for as there was nothing to strengthen the heart； but only to excite it； it naturally returns to its normal moderate tone and； thus； falls back into its previous languor。 Principles must be built on conceptions； on any other basis there can only be paroxysms； which can give the person no moral worth； nay； not even confidence in himself； without which the highest good in man； consciousness of the morality of his mind and character； cannot exist。 Now if these conceptions are to become subjectively practical； we must not rest satisfied with admiring the objective law of morality； and esteeming it highly in reference to humanity； but we must consider the conception of it in relation to man as an individual； and then this law appears in a form indeed that is highly deserving of respect； but not so pleasant as if it belonged to the element to which he is naturally accustomed； but on the contrary as often compelling him to quit this element； not without self…denial； and to betake himself to a higher； in which he can only maintain himself with trouble and with unceasing apprehension of a relapse。 In a word； the moral law demands obedience； from duty not from predilection； which cannot and ought not to be presupposed at all。 Let us now see； in an example； whether the conception of an action； as a noble and magnanimous one； has more subjective moving power than if the action is conceived merely as duty in relation to the solemn law of morality。 The action by which a man endeavours at the greatest peril of life to rescue people from shipwreck； at last losing his life in the attempt； is reckoned on one side as duty； but on the other and for the most part as a meritorious action； but our esteem for it is much weakened by the notion of duty to himself which seems in this case to be somewhat infringed。 More decisive is the magnanimous sacrifice of life for the safety of one's country； and yet there still remains some scruple whether it is a perfect duty to devote one's self to this purpose spontaneously and unbidden； and the action has not in itself the full force of a pattern and impulse to imitation。 But if an indispensable duty be in question； the transgression of which violates the moral law itself； and without regard to the welfare of mankind； and as it were tramples on its holiness （such as are usually called duties to God； because in Him we conceive the ideal of holiness in substance）； then we give our most perfect esteem to the pursuit of it at the sacrifice of all that can have any value for the dearest inclinations； and we find our soul strengthened and elevated by such an example； when we convince ourselves by contemplation of it that human nature is capable of so great an elevation above every motive that nature can oppose to it。 Juvenal describes such an example in a climax which makes the reader feel vividly the force of the spring that is contained in the pure law of duty； as duty：
Esto bonus miles； tutor bonus； arbiter idem Integer； ambiguae si quando citabere testis Incertaeque rei； Phalaris licet imperet ut sis Falsus； et admoto dictet periuria tauro； Summum crede nefas animam praeferre pudori； Et propter vitam vivendi perdere causas。*
*＇Juvenal； Satirae； 〃Be you a good soldier； a faithful tutor； an uncorrupted umpire also； if you are summoned as a witness in a doubtful and uncertain thing； though Phalaris should command that you should be false； and should dictate perjuries with the bull brought to you； believe it the highest impiety to prefer life to reputation； and for the sake of life； to lose the causes of living。〃＇
When we can bring any flattering thought of merit into our action； then the motive is already somewhat alloyed with self…love and has therefore some assistance from the side of the sensibility。 But to postpone everything to the holiness of duty alone； and to be conscious that we can because our own reason recognises this as its command and says that we ought to do it； this is； as it were； to raise ourselves altogether above the world of sense； and there is inseparably involved in the same a consciousness of the law； as a spring of a faculty that controls the sensibility； and although this is not always attended with effect； yet frequent engagement with this spring； and the at first minor attempts at using it； give hope that this effect may be wrought； and that by degrees the greatest； and that a purely moral interest in it may be produced in us。 The method then takes the following course。 At first we are only concerned to make the judging of actions by moral laws a natural employment accompanying all our own free actions； as well as the observation of those of others； and to make it as it were a habit； and to sharpen this judgement； asking first whether the action conforms objectively to the moral law； and to what law； and we distinguish the law that merely furnishes a principle of obligation from that which is really obligatory （leges obligandi a legibus obligantibus）； as； for instance； the law of what men's wants require from me； as contrasted with that which their rights demand； the latter of which prescribes essential； the former only non…essential duties； and thus we teach how to distinguish different kinds of duties which meet in the same action。 The other point to which attention must be directed is the question whether the action was also （subjectively） done for the sake of the moral law； so that it not only is morally correct as a deed； but also； by the maxim from which it is done； has moral worth as a disposition。 Now there is no doubt that this practice； and the resulting culture of our reason in judging merely of the practical； must gradually produce a certain interest even in the law of reason； and consequently in morally good actions。 For we ultimately take a liking for a thing； the contemplation of which makes us feel that the use of our cognitive faculties is extended； and this extension is especially furthered by that in which we find moral correctness； since it is only in such an order of things that reason； with its faculty of determining a priori on principle what ought to be done； can find satisfaction。 An observer of nature takes liking at last to objects that at first offended his senses； when he discovers in them the great adaptation of their organization to design； so that his reason finds food in its contemplation。 So Leibnitz spared an insect that he had carefully examined with the microscope； and replaced it on its leaf； because he had found himself instructed by the view of it and had； as it were； received a benefit from it。 But this employment of the faculty of judgement； which makes us feel our own cognitive powers； is not yet the interest in actions and in their morality itself。 It merely causes us to take pleasure in engaging in such criticism； and it gives to virtue or the disposition that conforms to moral laws a form of beauty； which is admired； but not on that account sought after （laudatur et alget）； as everything the contemplation of which produces a consciousness of the harmony of our powers of conception； and in which we feel the whole of our faculty of knowledge （understanding and imagination） strengthened； produces a satisfaction； which may also be communicated to others； while nevertheless the existence of the object remains indifferent to us； being only regarded as the occasion of our becoming aware of the capacities in us which are elevated above mere animal nature。 Now； however； the second exercise comes in； the living exhibition of morality of character by examples； in which attention is directed to purity of will； first only as a negative perfection； in so far as in an action done from duty no motives of inclination have any influence in determining it。 By this the pupil's attention is fixed upon the consciousness of his freedom； and although this renunciation at first excites a feeling of pain； nevertheless； by its withdrawing the pupil from the constraint of even real wants； there is proclaimed to him at the same time a deliverance from the manifold dissatisfaction in which all these wants entangle him； and the mind is made capable of receiving the sensation of satisfaction from other sources。 The heart is freed and lightened of a burden that always secretly presses on it； when instances of pure moral resolutions reveal to the man an inner faculty of which otherwise he has no right knowledge； the inward freedom to release himself from the boisterous importunity of inclinations； to such a degree that none of them； not even the dearest； shall have any influence on a resolution； for which we are now to employ our reason。 Suppose a case where I alone know that the wrong is on my side； and although a free confession of it and the offer of satisfaction are so strongly opposed by vanity； selfishness； and even an otherwise not illegitimate antipathy to the man whose rights are impaired by me； I am nevertheless able to discard all these considerations； in this there is implied a consciousness of independence on inclinations and circumstances； and of the possibility of being sufficient for myself； which is salutary to me in general for other purposes also。 And now the law of duty； in consequence of the positive worth which obedience to