《the+critique+of+practical+reason》

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the+critique+of+practical+reason- 第21部分


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rendered possible by freedom; and presented to us by reason as an
object of respect; but yet we are subjects in it; not the sovereign;
and to mistake our inferior position as creatures; and
presumptuously to reject the authority of the moral law; is already to
revolt from it in spirit; even though the letter of it is fulfilled。
  With this agrees very well the possibility of such a mand as:
Love God above everything; and thy neighbour as thyself。* For as a
mand it requires respect for a law which mands love and does not
leave it to our own arbitrary choice to make this our principle。
Love to God; however; considered as an inclination (pathological
love); is impossible; for He is not an object of the senses。 The
same affection towards men is possible no doubt; but cannot be
manded; for it is not in the power of any man to love anyone at
mand; therefore it is only practical love that is meant in that
pith of all laws。 To love God means; in this sense; to like to do
His mandments; to love one's neighbour means to like to practise
all duties towards him。 But the mand that makes this a rule
cannot mand us to have this disposition in actions conformed to
duty; but only to endeavour after it。 For a mand to like to do a
thing is in itself contradictory; because if we already know of
ourselves what we are bound to do; and if further we are conscious
of liking to do it; a mand would be quite needless; and if we do it
not willingly; but only out of respect for the law; a mand that
makes this respect the motive of our maxim would directly counteract
the disposition manded。 That law of all laws; therefore; like all
the moral precepts of the Gospel; exhibits the moral disposition in
all its perfection; in which; viewed as an ideal of holiness; it is
not attainable by any creature; but yet is the pattern which we should
strive to approach; and in an uninterrupted but infinite progress
bee like to。 In fact; if a rational creature could ever reach
this point; that he thoroughly likes to do all moral laws; this
would mean that there does not exist in him even the possibility of
a desire that would tempt him to deviate from them; for to overe
such a desire always costs the subject some sacrifice and therefore
requires self…pulsion; that is; inward constraint to something that
one does not quite like to do; and no creature can ever reach this
stage of moral disposition。 For; being a creature; and therefore
always dependent with respect to what be requires for plete
satisfaction; he can never be quite free from desires and
inclinations; and as these rest on physical causes; they can never
of themselves coincide with the moral law; the sources of which are
quite different; and therefore they make it necessary to found the
mental disposition of one's maxims on moral obligation; not on ready
inclination; but on respect; which demands obedience to the law;
even though one may not like it; not on love; which apprehends no
inward reluctance of the will towards the law。 Nevertheless; this
latter; namely; love to the law (which would then cease to be a
mand; and then morality; which would have passed subjectively
into holiness; would cease to be virtue) must be the constant though
unattainable goal of his endeavours。 For in the case of what we highly
esteem; but yet (on account of the consciousness of our weakness)
dread; the increased facility of satisfying it changes the most
reverential awe into inclination; and respect into love; at least this
would be the perfection of a disposition devoted to the law; if it
were possible for a creature to attain it。

  *This law is in striking contrast with the principle of private
happiness which some make the supreme principle of morality。 This
would be expressed thus: Love thyself above everything; and God and
thy neighbour for thine own sake。

  This reflection is intended not so much to clear up the
evangelical mand just cited; in order to prevent religious
fanaticism in regard to love of God; but to define accurately the
moral disposition with regard directly to our duties towards men;
and to check; or if possible prevent; a merely moral fanaticism
which infects many persons。 The stage of morality on which man (and;
as far as we can see; every rational creature) stands is respect for
the moral law。 The disposition that he ought to have in obeying this
is to obey it from duty; not from spontaneous inclination; or from
an endeavour taken up from liking and unbidden; and this proper
moral condition in which he can always be is virtue; that is; moral
disposition militant; and not holiness in the fancied possession of
a perfect purity of the disposition of the will。 It is nothing but
moral fanaticism and exaggerated self…conceit that is infused into the
mind by exhortation to actions as noble; sublime; and magnanimous;
by which men are led into the delusion that it is not duty; that is;
respect for the law; whose yoke (an easy yoke indeed; because reason
itself imposes it on us) they must bear; whether they like it or
not; that constitutes the determining principle of their actions;
and which always humbles them while they obey it; fancying that
those actions are expected from them; not from duty; but as pure
merit。 For not only would they; in imitating such deeds from such a
principle; not have fulfilled the spirit of the law in the least;
which consists not in the legality of the action (without regard to
principle); but in the subjection of the mind to the law; not only
do they make the motives pathological (seated in sympathy or
self…love); not moral (in the law); but they produce in this way a
vain; high…flying; fantastic way of thinking; flattering themselves
with a spontaneous goodness of heart that needs neither spur nor
bridle; for which no mand is needed; and thereby forgetting their
obligation; which they ought to think of rather than merit。 Indeed
actions of others which are done with great sacrifice; and merely
for the sake of duty; may be praised as noble and sublime; but only so
far as there are traces which suggest that they were done wholly out
of respect for duty and not from excited feelings。 If these;
however; are set before anyone as examples to be imitated; respect for
duty (which is the only true moral feeling) must be employed as the
motive… this severe holy precept which never allows our vain self…love
to dally with pathological impulses (however analogous they may be
to morality); and to take a pride in meritorious worth。 Now if we
search we shall find for all actions that are worthy of praise a law
of duty which mands; and does not leave us to choose what may be
agreeable to our inclinations。 This is the only way of representing
things that can give a moral training to the soul; because it alone is
capable of solid and accurately defined principles。
  If fanaticism in its most general sense is a deliberate over
stepping of the limits of human reason; then moral fanaticism is
such an over stepping of the bounds that practical pure reason sets to
mankind; in that it forbids us to place the subjective determining
principle of correct actions; that is; their moral motive; in anything
but the law itself; or to place the disposition which is thereby
brought into the maxims in anything but respect for this law; and
hence mands us to take as the supreme vital principle of all
morality in men the thought of duty; which strikes down all
arrogance as well as vain self…love。
  If this is so; it is not only writers of romance or sentimental
educators (although they may be zealous opponents of
sentimentalism); but sometimes even philosophers; nay; even the
severest of all; the Stoics; that have brought in moral fanaticism
instead of a sober but wise moral discipline; although the
fanaticism of the latter was more heroic; that of the former of an
insipid; effeminate character; and we may; without hypocrisy; say of
the moral teaching of the Gospel; that it first; by the purity of
its moral principle; and at the same time by its suitability to the
limitations of finite beings; brought all the good conduct of men
under the discipline of a duty plainly set before their eyes; which
does not permit them to indulge in dreams of imaginary moral
perfections; and that it also set the bounds of humility (that is;
self…knowledge) to self…conceit as well as to self…love; both which
are ready to mistake their limits。
  Duty! Thou sublime and mighty name that dost embrace nothing
charming or insinuating; but requirest submission; and yet seekest not
to move the will by threatening aught that would arouse natural
aversion or terror; but merely holdest forth a law which of itself
finds entrance into the mind; and yet gains reluctant reverence
(though not always obedience); a law before which all inclinations are
dumb; even though they secretly counter…work it; what origin is
there worthy of thee; and where is to be found the root of thy noble
descent which proudly rejects all kindred with the inclinations; a
root to be derived from which is the indispensable condition of the
only worth which men can give themselves?
  It can be nothing less than a power which elevates man above himself
(as a
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