that the ｛223｝ immediate objects existed without the mind； then
that they are archetypes； then causes； next instruments； then
occasions： lastly ； which being interpreted
proves 。 So Matter comes to nothing。 What think you；
Hylas； is not this a fair summary of your whole proceeding？
。 Be that as it will； yet I still insist upon it； that
our not being able to conceive a thing is no argument against its
existence。
。 That from a cause； effect； operation； sign； or other
circumstance； there may reasonably be inferred the existence of a
thing not immediately perceived； and that it were absurd for any
man to argue against the existence of that thing； from his having
no direct and positive notion of it； I freely own。 But； where
there is nothing of all this； where neither reason nor revelation
induces us to believe the existence of a thing； where we have not
even a relative notion of it； where an abstraction is made from
perceiving and being perceived； from Spirit and idea： lastly；
where there is not so much as the most inadequate or faint idea
pretended to I will not indeed thence conclude against the
reality of any notion； or existence of anything； but my inference
shall be； that you mean nothing at all； that you employ words to
no manner of purpose； without any design or signification
whatsoever。 And I leave it to you to consider how mere jargon
should be treated。
。 To deal frankly with you； Philonous； your arguments
seem in themselves unanswerable； but they have not so great an
effect on me as to produce that entire conviction； that hearty
acquiescence； which attends demonstration。 I find myself
relapsing into an obscure surmise of I know not what； 。
。 But； are you not sensible； Hylas； that two things
must concur to take away all scruple； and work a plenary assent
in the mind；？ Let a visible object be set in never so clear a
light； yet； if there is any imperfection in the sight； or if the
eye is not directed towards it； it will not be distinctly seen。
And though a demonstration be never so well grounded and fairly
proposed； yet； if there is withal a stain of prejudice； or a
wrong bias on the understanding； can it be expected on a sudden
to perceive clearly； and adhere firmly to the truth？ No； there is
need of time and pains： the attention must be awakened and
detained by a frequent repetition of the same thing placed oft in
the same； oft in different lights。 I have said it already； and
find I must still repeat and inculcate； that it is an
unaccountable licence ｛224｝ you take； in pretending to maintain
you know not what； for you know not what reason； to you know not
what purpose。 Can this be paralleled in any art or science； any
sect or profession of men？ Or is there anything so barefacedly
groundless and unreasonable to be met with even in the lowest of
common conversation？ But； perhaps you will still say； Matter may
exist； though at the same time you neither know
by ； or by its 。 This indeed is surprising；
and the more so because it is altogether voluntary ＇and of your
own head＇；＇6＇ you not being led to it by any one reason； for I
challenge you to shew me that thing in nature which needs Matter
to explain or account for it。
。 of things cannot be maintained without
supposing the existence of Matter。 And is not this； think you； a
good reason why I should be earnest in its defence？
。 The reality of things！ What things？ sensible or
intelligible？
。 Sensible things。
。 My glove for example？
。 That； or any other thing perceived by the senses。
。 But to fix on some particular thing。 Is it not a
sufficient evidence to me of the existence of this ； that
I see it； and feel it； and wear it？ Or； if this will not do； how
is it possible I should be assured of the reality of this thing；
which I actually see in this place； by supposing that some
unknown thing； which I never did or can see； exists after an
unknown manner； in an unknown place； or in no place at all？ How
can the supposed reality of that which is intangible be a proof
that anything tangible really exists？ Or； of that which is
invisible； that any visible thing； or； in general of anything
which is imperceptible； that a perceptible exists？ Do but explain
this and I shall think nothing too hard for you。
。 Upon the whole； I am content to own the existence of
matter is highly improbable； but the direct and absolute
impossibility of it does not appear to me。
。 But granting Matter to be possible； yet； upon that
account merely； it can have no more claim to existence than a
golden mountain； or a centaur。
。 I acknowledge it； but still you do not deny it is
possible； and that which is possible； for aught you know； may
actually exist。
。 I deny it to be possible； and have； if I mistake
not； ｛225｝ evidently proved； from your own concessions； that it
is not。 In the common sense of the word ； is there any
more implied than an extended； solid； figured； moveable
substance； existing without the mind？ And have not you
acknowledged； over and over； that you have seen evident reason
for denying the possibility of such a substance？
。 True； but that is only one sense of the term
。
。 But is it not the only proper genuine received
sense？ And； if Matter； in such a sense； be proved impossible； may
it not be thought with good grounds absolutely impossible？ Else
how could anything be proved impossible？ Or； indeed； how could
there be any proof at all one way or other； to a man who takes
the liberty to unsettle and change the common signification of
words？
。 I thought philosophers might be allowed to speak more
accurately than the vulgar； and were not always confined to the
common acceptation of a term。
。 But this now mentioned is the common received sense
among philosophers themselves。 But； not to insist on that； have
you not been allowed to take Matter in what sense you pleased？
And have you not used this privilege in the utmost extent；
sometimes entirely changing； at others leaving out； or putting
into the definition of it whatever； for the present； best served
your design； contrary to all the known rules of reason and logic？
And hath not this shifting； unfair method of yours spun out our
dispute to an unnecessary length； Matter having been particularly
examined； and by your own confession refuted in each of those
senses？ And can any more be required to prove the absolute
impossibility of a thing； than the proving it impossible in every
particular sense that either you or any one else understands it
in？
。 But I am not so thoroughly satisfied that you have
proved the impossibility of Matter； in the last most obscure
abstracted and indefinite sense。
。。 When is a thing shewn to be impossible？
。 When a repugnancy is demonstrated between the ideas
comprehended in its definition。
。 But where there are no ideas； there no repugnancy
can be demonstrated between ideas？
。 I agree with you。
。 Now； in that which you call the obscure indefinite
sense of the word ； it is plain； by your own confession；
there ｛226｝ was included no idea at all； no sense except an
unknown sense； which is the same thing as none。 You are not；
therefore； to expect I should prove a repugnancy between ideas；
where there are no ideas； or the impossibility of Matter taken in
an sense； that is； no sense at all。 My business was
only to shew you meant ； and this you were brought to
own。 So that； in all your various senses； you have been shewed
either to mean nothing at all； or； if anything； an absurdity。 And
if this be not sufficient to prove the impossibility of a thing；
I desire you will let me know what is。
。 I acknowledge you have proved that Matter is
impossible； nor do I see what more can be said in defence of it。
But； at the same time that I give up this； I suspect all my other
notions。 For surely none could be more seemingly evident than
this once was： and yet it now seems as false and absurd as ever
it did true before。 But I think we have discussed the point
sufficiently for the present。 The remaining part of the day I
would willingly spend in running over in my thoughts the several
heads of this morning's conversation； and tomorrow shall be glad
to meet you here again about the same time。
。 will not fail to attend you。 ｛227｝
THE THIRD DIALOGUE
Tell me； Hylas；＇7＇ what are the fruits of
yesterday's meditation？ Has it confirmed you in the same mind you
were in at parting？ or have you since seen cause to change your
opinion？
。 Truly my opinion is that all our opinions are alike
vain and uncertain。 What we approve to…day； we condemn to…morrow。
We keep a stir about knowledge； and spend our lives in the
pursuit of it； when； alas I we know nothing all the while： nor do
I think it possible for us ever t