the subjective ground of determination of the will of a being whose reason does not necessarily conform to the objective law； by virtue of its own nature； then it will follow； first； that not motives can be attributed to the Divine will； and that the motives of the human will （as well as that of every created rational being） can never be anything else than the moral law； and consequently that the objective principle of determination must always and alone be also the subjectively sufficient determining principle of the action； if this is not merely to fulfil the letter of the law； without containing its spirit。*
*We may say of every action that conforms to the law； but is not done for the sake of the law； that it is morally good in the letter； not in the spirit （the intention）。
Since； then； for the purpose of giving the moral law influence over the will； we must not seek for any other motives that might enable us to dispense with the motive of the law itself； because that would produce mere hypocrisy； without consistency； and it is even dangerous to allow other motives （for instance； that of interest） even to co…operate along with the moral law； hence nothing is left us but to determine carefully in what way the moral law becomes a motive； and what effect this has upon the faculty of desire。 For as to the question how a law can be directly and of itself a determining principle of the will （which is the essence of morality）； this is； for human reason； an insoluble problem and identical with the question： how a free will is possible。 Therefore what we have to show a priori is not why the moral law in itself supplies a motive； but what effect it； as such； produces （or； more correctly speaking； must produce） on the mind。 The essential point in every determination of the will by the moral law is that being a free will it is determined simply by the moral law； not only without the co…operation of sensible impulses； but even to the rejection of all such； and to the checking of all inclinations so far as they might be opposed to that law。 So far； then； the effect of the moral law as a motive is only negative； and this motive can be known a priori to be such。 For all inclination and every sensible impulse is founded on feeling； and the negative effect produced on feeling （by the check on the inclinations） is itself feeling； consequently； we can see a priori that the moral law； as a determining principle of the will； must by thwarting all our inclinations produce a feeling which may be called pain； and in this we have the first； perhaps the only； instance in which we are able from a priori considerations to determine the relation of a cognition （in this case of pure practical reason） to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure。 All the inclinations together （which can be reduced to a tolerable system； in which case their satisfaction is called happiness） constitute self…regard （solipsismus）。 This is either the self…love that consists in an excessive fondness for oneself （philautia）； or satisfaction with oneself （arrogantia）。 The former is called particularly selfishness； the latter self…conceit。 Pure practical reason only checks selfishness； looking on it as natural and active in us even prior to the moral law； so far as to limit it to the condition of agreement with this law； and then it is called rational self…love。 But self…conceit reason strikes down altogether； since all claims to self…esteem which precede agreement with the moral law are vain and unjustifiable； for the certainty of a state of mind that coincides with this law is the first condition of personal worth （as we shall presently show more clearly）； and prior to this conformity any pretension to worth is false and unlawful。 Now the propensity to self…esteem is one of the inclinations which the moral law checks； inasmuch as that esteem rests only on morality。 Therefore the moral law breaks down self…conceit。 But as this law is something positive in itself； namely； the form of an intellectual causality； that is； of freedom； it must be an object of respect； for； by opposing the subjective antagonism of the inclinations； it weakens self…conceit； and since it even breaks down； that is； humiliates； this conceit； it is an object of the highest respect and； consequently； is the foundation of a positive feeling which is not of empirical origin； but is known a priori。 Therefore respect for the moral law is a feeling which is produced by an intellectual cause； and this feeling is the only one that we know quite a priori and the necessity of which we can perceive。 In the preceding chapter we have seen that everything that presents itself as an object of the will prior to the moral law is by that law itself； which is the supreme condition of practical reason； excluded from the determining principles of the will which we have called the unconditionally good； and that the mere practical form which consists in the adaptation of the maxims to universal legislation first determines what is good in itself and absolutely； and is the basis of the maxims of a pure will； which alone is good in every respect。 However； we find that our nature as sensible beings is such that the matter of desire （objects of inclination； whether of hope or fear） first presents itself to us； and our pathologically affected self； although it is in its maxims quite unfit for universal legislation； yet； just as if it constituted our entire self； strives to put its pretensions forward first； and to have them acknowledged as the first and original。 This propensity to make ourselves in the subjective determining principles of our choice serve as the objective determining principle of the will generally may be called self…love； and if this pretends to be legislative as an unconditional practical principle it may be called self…conceit。 Now the moral law； which alone is truly objective （namely； in every respect）； entirely excludes the influence of self…love on the supreme practical principle； and indefinitely checks the self…conceit that prescribes the subjective conditions of the former as laws。 Now whatever checks our self…conceit in our own judgement humiliates； therefore the moral law inevitably humbles every man when he compares with it the physical propensities of his nature。 That； the idea of which as a determining principle of our will humbles us in our self…consciousness； awakes respect for itself； so far as it is itself positive and a determining principle。 Therefore the moral law is even subjectively a cause of respect。 Now since everything that enters into self…love belongs to inclination； and all inclination rests on feelings； and consequently whatever checks all the feelings together in self…love has necessarily； by this very circumstance； an influence on feeling； hence we comprehend how it is possible to perceive a priori that the moral law can produce an effect on feeling； in that it excludes the inclinations and the propensity to make them the supreme practical condition； i。e。； self…love； from all participation in the supreme legislation。 This effect is on one side merely negative； but on the other side； relatively to the restricting principle of pure practical reason； it is positive。 No special kind of feeling need be assumed for this under the name of a practical or moral feeling as antecedent to the moral law and serving as its foundation。 The negative effect on feeling （unpleasantness） is pathological； like every influence on feeling and like every feeling generally。 But as an effect of the consciousness of the moral law； and consequently in relation to a supersensible cause； namely； the subject of pure practical reason which is the supreme lawgiver； this feeling of a rational being affected by inclinations is called humiliation （intellectual self…depreciation）； but with reference to the positive source of this humiliation； the law； it is respect for it。 There is indeed no feeling for this law； but inasmuch as it removes the resistance out of the way； this removal of an obstacle is； in the judgement of reason； esteemed equivalent to a positive help to its causality。 Therefore this feeling may also be called a feeling of respect for the moral law； and for both reasons together a moral feeling。 While the moral law； therefore； is a formal determining principle of action by practical pure reason； and is moreover a material though only objective determining principle of the objects of action as called good and evil； it is also a subjective determining principle； that is； a motive to this action； inasmuch as it has influence on the morality of the subject and produces a feeling conducive to the influence of the law on the will。 There is here in the subject no antecedent feeling tending to morality。 For this is impossible； since every feeling is sensible； and the motive of moral intention must be free from all sensible conditions。 On the contrary； while the sensible feeling which is at the bottom of all our inclinations is the condition of that impression which we call respect； the cause that determines it lies in the pure practical reason； and this impression therefore； on account of its origin； must be called； not a pathological but a practical effect。 For by the fact that the conception of the moral law