only worth which men can give themselves？
It can be nothing less than a power which elevates man above himself
（as a part of the world of sense）； a power which connects him with
an order of things that only the understanding can conceive； with a
world which at the same time mands the whole sensible world； and
with it the empirically determinable existence of man in time； as well
as the sum total of all ends （which totality alone suits such
unconditional practical laws as the moral）。 This power is nothing
but personality； that is； freedom and independence on the mechanism of
nature； yet； regarded also as a faculty of a being which is subject to
special laws； namely； pure practical laws given by its own reason；
so that the person as belonging to the sensible world is subject to
his own personality as belonging to the intelligible ＇supersensible＇
world。 It is then not to be wondered at that man； as belonging to both
worlds； must regard his own nature in reference to its second and
highest characteristic only with reverence； and its laws with the
highest respect。
On this origin are founded many expressions which designate the
worth of objects according to moral ideas。 The moral law is holy
（inviolable）。 Man is indeed unholy enough； but he must regard humanity
in his own person as holy。 In all creation every thing one chooses and
over which one has any power； may be used merely as means； man
alone； and with him every rational creature； is an end in himself。
By virtue of the autonomy of his freedom he is the subject of the
moral law； which is holy。 just for this reason every will； even
every person's own individual will； in relation to itself； is
restricted to the condition of agreement with the autonomy of the
rational being； that is to say； that it is not to be subject to any
purpose which cannot accord with a law which might arise from the will
of the passive subject himself； the latter is； therefore； never to
be employed merely as means； but as itself also； concurrently； an end。
We justly attribute this condition even to the Divine will； with
regard to the rational beings in the world； which are His creatures；
since it rests on their personality； by which alone they are ends in
themselves。
This respect…inspiring idea of personality which sets before our
eyes the sublimity of our nature （in its higher aspect）； while at
the same time it shows us the want of accord of our conduct with it
and thereby strikes down self…conceit； is even natural to the
monest reason and easily observed。 Has not every even moderately
honourable man sometimes found that； where by an otherwise inoffensive
lie he might either have withdrawn himself from an unpleasant
business； or even have procured some advantages for a loved and
well…deserving friend； he has avoided it solely lest he should despise
himself secretly in his own eyes？ When an upright man is in the
greatest distress； which he might have avoided if he could only have
disregarded duty； is he not sustained by the consciousness that he has
maintained humanity in its proper dignity in his own person and
honoured it； that he has no reason to be ashamed of himself in his own
sight； or to dread the inward glance of self…examination？ This
consolation is not happiness； it is not even the smallest part of
it； for no one would wish to have occasion for it； or would；
perhaps； even desire a life in such circumstances。 But he lives； and
he cannot endure that he should be in his own eyes unworthy of life。
This inward peace is therefore merely negative as regards what can
make life pleasant； it is； in fact； only the escaping the danger of
sinking in personal worth； after everything else that is valuable
has been lost。 It is the effect of a respect for something quite
different from life； something in parison and contrast with which
life with all its enjoyment has no value。 He still lives only
because it is his duty； not because he finds anything pleasant in
life。
Such is the nature of the true motive of pure practical reason； it
is no other than the pure moral law itself； inasmuch as it makes us
conscious of the sublimity of our own supersensible existence and
subjectively produces respect for their higher nature in men who are
also conscious of their sensible existence and of the consequent
dependence of their pathologically very susceptible nature。 Now with
this motive may be bined so many charms and satisfactions of life
that even on this account alone the most prudent choice of a
rational Epicurean reflecting on the greatest advantage of life
would declare itself on the side of moral conduct； and it may even
be advisable to join this prospect of a cheerful enjoyment of life
with that supreme motive which is already sufficient of itself； but
only as a counterpoise to the attractions which vice does not fail
to exhibit on the opposite side； and not so as； even in the smallest
degree； to place in this the proper moving power when duty is in
question。 For that would be just the same as to wish to taint the
purity of the moral disposition in its source。 The majesty of duty has
nothing to do with enjoyment of life； it has its special law and its
special tribunal； and though the two should be never so well shaken
together to be given well mixed； like medicine； to the sick soul；
yet they will soon separate of themselves； and if they do not； the
former will not act； and although physical life might gain somewhat in
force； the moral life would fade away irrecoverably。
Critical Examination of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason。
By the critical examination of a science； or of a portion of it；
which constitutes a system by itself； I understand the inquiry and
proof why it must have this and no other systematic form； when we
pare it with another system which is based on a similar faculty
of knowledge。 Now practical and speculative reason are based on the
same faculty； so far as both are pure reason。 Therefore the difference
in their systematic form must be determined by the parison of both；
and the ground of this must be assigned。
The Analytic of pure theoretic reason had to do with the knowledge
of such objects as may have been given to the understanding； and was
obliged therefore to begin from intuition and consequently （as this is
always sensible） from sensibility； and only after that could advance
to concepts （of the objects of this intuition）； and could only end
with principles after both these had preceded。 On the contrary；
since practical reason has not to do with objects so as to know
them； but with its own faculty of realizing them （in accordance with
the knowledge of them）； that is； with a will which is a causality；
inasmuch as reason contains its determining principle； since；
consequently； it has not to furnish an object of intuition； but as
practical reason has to furnish only a law （because the notion of
causality always implies the reference to a law which determines the
existence of the many in relation to one another）； hence a critical
examination of the Analytic of reason； if this is to be practical
reason （and this is properly the problem）； must begin with the
possibility of practical principles a priori。 Only after that can it
proceed to concepts of the objects of a practical reason； namely；
those of absolute good and evil； in order to assign them in accordance
with those principles （for prior to those principles they cannot
possibly be given as good and evil by any faculty of knowledge）； and
only then could the section be concluded with the last chapter；
that； namely； which treats of the relation of the pure practical
reason to the sensibility and of its necessary influence thereon；
which is a priori cognisable； that is； of the moral sentiment。 Thus
the Analytic of the practical pure reason has the whole extent of
the conditions of its use in mon with the theoretical； but in
reverse order。 The Analytic of pure theoretic reason was divided
into transcendental Aesthetic and transcendental Logic； that of the
practical reversely into Logic and Aesthetic of pure practical
reason （if I may； for the sake of analogy merely； use these
designations； which are not quite suitable）。 This logic again was
there divided into the Analytic of concepts and that of principles：
here into that of principles and concepts。 The Aesthetic also had in
the former case two parts； on account of the two kinds of sensible
intuition； here the sensibility is not considered as a capacity of
intuition at all； but merely as feeling （which can be a subjective
ground of desire）； and in regard to it pure practical reason admits no
further division。
It is also easy to see the reason why this division into two parts
with its subdivision was not actually adopted here （as one might
have been induced to attempt by the example of the former critique）。
For since it is pure reason that is here considered in its practical
use； and consequently as proceeding from a priori principles； and
not from empirical principles of determination； hence the division
of the analytic of pure practical reason must resemble that of a
syllogism； namely； proceeding from the universal in the major
premiss （the moral pr