agree with the objective
law of a practical reason； they suppose that the being requires to
be impelled to action by something； because an internal obstacle
opposes itself。 Therefore they cannot be applied to the Divine will。
There is something so singular in the unbounded esteem for the
pure moral law； apart from all advantage； as it is presented for our
obedience by practical reason； the voice of which makes even the
boldest sinner tremble and pels him to hide himself from it； that
we cannot wonder if we find this influence of a mere intellectual idea
on the feelings quite inprehensible to speculative reason and
have to be satisfied with seeing so much of this a priori that such
a feeling is inseparably connected with the conception of the moral
law in every finite rational being。 If this feeling of respect were
pathological； and therefore were a feeling of pleasure based on the
inner sense； it would be in vain to try to discover a connection of it
with any idea a priori。 But ＇it＇ is a feeling that applies merely to
what is practical； and depends on the conception of a law； simply as
to its form； not on account of any object； and therefore cannot be
reckoned either as pleasure or pain； and yet produces an interest in
obedience to the law； which we call the moral interest； just as the
capacity of taking such an interest in the law （or respect for the
moral law itself） is properly the moral feeling。
The consciousness of a free submission of the will to the law； yet
bined with an inevitable constraint put upon all inclinations；
though only by our own reason； is respect for the law。 The law that
demands this respect and inspires it is clearly no other than the
moral （for no other precludes all inclinations from exercising any
direct influence on the will）。 An action which is objectively
practical according to this law； to the exclusion of every determining
principle of inclination； is duty； and this by reason of that
exclusion includes in its concept practical obligation； that is； a
determination to actions； however reluctantly they may be done。 The
feeling that arises from the consciousness of this obligation is not
pathological； as would be a feeling produced by an object of the
senses； but practical only； that is； it is made possible by a
preceding （objective） determination of the will and a causality of the
reason。 As submission to the law； therefore； that is； as a mand
（announcing constraint for the sensibly affected subject）； it contains
in it no pleasure； but on the contrary； so far； pain in the action。 On
the other hand； however； as this constraint is exercised merely by the
legislation of our own reason； it also contains something elevating；
and this subjective effect on feeling； inasmuch as pure practical
reason is the sole cause of it； may be called in this respect
self…approbation； since we recognize ourselves as determined thereto
solely by the law without any interest； and are now conscious of a
quite different interest subjectively produced thereby； and which is
purely practical and free； and our taking this interest in an action
of duty is not suggested by any inclination； but is manded and
actually brought about by reason through the practical law； whence
this feeling obtains a special name； that of respect。
The notion of duty； therefore； requires in the action；
objectively； agreement with the law； and； subjectively in its maxim；
that respect for the law shall be the sole mode in which the will is
determined thereby。 And on this rests the distinction between the
consciousness of having acted according to duty and from duty； that
is； from respect for the law。 The former （legality） is possible even
if inclinations have been the determining principles of the will；
but the latter （morality）； moral worth； can be placed only in this；
that the action is done from duty； that is； simply for the sake of the
law。*
*If we examine accurately the notion of respect for persons as it
has been already laid down； we shall perceive that it always rests
on the consciousness of a duty which an example shows us； and that
respect； therefore。 can never have any but a moral ground； and that it
is very good and even； in a psychological point of view； very useful
for the knowledge of mankind； that whenever we use this expression
we should attend to this secret and marvellous； yet often recurring；
regard which men in their judgement pay to the moral law。
It is of the greatest importance to attend with the utmost exactness
in all moral judgements to the subjective principle of all maxims；
that all the morality of actions may be placed in the necessity of
acting from duty and from respect for the law； not from love and
inclination for that which the actions are to produce。 For men and all
created rational beings moral necessity is constraint； that is
obligation； and every action based on it is to be conceived as a duty；
not as a proceeding previously pleasing； or likely to be Pleasing to
us of our own accord。 As if indeed we could ever bring it about that
without respect for the law； which implies fear； or at least
apprehension of transgression； we of ourselves； like the independent
Deity； could ever e into possession of holiness of will by the
coincidence of our will with the pure moral law being as it were
part of our nature； never to be shaken （in which case the law would
cease to be a mand for us； as we could never be tempted to be
untrue to it）。
The moral law is in fact for the will of a perfect being a law of
holiness； but for the will of every finite rational being a law of
duty； of moral constraint； and of the determination of its actions
by respect for this law and reverence for its duty。 No other
subjective principle must be assumed as a motive； else while the
action might chance to be such as the law prescribes； yet； as does not
proceed from duty； the intention； which is the thing properly in
question in this legislation； is not moral。
It is a very beautiful thing to do good to men from love to them and
from sympathetic good will； or to be just from love of order； but this
is not yet the true moral maxim of our conduct which is suitable to
our position amongst rational beings as men； when we pretend with
fanciful pride to set ourselves above the thought of duty； like
volunteers； and； as if we were independent on the mand； to want
to do of our own good pleasure what we think we need no mand to do。
We stand under a discipline of reason and in all our maxims must not
forget our subjection to it； nor withdraw anything therefrom； or by an
egotistic presumption diminish aught of the authority of the law
（although our own reason gives it） so as to set the determining
principle of our will； even though the law be conformed to； anywhere
else but in the law itself and in respect for this law。 Duty and
obligation are the only names that we must give to our relation to the
moral law。 We are indeed legislative members of a moral kingdom
rendered possible by freedom； and presented to us by reason as an
object of respect； but yet we are subjects in it