opposition between the implicit universal will and the single explicitly independent
will； and then； through the supersession of this opposition （through the negation
of the negation）； it determines itself in its existence as a will； so that it is a free will
not only in itself but for itself also； i。e。 it determines itself as self…related
negativity。 Its personality — and in abstract right the will is personality and no
more — it now has for its object； the infinite subjectivity of freedom； a
subjectivity become explicit in this way； is the principle of the moral standpoint 。
Remark： Let us look back more closely over the moments through which the concept of
freedom develops itself from the will's determinate character as originally abstract to its character
as self…related； and so at this point to its self…determination as subjectivity。 In property this
determinate character is the abstract one； 'mine'； and is therefore found in an external thing。 In
contract； 'mine' is mediated by the wills of the parties and means only something common。 In
wrong the will of the sphere of right has its abstract character of implicit being or immediacy
posited as contingency through the act of a single will； itself a contingent will。 At the moral
standpoint； the abstract determinacy of the will in the sphere of right has been so far overcome that
this contingency itself is； as reflected in upon itself and self…identical； the inward infinite contingency
of the will； i。e。 its subjectivity。
Addition： Truth entails that the concept shall be； and that this existence shall correspond with
the concept。 In the sphere of right； the will is existent in something external； but the next
requirement is that the will should be existent in something inward； in itself。 It must in its own eyes
be subjectivity； and have itself as its own object。 This relation to itself is the moment of affirmation；
but it can attain it only by superseding its immediacy。 The immediacy superseded in crime leads；
then； through punishment； i。e。 through the nullity of this nullity； to affirmation； i。e。 to morality。
Second Part： Morality
§ 105。
The standpoint of morality is the standpoint of the will which is infinite not
merely in itself but for itself （see § 104）。 In contrast with the will's implicit being；
with its immediacy and the determinate characteristics developed within it at that
level； this reflection of the will into itself and its explicit awareness of its identity
makes the person into the subject。
§ 106。
It is as subjectivity that the concept has now been determined； and since
subjectivity is distinct from the concept as such； i。e。 from the implicit principle of
the will； and since furthermore it is at the same time the will of the subject as a
single individual aware of himself （i。e。 still has immediacy in him）； it constitutes
the determinate existence of the concept。 In this way a higher ground has been
assigned to freedom； the Idea's existential aspect； or its moment of reality； is now
the subjectivity of the will。 Only in the Will as subjective can freedom or the
implicit principle of the will be actual。
Remark： The second sphere； — Morality； therefore throughout portrays the real aspect of the
concept of freedom； and the movement of this sphere is as follows： the will； which at the start is
aware only of its independence and which before it is mediated is only implicitly identical with the
universal will or the principle of the will； is raised beyond its ＇explicit＇ difference from the universal
will； beyond this situation in which it sinks deeper and deeper into itself； and is established as
explicitly identical with the principle of the will。； — This process is accordingly the cultivation of the
ground in which freedom is now set； i。e。 subjectivity。 What happens is that subjectivity； which is
abstract at the start； i。e。 distinct from the concept； becomes likened to it； and thereby the Idea
acquires its genuine realisation； The result is that the subjective…will determines itself as objective
too and so as truly concrete。
Addition： So far as right in the strict sense was concerned； it was of no importance what my
intention or my principle was。 This question about the self…determination and motive of the will；
like the question about its purpose； now enters at this point in connection with morality。 Since man
wishes to be judged in accordance with his own self…determined choices； he is free in this relation
to himself whatever the external situation may impose upon him。 No one can break in upon this
inner conviction of mankind； no violence can be done to it； and the moral will； therefore； is
inaccessible。 Man's worth is estimated by reference to his inward action and hence the standpoint
of morality is that of freedom aware of itself。
§ 107。
The self…determination of the will is at the same time a moment in the concept of
the will； and subjectivity is not merely its existential aspect but its own
determinate character （see § 104）。 The will aware of its freedom and determined
as subjective is at the start concept alone； but itself has determinate existence in
order to exist as Idea。 The moral standpoint therefore takes shape as the right of
the subjective Will。 In accordance with this right； the will recognises something
and is something； only in so far as the thing is its own and as the will is present to
itself there as something subjective。
The same process through which the moral attitude develops （see the Remark to
the preceding Paragraph） has from this point of view the form of being the
development of the right of the subjective will； or of the mode of its existence。 In
this process the subjective will further determines what it recognises as its own in
its object （Gegenstand）； so that this object becomes the will's own true concept；
becomes objective （objektiv） as the expression of the will's own universality。
Addition： This entire category of the subjectivity of the will is once again a whole which； as
subjectivity； must also have objectivity。 It is in a subject that freedom can first be realised； since
the subjective is the true material for this realisation。 But this embodiment of the will which we have
called subjectivity is different from the will which has developed all its potentialities to actuality。
That is to say； the will must free itself from this second one…sidedness of pure subjectivity in order
to become the fully actualised will。 In morality； it is man's private interest that comes into question；
and the high worth of this interest consists precisely in the fact that man knows himself as absolute
and is self…determined。 The uneducated man allows himself to be constrained in everything by
brute force and natural factors； children have no moral will but leave their parents to decide things
for them。 The educated man； however； develops an inner life and wills that he himself shall be in
everything he does。
§ 108。
The subjective will； directly aware of itself； and distinguished from the principle
of the will （see Remark to § 106）； is therefore abstract； restricted； and formal。
But not merely is subjectivity itself formal； in addition； as the infinite
self…determination of the will； it constitutes the form of all willing。 In this； its first
appearance in the single will； this form has not yet been established as identical
with the concept of the will； and therefore the moral point of view is that of
relation； of ought…to…be； or demand。 And since the self…difference of subjectivity
involves at the same time the character of being opposed to objectivity as external
fact； it follows that the point of view of consciousness comes on the scene here
too （see § 8）。 The general point of view here is that of the will's self…difference；
finitude； and appearance。
Remark： The moral is not characterised primarily by its having already been opposed to the
immoral； nor is right directly characterised by its opposition to wrong。 The point is rather that the
general characteristics of morality and immorality alike rest on the subjectivity of the will。
Addition： In morality； self…determination is to be thought of as the pure restlessness and activity
which can never arrive at anything that is。 It is in the sphere of ethical life that the will is for the first
time identical with the concept of the will and has this concept alone as its content。 In the moral
sphere the will still relates itself to its implicit principle and consequently its position is that of
difference。 The process through which this position develops is that whereby the subjective will
becomes identified with its concept。 Therefore the 'ought…to…be' which is never absent from the
moral sphere becomes an 'is' only in ethical life。 Further； this 'other' in relation to which the
subjective will stands is two…sided： first； it is what is substantive； the concept； secondly； it is
external fact。 Even if the good were posited in the subjective will； that still would not give it
complete realisation。