out of his mind： what answer think you he would make？
。 The same that I should myself； to wit； that it doth
exist out of his mind。 But then to a Christian it cannot surely
be shocking to say； the real tree； existing without his mind； is
truly known and comprehended by （that is ） the
infinite mind of God。 Probably he may not at first glance be
aware of the direct and immediate proof there is of this；
inasmuch as the very being of a tree； or any other sensible
thing； implies a mind wherein it is。 But the point itself he
cannot deny。 The question between the Materialists and me is not；
whether things have a existence out of the mind of this or
that person； but whether they have an existence；
distinct from being perceived by God； and exterior to all minds。
This indeed some heathens and philosophers have affirmed； but
whoever entertains notions of the Deity suitable to the Holy
Scriptures will be of another opinion。
。 But； according to your notions； what difference is
there between real things； and chimeras formed by the
imagination； or the visions of a dream since they are all
equally in the mind？
。 The ideas formed by the imagination are faint and
indistinct； they have； besides； an entire dependence on the will。
But the ideas perceived by sense； that is； real things； are more
vivid and clear； and； being imprinted on the mind by a spirit
distinct from us； have not the like dependence on our will。 There
is therefore no danger of confounding these with the foregoing：
and there is as little of confounding them with the visions of a
dream； which are dim； irregular； and confused。 And； though they
should happen to be never so lively and natural； yet； by their
not being connected； and of a piece with the preceding and
subsequent transactions of our lives； they might easily be
distinguished from realities。 In short； by whatever method you
distinguish on your scheme； the same； it
is evident； will hold also upon mine。 For； it must be； I presume；
by some perceived difference； and I am not for depriving you of
any one thing that you perceive。
。 But still； Philonous； you hold； there is nothing in
the world but spirits and ideas。 And this； you must needs
acknowledge； sounds very oddly。
。 I own the word ； not being commonly used for
； sounds something out of the way。 My reason for using it
was； because a necessary relation to the mind is understood to
｛236｝ be implied by that term； and it is now commonly used by
philosophers to denote the immediate objects of the
understanding。 But； however oddly the proposition may sound in
words； yet it includes nothing so very strange or shocking in its
sense； which in effect amounts to no more than this； to wit； that
there are only things perceiving； and things perceived； or that
every unthinking being is necessarily； and from …the very nature
of its existence； perceived by some mind； if not by a finite
created mind； yet certainly by the infinite mind of God； in whom
〃we five； and move； and have our being。〃 Is this as strange as to
say； the sensible qualities are not on the objects： or that we
cannot be sure of the existence of things； or know any thing of
their real natures though we both see and feel them； and
perceive them by all our senses？
。 And； in consequence of this； must we not think there
are no such things as physical or corporeal causes； but that a
Spirit is the immediate cause of all the phenomena in nature？ Can
there be anything more extravagant than this？
。 Yes； it is infinitely more extravagant to say a
thing which is inert operates on the mind； and which is
unperceiving is the cause of our perceptions； ＇without any regard
either to consistency； or the old known axiom； ＇。＇9＇ Besides； that
which to you； I know not for what reason； seems so extravagant is
no more than the Holy Scriptures assert in a hundred places。 In
them God is represented as the sole and immediate Author of all
those effects which some heathens and philosophers are wont to
ascribe to Nature； Matter； Fate； or the like unthinking
principle。 This is so much the constant language of Scripture
that it were needless to confirm it by citations。
。 You are not aware； Philonous； that in making God the
immediate Author of all the motions in nature； you make Him the
Author of murder； sacrilege； adultery； and the like heinous sins。
。 In answer to that； I observe； first； that the
imputation of guilt is the same； whether a person commits an
action with or without an instrument。 In case therefore you
suppose God to act by the mediation of an instrument or occasion；
called ； you as truly make Him the author of sin as I；
who think Him the immediate agent in all those operations
vulgarly ascribed to Nature。 I farther observe that sin or moral
turpitude ｛237｝ doth not consist in the outward physical action
or motion； but in the internal deviation of the will from the
laws of reason and religion。 This is plain； in that the killing
an enemy in a battle； or putting a criminal legally to death； is
not thought sinful； though the outward act be the very same with
that in the case of murder。 Since； therefore； sin doth not
consist in the physical action； the making God an immediate cause
of all such actions is not making Him the Author of sin。 Lastly；
I have nowhere said that God is the only agent who produces all
the motions in bodies。 It is true I have denied there are any
other agents besides spirits； but this is very consistent with
allowing to thinking rational beings； in the production of
motions； the use of limited powers； ultimately indeed derived
from God； but immediately under the direction of their own wills；
which is sufficient to entitle them to all the guilt of their
actions。
。 But the denying Matter； Philonous； or corporeal
Substance； there is the point。 You can never persuade me that
this is not repugnant to the universal sense of mankind。 Were our
dispute to be determined by most voices； I am confident you would
give up the point； without gathering the votes。
。 I wish both our opinions were fairly stated and
submitted to the judgment of men who had plain common sense；
without the prejudices of a learned education。 Let me be
represented as one who trusts his senses； who thinks he knows the
things he sees and feels； and entertains no doubts of their
existence； and you fairly set forth with all your doubts； your
paradoxes； and your scepticism about you； and I shall willingly
acquiesce in the determination of any indifferent person。 That
there is no substance wherein ideas can exist beside spirit is to
me evident。 And that the objects immediately perceived are ideas；
is on all hands agreed。 And that sensible qualities are objects
immediately perceived no one can deny。 It is therefore evident
there can be no of those qualities but spirit； in
which they exist； not by way of mode or property； but as a thing
perceived in that which perceives it。 I deny therefore that there
is … of the objects of sense； and that there is any material substance。 But if by
is meant only ； which
is seen and felt （and the unphilosophical part of the world； I
dare say； mean no more） then I am more certain of matter's
existence than you or any other philosopher pretend to be。 If
there be anything which makes ；die generality of mankind ｛238｝
averse from the notions I espouse； it is a misapprehension that I
deny the reality of sensible things。 But； as it is you who are
guilty of that； and not 1； it follows that in truth their
aversion is against your notions and not mine。 I do therefore
assert that I am as certain as of my own being； that there are
bodies or corporeal substances （meaning the things I perceive by
my senses）； and that； granting this； the bulk of mankind will
take no thought about； nor think themselves at all concerned in
the fate of those unknown natures； and philosophical quiddities；
which some men are so fond of。
。 What say you to this？ Since； according to you； men
judge of the reality of things by their senses； how can a man be
mistaken in thinking the moon a plain lucid surface； about a foot
in diameter； or a square tower； seen at a distance； round； or an
oar； with one end in the water； crooked？
。 He is not mistaken with regard to the ideas he
actually perceives； but in the inference he makes from his
present perceptions。 Thus； in the case of the oar； what he
immediately perceives by sight is certainly crooked； and so far
he is in the right。 But if he thence conclude that upon taking
the oar out of the water he shall perceive the same crookedness；
or that it would affect his touch as crooked things are wont to
do： in that he is mistaken。 In like manner； if he shall conclude
from what he perceives in one station； that； in case he advances
towards the moon or tower； he should still be affected with the
like ideas； he is