knows and comprehends all things； and exhibits them to our view
in such a manner； and according to such rules； as He Himself hath
ordained； and are by us termed the 。
。 Answer me； Philonous。 Are all our ideas perfectly
inert beings？ Or have they any agency included in them？
。 They are altogether passive and inert。
。 And is not God an agent； a being purely active？
。 I acknowledge it。
。 No idea therefore can be like unto； or represent the
nature of God？
。 It cannot。
。 Since therefore you have no of the mind of
God； how can you conceive it possible that things should exist in
His mind？ Or； if you can conceive the mind of God； without having
an idea of it； why may not I be allowed to conceive the existence
of Matter； notwithstanding I have no idea of it？
。 As to your first question： I own I have properly no
； either of God or any other spirit； for these being
active； cannot be represented by things perfectly inert； as our
ideas are。 I do nevertheless know that 1； who am a spirit or
thinking substance； exist as certainly a s I know my ideas exist。
Farther； I know what I mean by the terms I ； and I
know this immediately or intuitively； though I do not perceive it
as I perceive a triangle； a colour； or a sound。 The Mind； Spirit；
or Soul is that indivisible unextended thing which thinks； acts；
and perceives。 I say ； because unextended； and
； because extended； figured； moveable things are
ideas； and that which perceives ideas； which thinks and wills； is
plainly itself no idea； nor like an idea。 Ideas are things
inactive； and perceived。 And Spirits a sort of beings altogether
different from them。 I do not therefore say my soul is an idea；
or like an idea。 However； taking the word in a large
sense； my soul may be said to furnish me with an idea； that is；
an image or likeness of God though indeed extremely
inadequate。 For； all the notion I have of God is obtained by
reflecting on my own soul； heightening its powers； and removing
its ｛232｝ imperfections。 I have； therefore； though not an
inactive idea； yet in some sort of an active thinking
image of the Deity。 And； though I perceive Him not by sense； yet
I have a notion of Him； or know Him by reflexion and reasoning。
My own mind and my own ideas I have an immediate knowledge of；
and； by the help of these； do mediately apprehend the possibility
of the existence of other spirits and ideas。 Farther； from my own
being； and from the dependency I find in myself and my ideas； I
do； by an act of reason； necessarily infer the existence of a
God； and of all created things in the mind of God。 So much for
your first question。 For the second： I suppose by this time you
can answer it yourself。 For you neither perceive Matter
objectively； as you do an inactive being or idea； nor know it； as
you do yourself； by a reflex act； neither do you mediately
apprehend it by similitude of the one or the other； nor yet
collect it by reasoning from that which you know immediately。 All
which makes the case of widely different from that of
the 。
＇。 You say your own soul supplies you with some sort of
an idea or image of God。 But； at the same time； you acknowledge
you have； properly speaking； no of your own soul。 You even
affirm that spirits are a sort of beings altogether different
from ideas。 Consequently that no idea can be like a spirit。 We
have therefore no idea of any spirit。 You admit nevertheless that
there is spiritual Substance； although you have no idea of it；
while you deny there can be such a thing as material Substance；
because you have no notion or idea of it。 Is this fair dealing？
To act consistently； you must either admit Matter or reject
Spirit。 What say you to this？
。 say； in the first place； that I do not deny the
existence of material substance； merely because I have no notion
of it' but because the notion of it is inconsistent； or； in other
words； because it is repugnant that there should be a notion of
it。 Many things； for aught I know； may exist； whereof neither I
nor any other man hath or can have any idea or notion whatsoever。
But then those things must be possible； that is； nothing ｛233｝
inconsistent must be included in their definition。 I say；
secondly； that； although we believe things to exist which we do
not perceive； yet we may not believe that any particular thing
exists； without some reason for such belief： but I have no reason
for believing the existence of Matter。 I have no immediate
intuition thereof： neither can I immediately from my sensations；
ideas； notions； actions； or passions； infer an unthinking；
unperceiving； inactive Substance either by probable deduction；
or necessary consequence。 Whereas the being of my Self； that is；
my own soul； mind； or thinking principle； I evidently know by
reflexion。 You will forgive me if I repeat the same things in
answer to the same objections。 In the very notion or definition
of ； there is included a manifest repugnance
and inconsistency。 But this cannot be said of the notion of
Spirit。 That ideas should exist in what doth not perceive； or be
produced by what doth not act； is repugnant。 But； it is no
repugnancy to say that a perceiving thing should be the subject
of ideas； or an active thing the cause of them。 It is granted we
have neither an immediate evidence nor a demonstrative knowledge
of the existence of other finite spirits； but it will not thence
follow that such spirits are on a foot with material substances：
if to suppose the one be inconsistent； and it be not inconsistent
to suppose the other； if the one can be inferred by no argument；
and there is a probability for the other； if we see signs and
effects indicating distinct finite agents like ourselves； and see
no sign or symptom whatever that leads to a rational belief of
Matter。 I say； lastly； that I have a notion of Spirit； though I
have not； strictly speaking； an idea of it。 I do not perceive it
as an idea； or by means of an idea； but know it by reflexion。
。 Notwithstanding all you have said； to me it seems
that； according to your own way of thinking； and in consequence
of your own principles； it should follow that are only a
system of floating ideas； without any substance to support them。
Words are not to be used without a meaning。 And； as there is no
more meaning in than in ； the one is to be exploded as well as the other。
。 How often must I repeat； that I know or am conscious
of my own being； and that am not my ideas； but
somewhat else； a thinking； active principle that perceives；
knows； wifls； and operates about ideas。 I know that I； one ｛234｝
and the same self； perceive both colours and sounds： that a
colour cannot perceive a sound； nor a sound a colour： that I am
therefore one individual principle； distinct from colour and
sound； and； for the same reason； from aft other sensible things
and inert ideas。 But； I am not in like manner conscious either of
the existence or essence of Matter。 On the contrary； I know that
nothing inconsistent can exist； and that the existence of Matter
implies an inconsistency。 Farther； I know what I mean when I
affirm that there is a spiritual substance or support of ideas；
that is； that a spirit knows and perceives ideas。 But； I do not
know what is meant when it is said that an unperceiving substance
hath inherent in it and supports either ideas or the archetypes
of ideas。 There is therefore upon the whole no parity of case
between Spirit and Matter。＇＇8＇
。 I own myself satisfied in this point。 But； do you in
earnest think the real existence of sensible things consists in
their being actually perceived？ If so； how comes it that all
mankind distinguish between them？ Ask the first man you meet； and
he shall tell you； is one thing； and
is another。
。 am content； Hylas； to appeal to the common sense
of the world for the truth of my notion。 Ask the gardener why he
thinks yonder cherry…tree exists in the garden； and he shall tell
you； because he sees and feels it； in a word； because he
perceives it by his senses。 Ask him why he thinks an orange…tree
not to be there； and he shall tell you； because he does not
perceive it。 What he perceives by sense； that he terms a real；
being； and saith it ； but； that which is not
perceivable； the same； he saith； hath no being。
。 Yes； Philonous； I grant the existence of a sensible
thing consists in being perceivable； but not in being actually
perceived。
。 And what is perceivable but an idea？ And can an idea
exist without being actually perceived？ These are points long
since agreed between us。
。 But； be your opinion never so true； yet surely you
will not deny it is shocking； and contrary to the common sense of
men。 ｛235｝ Ask the fellow whether yonder tree hath an existence
out of his mind： what answer think you he would make？
。 The sam