might occasion needless disputes if we did not attend to it。 The
summum may mean either the supreme （supremum） or the perfect
（consummatum）。 The former is that condition which is itself
unconditioned； i。e。； is not subordinate to any other （originarium）；
the second is that whole which is not a part of a greater whole of the
same kind （perfectissimum）。 It has been shown in the Analytic that
virtue （as worthiness to be happy） is the supreme condition of all
that can appear to us desirable； and consequently of all our pursuit
of happiness； and is therefore the supreme good。 But it does not
follow that it is the whole and perfect good as the object of the
desires of rational finite beings； for this requires happiness also；
and that not merely in the partial eyes of the person who makes
himself an end； but even in the judgement of an impartial reason；
which regards persons in general as ends in themselves。 For to need
happiness； to deserve it； and yet at the same time not to
participate in it； cannot be consistent with the perfect volition of a
rational being possessed at the same time of all power； if； for the
sake of experiment； we conceive such a being。 Now inasmuch as virtue
and happiness together constitute the possession of the summum bonum
in a person； and the distribution of happiness in exact proportion
to morality （which is the worth of the person； and his worthiness to
be happy） constitutes the summum bonum of a possible world； hence this
summum bonum expresses the whole； the perfect good； in which； however；
virtue as the condition is always the supreme good； since it has no
condition above it； whereas happiness； while it is pleasant to the
possessor of it； is not of itself absolutely and in all respects good；
but always presupposes morally right behaviour as its condition。
When two elements are necessarily united in one concept； they must
be connected as reason and consequence； and this either so that
their unity is considered as analytical （logical connection）； or as
synthetical （real connection） the former following the law of
identity； the latter that of causality。 The connection of virtue and
happiness may therefore be understood in two ways： either the
endeavour to be virtuous and the rational pursuit of happiness are not
two distinct actions； but absolutely identical； in which case no maxim
need be made the principle of the former； other than what serves for
the latter； or the connection consists in this； that virtue produces
happiness as something distinct from the consciousness of virtue； as a
cause produces an effect。
The ancient Greek schools were； properly speaking； only two； and
in determining the conception of the summum bonum these followed in
fact one and the same method； inasmuch as they did not allow virtue
and happiness to be regarded as two distinct elements of the summum
bonum； and consequently sought the unity of the principle by the
rule of identity； but they differed as to which of the two was to be
taken as the fundamental notion。 The Epicurean said： 〃To be
conscious that one's maxims lead to happiness is virtue〃； the Stoic
said： 〃To be conscious of one's virtue is happiness。〃 With the former；
Prudence was equivalent to morality； with the latter； who chose a
higher designation for virtue； morality alone was true wisdom。
While we must admire the men who in such early times tried all
imaginable ways of extending the domain of philosophy； we must at
the same time lament that their acuteness was unfortunately misapplied
in trying to trace out identity between two extremely heterogeneous
notions； those of happiness and virtue。 But it agrees with the
dialectical spirit of their times （and subtle minds are even now
sometimes misled in the same way） to get rid of irreconcilable
differences in principle by seeking to change them into a mere contest
about words； and thus apparently working out the identity of the
notion under different names； and this usually occurs in cases where
the bination of heterogeneous principles lies so deep or so high；
or would require so plete a transformation of the doctrines assumed
in the rest of the philosophical system； that men are afraid to
penetrate deeply into the real difference and prefer treating it as
a difference in questions of form。
While both schools sought to trace out the identity of the practical
principles of virtue and happiness； they were not agreed as to the way
in which they tried to force this identity； but were separated
infinitely from one another； the one placing its principle on the side
of sense； the other on that of reason； the one in the consciousness of
sensible wants； the other in the independence of practical reason on
all sensible grounds of determination。 According to the Epicurean； the
notion of virtue was already involved in the maxim： 〃To promote
one's own happiness〃； according to the Stoics； on the other hand；
the feeling of happiness was already contained in the consciousness of
virtue。 Now whatever is contained in another notion is identical
with part of the containing notion； but not with the whole； and
moreover two wholes may be specifically distinct； although they
consist of the same parts； namely if the parts are united into a whole
in totally different ways。 The Stoic maintained that the virtue was
the whole summum bonum； and happiness only the consciousness of
possessing it； as making part of the state of the subject。 The
Epicurean maintained that happiness was the whole summum bonum； and
virtue only the form of the maxim for its pursuit； viz。； the
rational use of the means for attaining it。
Now it is clear from the Analytic that the maxims of virtue and
those of private happiness are quite heterogeneous as to their supreme
practical principle； and； although they belong to one summum bonum
which together they make possible； yet they are so far from coinciding
that they restrict and check one another very much in the same
subject。 Thus the question： 〃How is the summum bonum practically
possible？〃 still remains an unsolved problem； notwithstanding all
the attempts at coalition that have hitherto been made。 The Analytic
has； however； shown what it is that makes the problem difficult to
solve； namely； that happiness and morality are two specifically
distinct elements of the summum bonum and； therefore； their
bination cannot be analytically cognised （as if the man that
seeks his own happiness should find by mere analysis of his conception
that in so acting he is virtuous； or as if the man that follows virtue
should in the consciousness of such conduct find that he is already
happy ipso facto）； but must be a synthesis of concepts。 Now since this
bination is recognised as a priori； and therefore as practically
necessary； and consequently not as derived from experience； so that
the possibility of the summum bonum does not rest on any empirical
principle； it follows that the deduction ＇legitimation＇ of this
concept must be transcendental。 It is a priori （morally） necessary
to produce the summum bonum by freedom of will： therefore the
condition of its possibility must rest solely on a priori principles
of cognition。
I。 The Antinomy of Practical Reason。
In the summum bonum which is practical for us； i。e。； to be
realized by our will； virtue and happiness are thought as
necessarily bined； so that the one cannot be assumed by pure
practical reason without the other also being attached to it。 Now this
bination （like every other） is either analytical or synthetical。 It
bas been shown that it cannot be analytical； it must then be
synthetical and； more particularly； must be conceived as the
connection of cause and effect； since it concerns a practical good；
i。e。； one that is possible by means of action； consequently either the
desire of happiness must be the motive to maxims of virtue； or the
maxim of virtue must be the efficient cause of happiness。 The first is
absolutely impossible； because （as was proved in the Analytic）
maxims which place the determining principle of the will in the desire
of personal happiness are not moral at all； and no virtue can be
founded on them。 But the second is also impossible； because the
practical connection of causes and effects in the world； as the result
of the determination of the will； does not depend upon the moral
dispositions of the will； but on the knowledge of the laws of nature
and the physical power to use them for one's purposes； consequently we
cannot expect in the world by the most punctilious observance of the
moral laws any necessary connection of happiness with virtue
adequate to the summum bonum。 Now； as the promotion of this summum
bonum； the conception of which contains this connection； is a priori a
necessary object of our will and inseparably attached to the moral
law； the impossibility of the former must prove the falsity of the
latter。 If then the supreme good is not possible by practical rules；
then the moral law also which mands us to promote it is directed to
vain imaginary ends and must consequently be false。
II。 Critical Solution of the Antinomy of Practical Reason。
The antinomy of pure speculative reason exhibits a similar
co