contrary； it is the moral law that first determines the concept of good and makes it possible； so far as it deserves the name of good absolutely。 This remark； which only concerns the method of ultimate ethical inquiries； is of importance。 It explains at once the occasion of all the mistakes of philosophers with respect to the supreme principle of morals。 For they sought for an object of the will which they could make the matter and principle of a law （which consequently could not determine the will directly； but by means of that object referred to the feeling of pleasure or pain； whereas they ought first to have searched for a law that would determine the will a priori and directly； and afterwards determine the object in accordance with the will）。 Now； whether they placed this object of pleasure； which was to supply the supreme conception of goodness； in happiness； in perfection； in moral ＇feeling＇； or in the will of God； their principle in every case implied heteronomy； and they must inevitably come upon empirical conditions of a moral law； since their object； which was to be the immediate principle of the will； could not be called good or bad except in its immediate relation to feeling； which is always empirical。 It is only a formal law… that is； one which prescribes to reason nothing more than the form of its universal legislation as the supreme condition of its maxims… that can be a priori a determining principle of practical reason。 The ancients avowed this error without concealment by directing all their moral inquiries to the determination of the notion of the summum bonum； which they intended afterwards to make the determining principle of the will in the moral law； whereas it is only far later； when the moral law has been first established for itself； and shown to be the direct determining principle of the will； that this object can be presented to the will； whose form is now determined a priori； and this we shall undertake in the Dialectic of the pure practical reason。 The moderns； with whom the question of the summum bonum has gone out of fashion； or at least seems to have become a secondary matter； hide the same error under vague （expressions as in many other cases）。 It shows itself； nevertheless； in their systems； as it always produces heteronomy of practical reason； and from this can never be derived a moral law giving universal commands。 Now； since the notions of good and evil； as consequences of the a priori determination of the will； imply also a pure practical principle； and therefore a causality of pure reason； hence they do not originally refer to objects （so as to be； for instance； special modes of the synthetic unity of the manifold of given intuitions in one consciousness） like the pure concepts of the understanding or categories of reason in its theoretic employment； on the contrary； they presuppose that objects are given； but they are all modes （modi） of a single category； namely； that of causality； the determining principle of which consists in the rational conception of a law； which as a law of freedom reason gives to itself； thereby a priori proving itself practical。 However； as the actions on the one side come under a law which is not a physical law； but a law of freedom； and consequently belong to the conduct of beings in and consequently the consequently belong to the beings in the world of intelligence； yet on the other side as events in the world of sense they belong to phenomena； hence the determinations of a practical reason are only possible in reference to the latter and； therefore； in accordance with the categories of the understanding； not indeed with a view to any theoretic employment of it； i。e。； so as to bring the manifold of （sensible） intuition under one consciousness a priori； but only to subject the manifold of desires to the unity of consciousness of a practical reason； giving it commands in the moral law； i。e。； to a pure will a priori。 These categories of freedom… for so we choose to call them in contrast to those theoretic categories which are categories of physical nature… have an obvious advantage over the latter； inasmuch as the latter are only forms of thought which designate objects in an indefinite manner by means of universal concept of every possible intuition； the former； on the contrary； refer to the determination of a free elective will （to which indeed no exactly corresponding intuition can be assigned； but which has as its foundation a pure practical a priori law； which is not the case with any concepts belonging to the theoretic use of our cognitive faculties）； hence； instead of the form of intuition （space and time）； which does not lie in reason itself； but has to be drawn from another source； namely； the sensibility； these being elementary practical concepts have as their foundation the form of a pure will； which is given in reason and； therefore； in the thinking faculty itself。 From this it happens that as all precepts of pure practical reason have to do only with the determination of the will； not with the physical conditions （of practical ability） of the execution of one's purpose； the practical a priori principles in relation to the supreme principle of freedom are at once cognitions； and have not to wait for intuitions in order to acquire significance； and that for this remarkable reason； because they themselves produce the reality of that to which they refer （the intention of the will）； which is not the case with theoretical concepts。 Only we must be careful to observe that these categories only apply to the practical reason； and thus they proceed in order from those which are as yet subject to sensible conditions and morally indeterminate to those which are free from sensible conditions and determined merely by the moral law。
Table of the Categories of Freedom relatively to the Notions of Good and Evil。
I。 QUANTITY。 Subjective； according to maxims （practical opinions of the individual） Objective； according to principles （Precepts） A priori both objective and subjective principles of freedom （laws）
II。 QUALITY。 Practical rules of action （praeceptivae） Practical rules of omission （prohibitivae） Practical rules of exceptions （exceptivae）
III。 RELATION。 To personality To the condition of the person。 Reciprocal； of one person to the others of the others。
IV。 MODALITY。 The Permitted and the Forbidden Duty and the contrary to duty。 Perfect and imperfect duty。
It will at once be observed that in this table freedom is considered as a sort of causality not subject to empirical principles of determination； in regard to actions possible by it； which are phenomena in the world of sense； and that consequently it is referred to the categories which concern its physical possibility； whilst yet each category is taken so universally that the determining principle of that causality can be placed outside the world of sense in freedom as a property of a being in the world of intelligence； and finally the categories of modality introduce the transition from practical principles generally to those of morality； but only problematically。 These can be established dogmatically only by the moral law。 I add nothing further here in explanation of the present table； since it is intelligible enough of itself。 A division of this kind based on principles is very useful in any science； both for the sake of thoroughness and intelligibility。 Thus； for instance； we know from the preceding table and its first number what we must begin from in practical inquiries； namely； from the maxims which every one founds on his own inclinations； the precepts which hold for a species of rational beings so far as they agree in certain inclinations； and finally the law which holds for all without regard to their inclinations； etc。 In this way we survey the whole plan of what has to be done； every question of practical philosophy that has to be answered； and also the order that is to be followed。
Of the Typic of the Pure Practical Judgement。
It is the notions of good and evil that first determine an object of the will。 They themselves； however； are subject to a practical rule of reason which； if it is pure reason； determines the will a priori relatively to its object。 Now； whether an action which is possible to us in the world of sense； comes under the rule or not； is a question to be decided by the practical judgement； by which what is said in the rule universally （in abstracto） is applied to an action in concreto。 But since a practical rule of pure reason in the first place as practical concerns the existence of an object； and in the second place as a practical rule of pure reason implies necessity as regards the existence of the action and； therefore； is a practical law； not a physical law depending on empirical principles of determination； but a law of freedom by which the will is to be determined independently on anything empirical （merely by the conception of a law and its form）； whereas all instances that can occur of possible actions can only be empirical； that is； belong to the experience of physical nature； hence； it seems absurd to expect to find