subjective universality； which is now wickedness and now conscience。
Addition： If an action is to be moral； it must in the first place correspond with my purpose；
since the moral will has the right to refuse to recognise in the resulting state of affairs what was not
present inwardly as purpose。 Purpose concerns only the formal principle that the external will shall
be within me as something inward。 On the other hand； in the second moment of the moral sphere；
questions may be asked about the intention behind the action； i。e。 about the relative worth of the
action in relation to me。 The third and last moment is not the relative worth of the action but its
universal worth； the good。
In a moral action； then； there may be a breach first between what is purposed and what is really
effected and achieved； secondly； between what is there externally as a universal will and the
particular inner determination which I give to it。 The third and last point is that the intention should
be in addition the universal content of the action。 The good is the intention raised to be the concept
of the will。
i Purpose & Responsibility
§ 115。
The finitude of the subjective will in the immediacy of acting consists directly in
this； that its action presupposes an external object with a complex environment。
The deed sets up an alteration in this state of affairs confronting the will； and my
will has responsibility in general for its deed in so far as the abstract predicate
'mine' belongs to the state of affairs so altered。
Remark： An event； a situation which has been produced； is a concrete external actuality which
because of its concreteness has in it an indeterminable multiplicity of factors。 Any and every single
element which appears as the condition； ground； or cause of one such factor； and so has
contributed its share to the event in question； may be looked upon as responsible for the event； or
at least as sharing the responsibility for it。 Hence； in the case of a complex event （e。g。 the French
Revolution） it is open to the abstract Understanding to choose which of an endless number of
factors it will maintain to be responsible for it。
Addition： I am chargeable with what lay in my purpose and this is the most important point in
connection with crime。 But responsibility contains only the quite external judgement whether I have
or have not done some thing。 It does not follow that； because I am responsible； the thing done
may be imputed to me。
§ 116。
It is； of course； not my own doing if damage is caused to others by things whose
owner I am and which as external objects stand and are effective in manifold
connections with other things （as may also be the case with my self as a bodily
mechanism or as a living thing）。 This damage； however； is to some extent
chargeable to me because the things that cause it are in principle mine； although it
is true that they are subject to my control； vigilance； &c。； only to an extent
varying with their special character。
§ 117。
The freely acting will； in directing its aim on the state of affairs confronting it； has
an idea of the attendant circumstances。 But because the will is finite； since this
state of affairs is presupposed； the objective phenomenon is contingent so far as
the will is concerned； and may contain something other than what the will's idea
of it contains。 The will's right； however； is to recognise as its action； and to accept
responsibility for； only those presuppositions of the deed of which it was
conscious in its aim and those aspects of the deed which were contained in its
purpose。 The deed can be imputed to me only if my will is responsible for it … this
is the right to know。
Addition： The will has confronting it a state of affairs upon which it acts。 But in order to know
what this state of affairs is I must have an idea of it； and the responsibility is truly mine only in so
far as I had knowledge of the situation confronting me。 Such a situation is a presupposition of my
volition and my will is therefore finite； or rather； since my will is finite； it has a presupposition of this
kind。 As soon as my thinking and willing is rational； I am no longer at this level of finitude； since the
object on which I act is no longer an 'other' to me。 Finitude； however； implies fixed limits and
restrictions。 I have confronting me an 'other' which is only contingent； something necessary in a
purely external way； its path and mine may meet or diverge。 Nevertheless； I am nothing except in
relation to my freedom； and my will is responsible for the deed only in so far as I know what I am
doing。 Oedipus； who killed his father without knowing it； cannot be accused of parricide。 The
ancient penal codes； however； attached less weight to the subjective side of action； to imputability；
than we do nowadays。 That is why sanctuaries were instituted in ancient times for harbouring and
protecting the fugitive from vengeance。
§ 118。
Further； action is translated into external fact； and external fact has connections in
the field of external necessity through which it develops itself in all directions。
Hence action has a multitude of consequences。 These consequences are the
outward form whose inner soul is the aim of the action； and thus they are the
consequences of the action； they belong to the action。 At the same time；
however； the action； as the aim posited in the external world； has become the
prey of external forces which attach to it something totally different from what it
is explicitly and drive it on into alien and distant consequences。 Thus the will has
the right to repudiate the imputation of all consequences except the first； since it
alone was purposed。
Remark： To determine which results are accidental and which necessary is impossible； because
the necessity implicit in the finite comes into determinate existence as an external necessity； as a
relation of single things to one another； things which as self…subsistent are conjoined in indifference
to one another and externally。 The maxim： 'Ignore the consequences of actions' and the other：
'Judge actions by their consequences and make these the criterion of right and good' are both alike
maxims of the abstract Understanding。 The consequences； as the shape proper to the action and
immanent within it； exhibit nothing but its nature and are simply the action itself； therefore the action
can neither disavow nor ignore them。 On the other hand； however； among the consequences there
is also comprised something interposed from without and introduced by chance； and this is quite
unrelated to the nature of the action itself。
The development in the external world of the contradiction involved in the necessity of the finite is
just the conversion of necessity into contingency and vice versa。 From this point of view； therefore；
acting means surrendering oneself to this law。 It is because of this that it is to the advantage of the
criminal if his action has comparatively few bad consequences （while a good action must be
content to have had no consequences or very few）； and that the full developed consequences of a
crime are counted as part of the crime。
The self…consciousness of heroes （like that of Oedipus and others in Greek tragedy） had not
advanced out of its primitive simplicity either to reflection on the distinction between act and
action； between the external event and the purpose and knowledge of the circumstances； or to the
subdivision of consequences。 On the contrary； they accepted responsibility for the whole compass
of the deed。
Addition： The transition to intention depends on the fact that I accept responsibility only for
what my idea of the situation was。 That is to say； there can be imputed to me only what I knew of
the circumstances。 On the other hand； there are inevitable consequences linked with every action；
even if I am only bringing about some single； immediate； state of affairs。 The consequences in such
a case represent the universal implicit within that state of affairs。 Of course I cannot foresee the
consequences … they might be preventable … but I must be aware of the universal character of any
isolated act。 The important point here is not the isolated thing but the whole； and that depends not
on the differentia of the particular action； but on its universal nature。 Now the transition from
purpose to intention lies in the fact that I ought to be aware not simply of my single action but also
of the universal which is conjoined with it。 The universal which comes on the scene here in this way
is what I have willed； my intention。
ii Intention & Welfare
§ 119。
An action as an external event。 is a complex of connected parts which may be
regarded as divided into units ad infinitum； and the action may be treated as
having touched in the first instance only one of these units。 The truth of the
single； however； is the universal； and what explicitly gives action its specific
character is not an isolated content limited to an exte