the+critique+of+practical+reason- 第29部分

　　The　antinomy　of　pure　speculative　reason　exhibits　a　similar
conflict　between　freedom　and　physical　necessity　in　the　causality　of
events　in　the　world。　It　was　solved　by　showing　that　there　is　no　real
contradiction　when　the　events　and　even　the　world　in　which　they　occur
are　regarded　（as　they　ought　to　be）　merely　as　appearances；　since　one
and　the　same　acting　being；　as　an　appearance　（even　to　his　own　inner
sense）；　has　a　causality　in　the　world　of　sense　that　always　conforms
to　the　mechanism　of　nature；　but　with　respect　to　the　same　events；　so
far　as　the　acting　person　regards　himself　at　the　same　time　as　a
noumenon　（as　pure　intelligence　in　an　existence　not　dependent　on　the
condition　of　time）；　he　can　contain　a　principle　by　which　that　causality
acting　according　to　laws　of　nature　is　determined；　but　which　is
itself　free　from　all　laws　of　nature。
　　It　is　just　the　same　with　the　foregoing　antinomy　of　pure　practical
reason。　The　first　of　the　two　propositions；　〃That　the　endeavour　after
happiness　produces　a　virtuous　mind；〃　is　absolutely　false；　but　the
second；　〃That　a　virtuous　mind　necessarily　produces　happiness；〃　is
not　absolutely　false；　but　only　in　so　far　as　virtue　is　considered　as
a　form　of　causality　in　the　sensible　world；　and　consequently　only　if
I　suppose　existence　in　it　to　be　the　only　sort　of　existence　of　a
rational　being；　it　is　then　only　conditionally　false。　But　as　I　am　not
only　justified　in　thinking　that　I　exist　also　as　a　noumenon　in　a
world　of　the　understanding；　but　even　have　in　the　moral　law　a　purely
intellectual　determining　principle　of　my　causality　（in　the　sensible
world）；　it　is　not　impossible　that　morality　of　mind　should　have　a
connection　as　cause　with　happiness　（as　an　effect　in　the　sensible
world）　if　not　immediate　yet　mediate　（viz。；　through　an　intelligent
author　of　nature）；　and　moreover　necessary；　while　in　a　system　of　nature
which　is　merely　an　object　of　the　senses；　this　bination　could
never　occur　except　contingently　and；　therefore；　could　not　suffice
for　the　summum　bonum。
　　Thus；　notwithstanding　this　seeming　conflict　of　practical　reason　with
itself；　the　summum　bonum；　which　is　the　necessary　supreme　end　of　a　will
morally　determined；　is　a　true　object　thereof；　for　it　is　practically
possible；　and　the　maxims　of　the　will　which　as　regards　their　matter
refer　to　it　have　objective　reality；　which　at　first　was　threatened　by
the　antinomy　that　appeared　in　the　connection　of　morality　with
happiness　by　a　general　law；　but　this　was　merely　from　a
misconception；　because　the　relation　between　appearances　was　taken
for　a　relation　of　the　things　in　themselves　to　these　appearances。
　　When　we　find　ourselves　obliged　to　go　so　far；　namely；　to　the
connection　with　an　intelligible　world；　to　find　the　possibility　of
the　summum　bonum；　which　reason　points　out　to　all　rational　beings　as
the　goal　of　all　their　moral　wishes；　it　must　seem　strange　that；
nevertheless；　the　philosophers　both　of　ancient　and　modern　times　have
been　able　to　find　happiness　in　accurate　proportion　to　virtue　even　in
this　life　（in　the　sensible　world）；　or　have　persuaded　themselves　that
they　were　conscious　thereof。　For　Epicurus　as　well　as　the　Stoics
extolled　above　everything　the　happiness　that　springs　from　the
consciousness　of　living　virtuously；　and　the　former　was　not　so　base
in　his　practical　precepts　as　one　might　infer　from　the　principles　of
his　theory；　which　he　used　for　explanation　and　not　for　action；　or　as
they　were　interpreted　by　many　who　were　misled　by　his　using　the　term
pleasure　for　contentment；　on　the　contrary；　he　reckoned　the　most
disinterested　practice　of　good　amongst　the　ways　of　enjoying　the　most
intimate　delight；　and　his　scheme　of　pleasure　（by　which　he　meant
constant　cheerfulness　of　mind）　included　the　moderation　and　control
of　the　inclinations；　such　as　the　strictest　moral　philosopher　might
require。　He　differed　from　the　Stoics　chiefly　in　making　this　pleasure
the　motive；　which　they　very　rightly　refused　to　do。　For；　on　the　one
hand；　the　virtuous　Epicurus；　like　many　well…intentioned　men　of　this
day　who　do　not　reflect　deeply　enough　on　their　principles；　fell　into
the　error　of　presupposing　the　virtuous　disposition　in　the　persons
for　whom　he　wished　to　provide　the　springs　to　virtue　（and　indeed　the
upright　man　cannot　be　happy　if　he　is　not　first　conscious　of　his
uprightness；　since　with　such　a　character　the　reproach　that　his　habit
of　thought　would　oblige　him　to　make　against　himself　in　case　of
transgression　and　his　moral　self…condemnation　would　rob　him　of　all
enjoyment　of　the　pleasantness　which　his　condition　might　otherwise
contain）。　But　the　question　is：　How　is　such　a　disposition　possible　in
the　first　instance；　and　such　a　habit　of　thought　in　estimating　the
worth　of　one's　existence；　since　prior　to　it　there　can　be　in　the
subject　no　feeling　at　all　for　moral　worth？　If　a　man　is　virtuous
without　being　conscious　of　his　integrity　in　every　action；　he　will
certainly　not　enjoy　life；　however　favourable　fortune　may　be　to　him
in　its　physical　circumstances；　but　can　we　make　him　virtuous　in　the
first　instance；　in　other　words；　before　he　esteems　the　moral　worth　of
his　existence　so　highly；　by　praising　to　him　the　peace　of　mind　that
would　result　from　the　consciousness　of　an　integrity　for　which　he　has
no　sense？
　　On　the　other　hand；　however；　there　is　here　an　occasion　of　a　vitium
subreptionis；　and　as　it　were　of　an　optical　illusion；　in　the
self…consciousness　of　what　one　does　as　distinguished　from　what　one
feels…　an　illusion　which　even　the　most　experienced　cannot　altogether
avoid。　The　moral　disposition　of　mind　is　necessarily　bined　with　a
consciousness　that　the　will　is　determined　directly　by　the　law。　Now　the
consciousness　of　a　determination　of　the　faculty　of　desire　is　always
the　source　of　a　satisfaction　in　the　resulting　action；　but　this
pleasure；　this　satisfaction　in　oneself；　is　not　the　determining
principle　of　the　action；　on　the　contrary；　the　determination　of　the
will　directly　by　reason　is　the　source　of　the　feeling　of　pleasure；
and　this　remains　a　pure　practical　not　sensible　determination　of　the
faculty　of　desire。　Now　as　this　determination　has　exactly　the　same
effect　within　in　impelling　to　activity；　that　a　feeling　of　the　pleasure
to　be　expected　from　the　desired　action　would　have　had；　we　easily
look　on　what　we　ourselves　do　as　something　which　we　merely　passively
feel；　and　take　the　moral　spring　for　a　sensible　impulse；　just　as　it
happens　in　the　so…called　illusion　of　the　senses　（in　this　case　the
inner　sense）。　It　is　a　sublime　thing　in　human　nature　to　be　determined
to　actions　immediately　by　a　purely　rational　law；　sublime　even　is　the
illusion　that　regards　the　subjective　side　of　this　capacity　of
intellectual　determination　as　something　sensible　and　the　effect　of　a
special　sensible　feeling　（for　an　intellectual　feeling　would　be　a
contradiction）。　It　is　also　of　great　importance　to　attend　to　this
property　of　our　personality　and　as　much　as　possible　to　cultivate　the
effect　of　reason　on　this　feeling。　But　we　must　beware　lest　by　falsely
extolling　this　moral　determining　principle　as　a　spring；　making　its
source　lie　in　particular　feelings　of　pleasure　（which　are　in　fact
only　results）；　we　degrade　and　disfigure　the　true　genuine　spring；　the
law　itself；　by　putting　as　it　were　a　false　foil　upon　it。　Respect；　not
pleasure　or　enjoyment　of　happiness；　is　something　for　which　it　is　not
possible　that　reason　should　have　any　antecedent　feeling　as　its
foundation　（for　this　would　always　be　sensible　and　pathological）；　and
consciousness　of　immediate　obligation　of　the　will　by　the　law　is　by
no　means　analogous　to　the　feeling　of　pleasure；　although　in　relation　to
the　faculty　of　desire　it　produces　the　same　effect；　but　from
different　sources：　it　is　only　by　this　mode　of　conception；　however；
that　we　can　attain　what　we　are　seeking；　namely；　that　actions　be　done
not　merely　in　accordance　with　duty　（as　a　result　of　pleasant　feelings）；
but　from　duty；　which　must　be　the　true　end　of　all　moral　cultivation。
　　Have　we　not；　however；　a　word　which　does　not　express　enjoyment；　as
happiness　does；　but　indicates　a　satisfaction　in　one's　existence；　an
analogue　of　the　happiness　which　must　necessarily　acpany　the
consciousness　of　virtue？　Yes　this　word　is　self…contentment　which　in
its　proper　signification　always　designates　only　a　negative
satisfaction　in　one's　existence；　in　which　one　is　conscious　of
needing　nothing。　Freedom　and　the　consciousness　of　it　as　a　faculty　of
following　the　moral　law　with　unyielding　resolution　is　independence
of　inclinations；　at　least　as　motives　determining　（though　not　as
affecting）　our　desire；　and　so　far　as　I　am　conscious　of　this　freedom　in
following　my　moral　maxims；　it　is　the　only　source　of　an　unaltered
contentment　which　is　necessarily　connected　with　it　and　rests　on　no
special　feeling。　This　may　be　called　intellectual　contentment。　The
sensible　contentment　（improperly　so…called）　which　rests　on　the
satisfaction　of　the　inclinations；　however　delicate　they　may　be
imagined　to　be；　can　never　be　adequate　to　the　conception　of　it。　For　the
inclinations　change；　they　grow　with　the　indulgence　shown　them；　and
always　leave　behind　a　still　greater　void　than　we　had　thought　to
fill。　Hence　they　are　always　burdensome　to　a　rational　being；　and；
although　he　cannot　lay　them　aside；　they　wrest　from　him　t