external fact。 Even if the good were posited in the subjective will； that still would not give it
complete realisation。
§ 109。
This form of all willing primarily involves in accordance with its general character
（a） the opposition of subjectivity and objectivity； and （b） the activity （see § 8）
related to this opposition。 Now existence and specific determinacy are identical in
the concept of the will （see § 104）； and the will as subjective is itself this concept
。 Hence the moments of this activity consist more precisely in （a） distinguishing
between objectivity and subjectivity and even ascribing independence to。 them
both； and （b） establishing them as identical。 In the will which is self…determining；
＇a＇ its specific determinacy is in the first place established in the will itself by
itself as its inner particularisation； as a content which it gives to itself。 This is
the first negation； and the formal limitation （Grenze） of this negation is that
of being only something posited； something subjective。
＇b＇ As infinitely reflected into itself； this limitation exists for the will； and the
will is the struggle to transcend this barrier （Schranke）； i。e。 it is the activity
of translating this content in some way or other from subjectivity into
objectivity； into an immediate existence。
＇c＇ The simple identity of the will with itself in this opposition is the content
which remains self…identical in both these opposites and indifferent to this
formal distinction of opposition。 In short； it is my aim ＇the purpose willed＇。
§ 110。
But； at the standpoint of morality； where the will is aware of its freedom； of this
identity of the will with itself （see § 105）； this identity of content acquires the
more particularised character appropriate to itself。
（a） The content as 'mine' has for me this character： by virtue of its identity in
subject and object it enshrines for me my subjectivity； not merely as my inner
purpose； but also inasmuch as it has acquired outward existence。
Addition： The content of the subjective or moral will has a specific character of its own； i。e。
even if it has acquired the form of objectivity； it must still continue to enshrine my subjectivity； and
my act is to count as mine only if on its inward side it has been determined by me； if it was my
purpose； my intention。 Beyond what lay in my subjective will I recognise nothing in its expression
as mine。 What I wish to see in my deed is my subjective consciousness over again。
§ 111。
（b） Though the content does have in it something particular； whencesoever it may
be derived； still it is the content of the will reflected into itself in its determinacy
and thus of the self…identical and universal will； and therefore：
＇a＇ the content is inwardly characterised as adequate to the principle of the
will or as possessing the objectivity of the concept；
＇b＇ since the subjective will； as aware of itself； is at the same time still
formal （see § 108）； the content's adequacy to the concept is still only
something demanded； and hence this entails the possibility that the content
may not be adequate to the concept。
§ 112。
（c） Since in carrying out my aims I retain my subjectivity （see § 110）； during this
process of objectifying them I simultaneously supersede the immediacy of this
subjectivity as well as its character as this my individual subjectivity。 But the
external subjectivity which is thus identical with me is the will of others （see §
73）。 The will's ground of existence is now subjectivity （see § 106） and the will of
others is that existence which I give to my aim and which is at the same time to
me an other。 The achievement of my aim； therefore； implies this identity of my
will with the will of others； it has a positive bearing on the will of others。
Remark： The objectivity of the aim achieved thus involves three meanings； or rather it has three
moments present within it at once； it is：
＇a＇ something existing externally and immediately （see § 106）；
＇b＇ adequate to the concept （see § 111）；
＇c＇ universal subjectivity。
The subjectivity which maintains itself in this objectivity consists：
＇a＇ in the fact that the objective aim is mine； so that in it I maintain myself as this individual
（see § 110）；
＇b＇ and ＇c＇； in moments which coincide with the moments ＇b＇ and ＇c＇ above。
At the standpoint of morality； subjectivity and objectivity are distinct from one another； or united
only by their mutual contradiction； it is this fact more particularly which constitutes the finitude of
this sphere or its character as mere appearance （see § 108）； and the development of this
standpoint is the development of these contradictions and their resolutions； resolutions； however；
which within this field can be no more than relative。
Addition： In dealing with formal right； I said ＇see § 38＇ that it contained prohibitions only； that
hence a right action； strictly so called； was purely negative in character in respect of the will of
others。 In morality； on the other hand； my will has a positive character in relation to the Will of
others； i。e。 the universal will is implicitly present within what the subjective will effects。 To effect
something is to produce something or to alter what already exists； and such changes have a
bearing on the will of others。 The concept of morality is the inner relation of the will to itself。 But
here it is not only one will； on the contrary its objectification implies at the same time the
cancellation of the single will； and therefore； in addition； just because the character of
one…sidedness vanishes； the positing of two wills and a positive bearing of each on the other。 So
far as rights are concerned； it makes no difference whether someone else's will may do something
in relation to mine； when I give my will an embodiment in property。 In morality； however； the
welfare of others too is in question； and this positive bearing cannot come on the scene before this
point。
§ 113。
The externalisation of the subjective or moral will is action。 Action implies the
determinate characteristics here indicated： ＇a＇ in its externality it must be known
to me as my action； ＇b＇ it must bear essentially on the concept as an 'ought' ＇see §
131＇； ＇c＇ it must have an essential bearing on the will of others。
Remark： It is not until we come to the externalisation of the moral will that we come to action。
The existence which the will gives to itself in the sphere of formal rights is existence in an
immediate thing and is itself immediate； to start with； it neither has in itself any express bearing on
the concept； which is at that point not yet contrasted with the subjective will and so is not
distinguished from it； nor has it a positive bearing on the will of others； in the sphere of right；
command in its fundamental character is only prohibition （see § 38）。 In contract and wrong； there
is the beginning of a bearing on the will of others； but the correspondence established in contract
between one will and another is grounded in arbitrariness； and the essential bearing which the will
has there on the will of the other is； as a matter of rights； something negative； i。e。 one party retains
his property （the value of it） and allows the other to retain his。 On the other hand； crime in its
aspect as issuing from the subjective will； and the question of the mode of its existence in that will；
come before us now for consideration for the first time。
The content of an action at law （actio）； as something determined by legal enactment； is not
imputable to me。 Consequently； such an action contains only some of the moments of a moral
action proper； and contains them only Incidentally。 The aspect of an action in virtue of which it is
properly moral is therefore distinct from its aspect as legal。
§ 114。
The right of the moral will involves three aspects：
（a） The abstract or formal right of action； the right that the content of the
action as carried out in immediate existence； shall be in principle mine； that
thus the action shall be the Purpose of the subjective will。
（b） The particular aspect of the action is its inner content ＇a＇ as I am aware
of it in its general character； my awareness of this general character
constitutes the worth of the action and the reason I think good to do it … in
short my Intention。 ＇b＇ Its content is my special aim； the aim of my
particular； merely individual； existence； i。e。 Welfare。
（c） This content （as something which is inward and which yet at the same
time is raised to its universality as to absolute objectivity） is the absolute end
of the will； the Good — with the opposition in the sphere of reflection； of
subjective universality； which is now wickedness and now conscience。
Addition： If an action is to be moral； it m