the critique of practical reason- 第19部分

led；　not　a　pathological　but　a　practical　effect。　For　by　the　fact　that　the　conception　of　the　moral　law　deprives　self…love　of　its　influence；　and　self…conceit　of　its　illusion；　it　lessens　the　obstacle　to　pure　practical　reason　and　produces　the　conception　of　the　superiority　of　its　objective　law　to　the　impulses　of　the　sensibility；　and　thus；　by　removing　the　counterpoise；　it　gives　relatively　greater　weight　to　the　law　in　the　judgement　of　reason　（in　the　case　of　a　will　affected　by　the　aforesaid　impulses）。　Thus　the　respect　for　the　law　is　not　a　motive　to　morality；　but　is　morality　itself　subjectively　considered　as　a　motive；　inasmuch　as　pure　practical　reason；　by　rejecting　all　the　rival　pretensions　of　selflove；　gives　authority　to　the　law；　which　now　alone　has　influence。　Now　it　is　to　be　observed　that　as　respect　is　an　effect　on　feeling；　and　therefore　on　the　sensibility；　of　a　rational　being；　it　presupposes　this　sensibility；　and　therefore　also　the　finiteness　of　such　beings　on　whom　the　moral　law　imposes　respect；　and　that　respect　for　the　law　cannot　be　attributed　to　a　supreme　being；　or　to　any　being　free　from　all　sensibility；　in　whom；　therefore；　this　sensibility　cannot　be　an　obstacle　to　practical　reason。　　　This　feeling　（which　we　call　the　moral　feeling）　is　therefore　produced　simply　by　reason。　It　does　not　serve　for　the　estimation　of　actions　nor　for　the　foundation　of　the　objective　moral　law　itself；　but　merely　as　a　motive　to　make　this　of　itself　a　maxim。　But　what　name　could　we　more　suitably　apply　to　this　singular　feeling　which　cannot　be　compared　to　any　pathological　feeling？　It　is　of　such　a　peculiar　kind　that　it　seems　to　be　at　the　disposal　of　reason　only；　and　that　pure　practical　reason。　　　Respect　applies　always　to　persons　only…　not　to　things。　The　latter　may　arouse　inclination；　and　if　they　are　animals　（e。g。；　horses；　dogs；　etc。）；　even　love　or　fear；　like　the　sea；　a　volcano；　a　beast　of　prey；　but　never　respect。　Something　that　comes　nearer　to　this　feeling　is　admiration；　and　this；　as　an　affection；　astonishment；　can　apply　to　things　also；　e。g。；　lofty　mountains；　the　magnitude；　number；　and　distance　of　the　heavenly　bodies；　the　strength　and　swiftness　of　many　animals；　etc。　But　all　this　is　not　respect。　A　man　also　may　be　an　object　to　me　of　love；　fear；　or　admiration；　even　to　astonishment；　and　yet　not　be　an　object　of　respect。　His　jocose　humour；　his　courage　and　strength；　his　power　from　the　rank　be　has　amongst　others；　may　inspire　me　with　sentiments　of　this　kind；　but　still　inner　respect　for　him　is　wanting。　Fontenelle　says；　〃I　bow　before　a　great　man；　but　my　mind　does　not　bow。〃　I　would　add；　before　an　humble　plain　man；　in　whom　I　perceive　uprightness　of　character　in　a　higher　degree　than　I　am　conscious　of　in　myself；…　my　mind　bows　whether　I　choose　it　or　not；　and　though　I　bear　my　head　never　so　high　that　he　may　not　forget　my　superior　rank。　Why　is　this？　Because　his　example　exhibits　to　me　a　law　that　humbles　my　self…conceit　when　I　compare　it　with　my　conduct：　a　law；　the　practicability　of　obedience　to　which　I　see　proved　by　fact　before　my　eyes。　Now；　I　may　even　be　conscious　of　a　like　degree　of　uprightness；　and　yet　the　respect　remains。　For　since　in　man　all　good　is　defective；　the　law　made　visible　by　an　example　still　humbles　my　pride；　my　standard　being　furnished　by　a　man　whose　imperfections；　whatever　they　may　be；　are　not　known　to　me　as　my　own　are；　and　who　therefore　appears　to　me　in　a　more　favourable　light。　Respect　is　a　tribute　which　we　cannot　refuse　to　merit；　whether　we　will　or　not；　we　may　indeed　outwardly　withhold　it；　but　we　cannot　help　feeling　it　inwardly。　　　Respect　is　so　far　from　being　a　feeling　of　pleasure　that　we　only　reluctantly　give　way　to　it　as　regards　a　man。　We　try　to　find　out　something　that　may　lighten　the　burden　of　it；　some　fault　to　compensate　us　for　the　humiliation　which　such　which　such　an　example　causes。　Even　the　dead　are　not　always　secure　from　this　criticism；　especially　if　their　example　appears　inimitable。　Even　the　moral　law　itself　in　its　solemn　majesty　is　exposed　to　this　endeavour　to　save　oneself　from　yielding　it　respect。　Can　it　be　thought　that　it　is　for　any　other　reason　that　we　are　so　ready　to　reduce　it　to　the　level　of　our　familiar　inclination；　or　that　it　is　for　any　other　reason　that　we　all　take　such　trouble　to　make　it　out　to　be　the　chosen　precept　of　our　own　interest　well　understood；　but　that　we　want　to　be　free　from　the　deterrent　respect　which　shows　us　our　own　unworthiness　with　such　severity？　Nevertheless；　on　the　other　hand；　so　little　is　there　pain　in　it　that　if　once　one　has　laid　aside　self…conceit　and　allowed　practical　influence　to　that　respect；　he　can　never　be　satisfied　with　contemplating　the　majesty　of　this　law；　and　the　soul　believes　itself　elevated　in　proportion　as　it　sees　the　holy　law　elevated　above　it　and　its　frail　nature。　No　doubt　great　talents　and　activity　proportioned　to　them　may　also　occasion　respect　or　an　analogous　feeling。　It　is　very　proper　to　yield　it　to　them；　and　then　it　appears　as　if　this　sentiment　were　the　same　thing　as　admiration。　But　if　we　look　closer　we　shall　observe　that　it　is　always　uncertain　how　much　of　the　ability　is　due　to　native　talent；　and　how　much　to　diligence　in　cultivating　it。　Reason　represents　it　to　us　as　probably　the　fruit　of　cultivation；　and　therefore　as　meritorious；　and　this　notably　reduces　our　self…conceit；　and　either　casts　a　reproach　on　us　or　urges　us　to　follow　such　an　example　in　the　way　that　is　suitable　to　us。　This　respect；　then；　which　we　show　to　such　a　person　（properly　speaking；　to　the　law　that　his　example　exhibits）　is　not　mere　admiration；　and　this　is　confirmed　also　by　the　fact　that　when　the　common　run　of　admirers　think　they　have　learned　from　any　source　the　badness　of　such　a　man's　character　（for　instance　Voltaire's）　they　give　up　all　respect　for　him；　whereas　the　true　scholar　still　feels　it　at　least　with　regard　to　his　talents；　because　he　is　himself　engaged　in　a　business　and　a　vocation　which　make　imitation　of　such　a　man　in　some　degree　a　law。　　　Respect　for　the　moral　law　is；　therefore；　the　only　and　the　undoubted　moral　motive；　and　this　feeling　is　directed　to　no　object；　except　on　the　ground　of　this　law。　The　moral　law　first　determines　the　will　objectively　and　directly　in　the　judgement　of　reason；　and　freedom；　whose　causality　can　be　determined　only　by　the　law；　consists　just　in　this；　that　it　restricts　all　inclinations；　and　consequently　self…esteem；　by　the　condition　of　obedience　to　its　pure　law。　This　restriction　now　has　an　effect　on　feeling；　and　produces　the　impression　of　displeasure　which　can　be　known　a　priori　from　the　moral　law。　Since　it　is　so　far　only　a　negative　effect　which；　arising　from　the　influence　of　pure　practical　reason；　checks　the　activity　of　the　subject；　so　far　as　it　is　determined　by　inclinations；　and　hence　checks　the　opinion　of　his　personal　worth　（which；　in　the　absence　of　agreement　with　the　moral　law；　is　reduced　to　nothing）；　hence；　the　effect　of　this　law　on　feeling　is　merely　humiliation。　We　can；　therefore；　perceive　this　a　priori；　but　cannot　know　by　it　the　force　of　the　pure　practical　law　as　a　motive；　but　only　the　resistance　to　motives　of　the　sensibility。　But　since　the　same　law　is　objectively；　that　is；　in　the　conception　of　pure　reason；　an　immediate　principle　of　determination　of　the　will；　and　consequently　this　humiliation　takes　place　only　relatively　to　the　purity　of　the　law；　hence；　the　lowering　of　the　pretensions　of　moral　self…esteem；　that　is；　humiliation　on　the　sensible　side；　is　an　elevation　of　the　moral；　i。e。；　practical；　esteem　for　the　law　itself　on　the　intellectual　side；　in　a　word；　it　is　respect　for　the　law；　and　therefore；　as　its　cause　is　intellectual；　a　positive　feeling　which　can　be　known　a　priori。　For　whatever　diminishes　the　obstacles　to　an　activity　furthers　this　activity　itself。　Now　the　recognition　of　the　moral　law　is　the　consciousness　of　an　activity　of　practical　reason　from　objective　principles；　which　only　fails　to　reveal　its　effect　in　actions　because　subjective　（pathological）　causes　hinder　it。　Respect　for　the　moral　law　then　must　be　regarded　as　a　positive；　though　indirect；　effect　of　it　on　feeling；　inasmuch　as　this　respect　weakens　the　impeding　influence　of　inclinations　by　humiliating　selfesteem；　and　hence　also　as　a　subjective　principle　of　activity；　that　is；　as　a　motive　to　obedience　to　the　law；　and　as　a　principle　of　the　maxims　of　a　life　conformable　to　it。　From　the　notion　of　a　motive　arises　that　of　an　interest；　which　can　never　be　attributed　to　any　being　unless　it　possesses　reason；　and　which　signifies　a　motive　of　the　will　in　so　far　as　it　is　conceived　by　the　reason。　Since　in　a　morally　good　will　the　law　itself　must　be　the　motive；　the　moral　interest　is　a　pure　interest　of　practical　reason　alone；　independent　of　sense。　On　the　notion　of　an　interest　is　based　that　of　a　maxim。　This；　therefore；　is　morally　good　only　in　case　it　rests　simply　on　the　interest　taken　in　obedience　to　the　law。　All　three　notions；　however；　that　of　a　motive；　of　an　interest；　and　of　a　maxim；　can　be　applied　only　to　finite　beings。　For　they　all　suppose　a　limitation　of　the　nature　of　the　being；　in　that　the　subjective　character　of　his　choice　does　not　of　itself　agree　with　the　objective　law　of　a　practical　reason；　they　suppose　that　the　being　requires　to　be　impelled　to　action　by　something；　because　an　internal　obstacle　opposes　itself。　Therefore　they　cannot　be　applied　to　the　Divine　will。　　　There　is　something