the critique of practical reason- 第15部分

osition　is　at　least　very　doubtful　if　it　is　translated：　〃We　desire　nothing　except　with　a　view　to　our　weal　or　woe〃；　on　the　other　hand；　if　we　render　it　thus：　〃Under　the　direction　of　reason　we　desire　nothing　except　so　far　as　we　esteem　it　good　or　evil；〃　it　is　indubitably　certain　and　at　the　same　time　quite　clearly　expressed。　　　Well　or　ill　always　implies　only　a　reference　to　our　condition；　as　pleasant　or　unpleasant；　as　one　of　pleasure　or　pain；　and　if　we　desire　or　avoid　an　object　on　this　account；　it　is　only　so　far　as　it　is　referred　to　our　sensibility　and　to　the　feeling　of　pleasure　or　pain　that　it　produces。　But　good　or　evil　always　implies　a　reference　to　the　will；　as　determined　by　the　law　of　reason；　to　make　something　its　object；　for　it　is　never　determined　directly　by　the　object　and　the　idea　of　it；　but　is　a　faculty　of　taking　a　rule　of　reason　for　or　motive　of　an　action　（by　which　an　object　may　be　realized）。　Good　and　evil　therefore　are　properly　referred　to　actions；　not　to　the　sensations　of　the　person；　and　if　anything　is　to　be　good　or　evil　absolutely　（i。e。；　in　every　respect　and　without　any　further　condition）；　or　is　to　be　so　esteemed；　it　can　only　be　the　manner　of　acting；　the　maxim　of　the　will；　and　consequently　the　acting　person　himself　as　a　good　or　evil　man　that　can　be　so　called；　and　not　a　thing。　　　However；　then；　men　may　laugh　at　the　Stoic；　who　in　the　severest　paroxysms　of　gout　cried　out：　〃Pain；　however　thou　tormentest　me；　I　will　never　admit　that　thou　art　an　evil　（kakov；　malum）〃：　he　was　right。　A　bad　thing　it　certainly　was；　and　his　cry　betrayed　that；　but　that　any　evil　attached　to　him　thereby；　this　he　bad　no　reason　whatever　to　admit；　for　pain　did　not　in　the　least　diminish　the　worth　of　his　person；　but　only　that　of　his　condition。　If　he　had　been　conscious　of　a　single　lie；　it　would　have　lowered　his　pride；　but　pain　served　only　to　raise　it；　when　he　was　conscious　that　he　had　not　deserved　it　by　any　unrighteous　action　by　which　he　had　rendered　himself　worthy　of　punishment。　　　What　we　call　good　must　be　an　object　of　desire　in　the　judgement　of　every　rational　man；　and　evil　an　object　of　aversion　in　the　eyes　of　everyone；　therefore；　in　addition　to　sense；　this　judgement　requires　reason。　So　it　is　with　truthfulness；　as　opposed　to　lying；　so　with　justice；　as　opposed　to　violence；　&c。　But　we　may　call　a　thing　a　bad　＇or　ill）　thing；　which　yet　everyone　must　at　the　same　time　acknowledge　to　be　good；　sometimes　directly；　sometimes　indirectly。　The　man　who　submits　to　a　surgical　operation　feels　it　no　doubt　as　a　bad　thing；　but　by　their　reason　he　and　everyone　acknowledge　it　to　be　good。　If　a　man　who　delights　in　annoying　and　vexing　peaceable　people　at　last　receives　a　right　good　beating；　this　is　no　doubt　a　bad　thing；　but　everyone　approves　it　and　regards　it　as　a　good　thing；　even　though　nothing　else　resulted　from　it；　nay；　even　the　man　who　receives　it　must　in　his　reason　acknowledge　that　he　has　met　justice；　because　he　sees　the　proportion　between　good　conduct　and　good　fortune；　which　reason　inevitably　places　before　him；　here　put　into　practice。　　　No　doubt　our　weal　and　woe　are　of　very　great　importance　in　the　estimation　of　our　practical　reason；　and　as　far　as　our　nature　as　sensible　beings　is　concerned；　our　happiness　is　the　only　thing　of　consequence；　provided　it　is　estimated　as　reason　especially　requires；　not　by　the　transitory　sensation；　but　by　the　influence　that　this　has　on　our　whole　existence；　and　on　our　satisfaction　therewith；　but　it　is　not　absolutely　the　only　thing　of　consequence。　Man　is　a　being　who；　as　belonging　to　the　world　of　sense；　has　wants；　and　so　far　his　reason　has　an　office　which　it　cannot　refuse；　namely；　to　attend　to　the　interest　of　his　sensible　nature；　and　to　form　practical　maxims；　even　with　a　view　to　the　happiness　of　this　life；　and　if　possible　even　to　that　of　a　future。　But　he　is　not　so　completely　an　animal　as　to　be　indifferent　to　what　reason　says　on　its　own　account；　and　to　use　it　merely　as　an　instrument　for　the　satisfaction　of　his　wants　as　a　sensible　being。　For　the　possession　of　reason　would　not　raise　his　worth　above　that　of　the　brutes；　if　it　is　to　serve　him　only　for　the　same　purpose　that　instinct　serves　in　them；　it　would　in　that　case　be　only　a　particular　method　which　nature　had　employed　to　equip　man　for　the　same　ends　for　which　it　has　qualified　brutes；　without　qualifying　him　for　any　higher　purpose。　No　doubt　once　this　arrangement　of　nature　has　been　made　for　him　he　requires　reason　in　order　to　take　into　consideration　his　weal　and　woe；　but　besides　this　he　possesses　it　for　a　higher　purpose　also；　namely；　not　only　to　take　into　consideration　what　is　good　or　evil　in　itself；　about　which　only　pure　reason；　uninfluenced　by　any　sensible　interest；　can　judge；　but　also　to　distinguish　this　estimate　thoroughly　from　the　former　and　to　make　it　the　supreme　condition　thereof。　　　In　estimating　what　is　good　or　evil　in　itself；　as　distinguished　from　what　can　be　so　called　only　relatively；　the　following　points　are　to　be　considered。　Either　a　rational　principle　is　already　conceived；　as　of　itself　the　determining　principle　of　the　will；　without　regard　to　possible　objects　of　desire　（and　therefore　by　the　more　legislative　form　of　the　maxim）；　and　in　that　case　that　principle　is　a　practical　a　priori　law；　and　pure　reason　is　supposed　to　be　practical　of　itself。　The　law　in　that　case　determines　the　will　directly；　the　action　conformed　to　it　is　good　in　itself；　a　will　whose　maxim　always　conforms　to　this　law　is　good　absolutely　in　every　respect　and　is　the　supreme　condition　of　all　good。　Or　the　maxim　of　the　will　is　consequent　on　a　determining　principle　of　desire　which　presupposes　an　object　of　pleasure　or　pain；　something　therefore　that　pleases　or　displeases；　and　the　maxim　of　reason　that　we　should　pursue　the　former　and　avoid　the　latter　determines　our　actions　as　good　relatively　to　our　inclination；　that　is；　good　indirectly；　i。e。；　relatively　to　a　different　end　to　which　they　are　means）；　and　in　that　case　these　maxims　can　never　be　called　laws；　but　may　be　called　rational　practical　precepts。　The　end　itself；　the　pleasure　that　we　seek；　is　in　the　latter　case　not　a　good　but　a　welfare；　not　a　concept　of　reason；　but　an　empirical　concept　of　an　object　of　sensation；　but　the　use　of　the　means　thereto；　that　is；　the　action；　is　nevertheless　called　good　（because　rational　deliberation　is　required　for　it）；　not　however；　good　absolutely；　but　only　relatively　to　our　sensuous　nature；　with　regard　to　its　feelings　of　pleasure　and　displeasure；　but　the　will　whose　maxim　is　affected　thereby　is　not　a　pure　will；　this　is　directed　only　to　that　in　which　pure　reason　by　itself　can　be　practical。　　　This　is　the　proper　place　to　explain　the　paradox　of　method　in　a　critique　of　practical　reason；　namely；　that　the　concept　of　good　and　evil　must　not　be　determined　before　the　moral　law　（of　which　it　seems　as　if　it　must　be　the　foundation）；　but　only　after　it　and　by　means　of　it。　In　fact；　even　if　we　did　not　know　that　the　principle　of　morality　is　a　pure　a　priori　law　determining　the　will；　yet；　that　we　may　not　assume　principles　quite　gratuitously；　we　must；　at　least　at　first；　leave　it　undecided；　whether　the　will　has　merely　empirical　principles　of　determination；　or　whether　it　has　not　also　pure　a　priori　principles；　for　it　is　contrary　to　all　rules　of　philosophical　method　to　assume　as　decided　that　which　is　the　very　point　in　question。　Supposing　that　we　wished　to　begin　with　the　concept　of　good；　in　order　to　deduce　from　it　the　laws　of　the　will；　then　this　concept　of　an　object　（as　a　good）　would　at　the　same　time　assign　to　us　this　object　as　the　sole　determining　principle　of　the　will。　Now；　since　this　concept　had　not　any　practical　a　priori　law　for　its　standard；　the　criterion　of　good　or　evil　could　not　be　placed　in　anything　but　the　agreement　of　the　object　with　our　feeling　of　pleasure　or　pain；　and　the　use　of　reason　could　only　consist　in　determining　in　the　first　place　this　pleasure　or　pain　in　connexion　with　all　the　sensations　of　my　existence；　and　in　the　second　place　the　means　of　securing　to　myself　the　object　of　the　pleasure。　Now；　as　experience　alone　can　decide　what　conforms　to　the　feeling　of　pleasure；　and　by　hypothesis　the　practical　law　is　to　be　based　on　this　as　a　condition；　it　follows　that　the　possibility　of　a　priori　practical　laws　would　be　at　once　excluded；　because　it　was　imagined　to　be　necessary　first　of　all　to　find　an　object　the　concept　of　which；　as　a　good；　should　constitute　the　universal　though　empirical　principle　of　determination　of　the　will。　But　what　it　was　necessary　to　inquire　first　of　all　was　whether　there　is　not　an　a　priori　determining　principle　of　the　will　（and　this　could　never　be　found　anywhere　but　in　a　pure　practical　law；　in　so　far　as　this　law　prescribes　to　maxims　merely　their　form　without　regard　to　an　object）。　Since；　however；　we　laid　the　foundation　of　all　practical　law　in　an　object　determined　by　our　conceptions　of　good　and　evil；　whereas　without　a　previous　law　that　object　could　not　be　conceived　by　empirical　concepts；　we　have　deprived　ourselves　beforehand　of　the　possibility　of　even　conceiving　a　pure　practical　law。　On　the　other　hand；　if　we　had　first　investigated　the　latter　analytically；　we　should　have　found　that　it　is　not　the　concept　of　good　as　an　object　that　determines　the　moral　law　and　makes　it　possible；　but　that；　on　the　contrary；　it　is　the　moral　law　that　first　determines　the　concept　of　good　and　makes　it　possible；　so　fa