things in themselves （which is the mon view）； then it is impossible
to reconcile the necessity of the causal relation with freedom； they
are contradictory。 For from the former it follows that every event；
and consequently every action that takes place at a certain point of
time； is a necessary result of what existed in time preceding。 Now
as time past is no longer in my power； hence every action that I
perform must be the necessary result of certain determining grounds
which are not in my power； that is； at the moment in which I am acting
I am never free。 Nay； even if I assume that my whole existence is
independent on any foreign cause （for instance； God）； so that the
determining principles of my causality； and even of my whole
existence； were not outside myself； yet this would not in the least
transform that physical necessity into freedom。 For at every moment of
time I am still under the necessity of being determined to action by
that which is not in my power； and the series of events infinite a
parte priori； which I only continue according to a pre…determined
order and could never begin of myself； would be a continuous
physical chain； and therefore my causality would never be freedom。
If； then； we would attribute freedom to a being whose existence is
determined in time； we cannot except him from the law of necessity
as to all events in his existence and； consequently； as to his actions
also； for that would be to hand him over to blind chance。 Now as
this law inevitably applies to all the causality of things； so far
as their existence is determinable in time； it follows that if this
were the mode in which we had also to conceive the existence of
these things in themselves； freedom must be rejected as a vain and
impossible conception。 Consequently； if we would still save it； no
other way remains but to consider that the existence of a thing； so
far as it is determinable in time； and therefore its causality；
according to the law of physical necessity； belong to appearance；
and to attribute freedom to the same being as a thing in itself。
This is certainly inevitable； if we would retain both these
contradictory concepts together； but in application； when we try to
explain their bination in one and the same action； great
difficulties present themselves which seem to render such a
bination impracticable。
When I say of a man who mits a theft that； by the law of
causality； this deed is a necessary result of the determining causes
in preceding time； then it was impossible that it could not have
happened； how then can the judgement； according to the moral law； make
any change； and suppose that it could have been omitted； because the
law says that it ought to have been omitted； that is； how can a man be
called quite free at the same moment； and with respect to the same
action in which he is subject to an inevitable physical necessity？
Some try to evade this by saying that the causes that determine his
causality are of such a kind as to agree with a parative notion
of freedom。 According to this； that is sometimes called a free effect；
the determining physical cause of which lies within the acting thing
itself； e。g。； that which a projectile performs when it is in free
motion； in which case we use the word freedom； because while it is
in flight it is not urged by anything external； or as we call the
motion of a clock a free motion； because it moves its hands itself；
which therefore do not require to be pushed by external force； so
although the actions of man are necessarily determined by causes which
precede in time； we yet call them free； because these causes are ideas
produced by our own faculties； whereby desires are evoked on
occasion of circumstances； and hence actions are wrought according
to our own pleasure。 This is a wretched subterfuge with which some
persons still let themselves be put off； and so think they have
solved； with a petty word… jugglery； that difficult problem； at the
solution of which centuries have laboured in vain； and which can
therefore scarcely be found so pletely on the surface。 In fact；
in the question about the freedom which must be the foundation of
all moral laws and the consequent responsibility； it does not matter
whether the principles which necessarily determine causality by a
physical law reside within the subject or without him； or in the
former case whether these principles are instinctive or are
conceived by reason； if； as is admitted by these men themselves； these
determining ideas have the ground of their existence in time and in
the antecedent state； and this again in an antecedent； etc。 Then it
matters not that these are internal； it matters not that they have a
psychological and not a mechanical causality； that is； produce actions
by means of ideas and not by bodily movements； they are still
determining principles of the causality of a being whose existence
is determinable in time； and therefore under the necessitation of
conditions of past time； which therefore； when the subject has to act；
are no longer in his power。 This may imply psychological freedom （if
we choose to apply this term to a merely internal chain of ideas in
the mind）； but it involves physical necessity and； therefore； leaves
no room for transcendental freedom； which must be conceived as
independence on everything empirical； and； consequently； on nature
generally； whether it is an object of the internal sense considered in
time only； or of the external in time and space。 Without this
freedom （in the latter and true sense）； which alone is practical a
priori； no moral law and no moral imputation are possible。 just for
this reason the necessity of events in time； according to the physical
law of causality； may be called the mechanism of nature； although we
do not mean by this that things which are subject to it must be really
material machines。 We look here only to the necessity of the
connection of events in a time…series as it is developed according
to the physical law； whether the subject in which this development
takes place is called automaton materiale when the mechanical being is
moved by matter； or with Leibnitz spirituale when it is impelled by
ideas； and if the freedom of our will were no other than the latter
（say the psychological and parative； not also transcendental；
that is； absolute）； then it would at bottom be nothing better than the
freedom of a turnspit； which； when once it is wound up； acplishes
its motions of itself。
Now； in order to remove in the supposed case the apparent
contradiction between freedom and the mechanism of nature in one and
the same action； we must remember what was said in the Critique of
Pure Reason； or what follows therefrom； viz。； that the necessity of
nature； which cannot co…exist with the freedom of the subject；
appertains only to the attributes of the thing that is subject to
time…conditions； consequently only to those of the acting subject as a
phenomenon； that therefore in this respect the determining
principles of every action of the same reside in what belongs to
past time and is no longer in his power （in which must be included his
own past actions and the character that these may determine for him in
his own eyes as a phenomenon）。 But the very same subject； being on the
other side conscious of himself as a thing in himself； considers his
existence also in so far as it is not subject to time…conditions；
and regards himself as only determinable by laws which he gives
himself through reason； and in this his existence nothing is
antecedent to the determination of his will； but every action； and
in general every modification of his existence； varying according to
his internal sense； even the whole series of his existence as a
sensible being is in the consciousness of his supersensible
existence nothing but the result； and never to be regarded as the
determining principle； of his causality as a noumenon。 In this view
now the rational being can justly say of every unlawful action that he
performs； that he could very well have left it undone； although as
appearance it is sufficiently determined in the past； and in this
respect is absolutely necessary； for it； with all the past which
determines it； belongs to the one single phenomenon of his character
which he makes for himself； in consequence of which he imputes the
causality of those appearances to himself as a cause independent of
sensibility。
With this agree perfectly the judicial sentences of that wonderful
faculty in us which we call conscience。 A man may use as much art as
he likes in order to paint to himself an unlawful act； that he
remembers； as an unintentional error； a mere oversight； such as one
can never altogether avoid； and therefore as something in which he was
carried away by the stream of physical necessity； and thus to make
himself out innocent； yet he finds that the advocate who speaks in his
favour can by no means silence the accuser within； if only he is
conscious that at the time when he did this wrong he was in his
senses； that is； in possession of his freedom； and； nevertheless； he
accounts for his error from some bad habits； which by gradual
neglect of attention he has allowed