pursuit of it； when； alas I we know nothing all the while： nor do
I think it possible for us ever to know anything in this life。
Our faculties are too narrow and too few。 Nature certainly never
intended us for speculation。
。 What！ Say you we can know nothing； Hylas？
。 There is not that single thing in the world whereof
we can know the real nature； or what it is in itself。
。 Will you tell me I do not really know what fire or
water is？
。 You may indeed know that fire appears hot； and water
fluid； but this is no more than knowing what sensations are
produced in your own mind； upon the application of fire and water
to your organs of sense。 Their internal constitution； their true
and real nature； you are utterly in the dark as to 。
。 Do I not know this to be a real stone that I stand
on； and that which I see before my eyes to be a real tree？
。 ？ No； it is impossible you or any man alive
should know it。 All you know is； that you have such a certain
idea or appearance in your own mind。 But what is this to the real
tree or stone？ I tell you that colour； figure； and hardness；
which you perceive； are not the real natures of those things； or
in the least like them。 The same may be said of all other real
things； or corporeal substances； which compose the world。 They
have none of them anything of themselves； like those sensible
qualities by us perceived。 We should not therefore pretend to
affirm or know anything of them； as they are in their own nature。
。 But surely； Hylas； I can distinguish gold； for
example； ｛228｝ from iron： and how could this be； if I knew not
what either truly was？
。 Believe me； Philonous； you can only distinguish
between your own ideas。 That yellowness； that weight； and other
sensible qualities； think you they are really in the gold？ They
are only relative to the senses； and have no absolute existence
in nature。 And in pretending to distinguish the species of real
things； by the appearances in your mind； you may perhaps act as
wisely as he that should conclude two men were of a different
species； because their clothes were not of the same colour。
。 It seems； then； we are altogether put off with the
appearances of things； and those false ones too。 The very meat I
eat； and the cloth I wear； have nothing in them like what I see
and feel。
。 Even so。
。 But is it not strange the whole world should be thus
imposed on； and so foolish as to believe their senses？ And yet I
know not how it is； but men eat； and drink； and sleep； and
perform all the offices of life； as comfortably and conveniently
as if they really knew the things they are conversant about。
。 They do so： but you know ordinary practice does not
require a nicety of speculative knowledge。 Hence the vulgar
retain their mistakes； and for all that make a shift to bustle
through the affairs of life。 But philosophers know better things。
。 You mean； they that they 。
。 That is the very top and perfection of human
knowledge。
。 But are you all this while in earnest； Hylas； and
are you seriously persuaded that you know nothing real in the
world？ Suppose you are going to write； would you not call for
pen； ink； and paper； like another man； and do you not know what
it is you call for？
。 How often must I tell you； that I know not the real
nature of any one thing in the universe？ I may indeed upon
occasion make use of pen； ink； and paper。 But what any one of
them is in its own true nature； I declare positively I know not。
And the same is true with regard to every； other corporeal thing。
And； what is more； we are not only ignorant of the true and real
nature of things； but even of their existence。 It cannot be
denied that we perceive such certain appearances or ideas； but it
cannot be concluded from thence that bodies really exist。 ｛229｝
Nay； now I think on it； I must； agreeably to my former
concessions； farther declare that it is impossible any
corporeal thing should exist in nature。
。 You amaze me。 Was ever anything more wild and
extravagant than the notions you now maintain： and is it not
evident you are led into all these extravagances by the belief of
？ This makes you dream of those unknown
natures in everything。 It is this occasions your distinguishing
between the reality and sensible appearances of things。 It is to
this you are indebted for being ignorant of what everybody else
knows perfectly well。 Nor is this all： you are not only ignorant
of the true nature of everything； but you know not whether
anything really exists； or whether there are any true natures at
all； forasmuch as you attribute to your material beings an
absolute or external existence； wherein you suppose their reality
consists。 And； as you are forced in the end to acknowledge such
an existence means either a direct repugnancy； or nothing at all；
it follows that you are obliged to pull down your own hypothesis
of material Substance； and positively to deny the real existence
of any part of the universe。 And so you are plunged into the
deepest and most deplorable scepticism that ever man was。 Tell
me； Hylas； is it not as I say？
。 I agree with you。 was no more
than an hypothesis； and a false and groundless one too。 I will no
longer spend my breath in defence of it。 But whatever hypothesis
you advance； or whatsoever scheme of things you introduce in its
stead； I doubt not it will appear every whit as false： let me but
be allowed to question you upon it。 That is； suffer me to serve
you in your own kind； and I warrant it shall conduct you through
as many perplexities and contradictions； to the very same state
of scepticism that I myself am in at present。
。 I assure you； Hylas； I do not pretend to frame any
hypothesis at all。 I am of a vulgar cast； simple enough to
believe my senses； and leave things as I find them。 To be plain；
it is my opinion that the real things are those very things I
see； and feel； and perceive by my senses。 These I know； and；
finding they answer all the necessities and purposes of life；
have no reason to be solicitous about any other unknown beings。 A
piece of sensible bread； for instance； would stay my stomach
better than ten thousand times as much of that insensible；
unintelligible； real bread you speak of。 It is likewise my
opinion that colours and other sensible qualities are on the
｛230｝ objects。 I cannot for my life help thinking that snow is
white； and fire hot。 You indeed； who by and fire mean
certain external； unperceived； unperceiving substances； are in
the right to deny whiteness or heat to be affections inherent in
。 But I； who understand by those words the things I see and
feel； am obliged to think like other folks。 And； as I am no
sceptic with regard to the nature of things； so neither am I as
to their existence。 That a thing should be really perceived by my
senses； and at the same time not really exist； is to me a plain
contradiction； since I cannot prescind or abstract； even in
thought； the existence of a sensible thing from its being
perceived。 Wood； stones； fire； water； flesh； iron； and the like
things； which I name and discourse of； are things that I know。
And I should not have known them but that I perceived them by my
senses； and things perceived by the senses are immediately
perceived； and things immediately perceived are ideas； and ideas
cannot exist without the mind； their existence therefore consists
in being perceived； when； therefore； they are actually perceived
there can be no doubt of their existence。 Away then with all that
scepticism； all those ridiculous philosophical doubts。 What a
jest is it for a philosopher to question the existence of
sensible things； till he hath it proved to him from the veracity
of God； or to pretend our knowledge in this point falls short of
intuition or demonstration！ I might as well doubt of my own
being； as of the being of those things I actually see and feel。
。 Not so fast； Philonous： you say you cannot conceive
how sensible things should exist without the mind。 Do you not？
。 I do。
。 Supposing you were annihilated； cannot you conceive
it possible that things perceivable by sense may still exist？
。 can； but then it must be in another mind。 When I
deny sensible things an existence out of the mind； I do not mean
my mind in particular； but all minds。 Now； it is plain they have
an existence exterior to my mind； since I find them by experience
to be independent of it。 There is therefore some other Mind
wherein they exist； during the intervals between the times of
｛231｝ my perceiving them： as likewise they did before my birth；
and would do after my supposed annihilation。 And； as the same is
true with regard to all other finite created spirits； it
necessarily follows there is an ； which
knows and comprehends all things； and exhibits them to our view
in such a manner； and according to such rules； as