a person； and yet in spite of that the bare abstraction； 'person'； is somewhat contemptuous in its
very expression。 'Person' is essentially different from 'subject'； since 'subject' is only the possibility
of personality； every living thing of any sort is a subject。 A person； then； is a subject aware of this
subjectivity； since in personality it is of myself alone that I am aware。 A person is a unit of freedom
aware of its sheer independence。 As this person； I know myself to be free in myself I can abstract
from everything； since nothing confronts me save pure personality； and yet as this person I am
something wholly determinate； e。g。 I am of a certain age； a certain stature； I occupy this space；
and so on through whatever other details you like。 Thus personality is at once the sublime and the
trivial。； It implies this unity of the infinite with the purely finite； of the wholly limitless with
determinate limitation。 It is the sublimity of personality that is able to sustain this contradiction； a
contradiction which nothing merely natural contains or could endure。
§ 36。
（1） Personality essentially involves the capacity for rights and constitutes the
concept and the basis （itself abstract） of the system of abstract and therefore
formal right。 Hence the imperative of right is： 'Be a person and respect others as
persons。'
§ 37。
（2） The particularity of the will is a moment in the consciousness of the will as a
whole （see § 34）； but it is not yet contained in abstract personality as such。
Therefore； it is present at this point； but as still sundered from personality； from
the character of freedom； present as desire； need； impulse； casual whim； and so
forth。 In formal right； therefore； there is no question of particular interests； of my
advantage or my welfare； any more than there is of the particular motive behind
my volition； of insight and intention。
Addition： Since； in personality； particularity is not present as freedom； everything which
depends on particularity is here a matter of indifference。 To have no interest except in one's formal
right may be pure obstinacy； often a fitting accompaniment of a cold heart and restricted
sympathies。 It is uncultured people who insist most on their rights； while noble minds look on other
aspects of the thing。 Thus abstract right is nothing but a bare possibility and； at least in contrast
with the whole range of the situation； something formal。 On that account； to have a right gives one
a warrant； but it is not absolutely necessary that one should insist on one's rights； because that is
only one aspect of the whole situation。 That is to say； possibility is being which has the significance
of also not being。
§ 38。
In relation to action in the concrete and to moral and ethical ties； abstract right is；
in contrast with the further content which these involve； only a possibility； and to
have a right is therefore to have only a permission or a warrant。 The
unconditional commands of abstract right are restricted； once again because of its
abstractness； to the negative： 'Do not infringe personality and what personality
entails。' The result is that there are only prohibitions in the sphere of right； and the
positive form of any command in this sphere is based in the last resort； if we
examine its ultimate content； on prohibition。
§ 39。
（3） As immediate individuality； a person in making decisions is related to a world
of nature directly confronting him； and thus the personality of the will stands over
against this world as something subjective。 For personality； however； as
inherently infinite and universal； the restriction of being only subjective is a
contradiction and a nullity。 Personality is that which struggles to lift itself above
this restriction and to give itself reality； or in other words to claim that external
world as its own。
§ 40。
Right is in the first place the immediate embodiment which freedom gives itself in
an immediate way； i。e。 （a） possession； which is property — ownership。 Freedom
is here the freedom of the abstract will in general or； eo ipso； the freedom of a
single person related only to himself。 （b） A person by distinguishing himself from
himself relates himself to another person； and it is only as owners that these two
persons really exist for each other。 Their implicit identity is realised through the
transference of property from one to the other in conformity with a common will
and without detriment to the rights of either。 This is contract。 （c） The will which
is differentiated not in the sense of （b） as being contrasted with another person；
but in the sense of （a） as related to itself； is as a particular will at variance with
and opposed to itself as an absolute will。 This opposition is wrongdoing and
crime。
Remark： The classification of the system of rights into jus ad personam and jus ad rem on the
one hand； and jus ad actiones on the other； like the many other similar classifications； has as its
primary aim the imposition of an external order on the mass of unorganised material confronting
the classifier。 The striking thing about this classification is the confusion in it due to the disorderly
intermixture of rights which presuppose substantial ties； e。g。 those of family and political life； and
rights which only an abstract personality as such。 This confusion is exemplified in the classification
of rights （adopted by Kant and since favoured by others） into jus reale； jus personals； and jus
realiter personals。
To develop the perversity and lack of speculative thought in the classification of rights into jus ad
personant and jus ad rem； which lies at 'the root of Roman law （jus ad actiones concerns the
administration of and is of a different order altogether）； would take us too far afield； a re this much
at least is clear： it is personality alone which can confer a right to things and therefore jus ad
personam in its essence is jus ad rem； rem being taken here in its general sense as anything
external to my freedom； including even my body and my life。 In this sense； jus ad rem is the right
of personality as such。 But from the point of view of what is called jus ad personam in Roman
law； a man is reckoned a person only when he is treated as possessing a certain status。 Hence in
Roman law； even personality itself is only a certain standing or status contrasted； with slavery。 The
so…called Roman law of 'personal' rights； then； is concerned with family relationships； though it
excludes the right over slaves （and 'slaves' almost includes children too） as well as the status
（called capitis diminutio） of having lost one's rights。 （In Kant； by the way； family relationships are
the jura realiter personalia。） The Roman jus ad personam is therefore not the right of the
person as person but at most the right of a person in his particular capacity。 （Later on in this book；
it will be shown that the substantial basis of family relationships is rather the sacrifice of
personality。） Now it must be obvious that it is perverse treat the right of a specific person in his
particular capacity before the universal right of personality as such。
Kant's jura personalia are the rights issuing from a contract whereby I undertake to give
something or to perform something — the jus ad rem conferred by an obligatio in Roman law。 To
be sure； it is only a person who is required to execute the covenants of a contract； just as it is also
only a person who acquires the right to their execution。 But a right of this sort cannot for this
reason be called a 'personal' right； rights of whatever sort belong to a person alone。 Objectively
considered； a right arising from a contract is never a right over a person； but only a right over
something external to a person or something which he can alienate； always a right over a thing。
A： Property … B： Contract … C： Wrong
Transition from Right to Morality
§ 104。
That is to say； crime； and justice in the form of revenge； display （i） the shape
which the will's development takes when it has passed over into the distinction
between the universal implicit will and the single will explicitly in opposition to the
universal； and （ii） the fact that the universal will； returning into itself through
superseding this opposition； has now itself become actual and explicit。 In this
way； the right； upheld in face of the explicitly independent single will； is and is
recognised as actual on the score of its necessity。 At the same time； however； this
external formation which the will has here is eo ipso a step forward in the inner
determination of the will by the concept。 The will's immanent actualisation in
accordance with its concept is the process whereby it supersedes its implicit state
and the form of immediacy in which it begins and which is the shape it assumes
in abstract right （see Remark to § 21）； this means that it first puts itself in the
opposition between the implicit universal