character is not an isolated content limited to an external unit； but a universal
content； comprising in itself the complex of connected parts。 Purpose； as issuing
from a thinker； comprises more than the mere unit； essentially it comprises that
universal side of the action； i。e。 the intention。
Remark： Etymologically； Absicht （intention） implies abstraction； either the form of universality
or the extraction of a particular aspect of the concrete thing。 The endeavour to justify an action by
the intention behind it involves the isolation of one or other of its single aspects which is alleged to
be the essence of the action on its subjective side。
To judge an action as an external deed without yet determining its rightness or wrongness is simply
to bestow on it a universal predicate； i。e。 to describe it as burning； killing； &c。
The discrete character of the external world shows what the nature of that world is； namely a chain
of external relations。 Actuality is touched in the first instance only at a single point （arson； for
instance； directly concerns only a tiny section of the firewood； i。e。 is describable in a proposition；
not a judgment）； but the universal nature of this point entails its expansion。 In a living thing； the
single part is there in its immediacy not as a mere part； but as an organ in which the universal is
really present as the universal； hence in murder； it is not a piece of flesh； as something isolated；
which is injured； but life itself which is injured in that piece of flesh。 It is subjective reflection；
ignorant of the logical nature of the single and the universal； which indulges ad libitum in the
subdivision of single parts and consequences； and yet it is the nature of the finite deed itself to
contain such separable contingencies。 The device of dolus indirectus has its basis in these
considerations。
Addition： It happens of course that circumstances may make an action miscarry to a greater or
lesser degree。 In a case of arson； for instance； the fire may not catch or alternatively it may take
hold further than the incendiary intended。 In spite of this； however； we must not make this a
distinction between good and bad luck； since in acting a man must lay his account with externality。
The old Proverb is correct： 'A flung stone is the devil's。' To act is to expose oneself to bad luck。
Thus bad luck has a right over me and is an embodiment of my own willing。
§ 120。
The right of intention is that the universal quality of the action shall not merely be
implicit but shall be known by the agent； and so shall have lain from the start in
his subjective will。 Vice versa； what may be called the right of the objectivity of
action is the right of the action to evince itself as known and willed by the subject
as a thinker。
Remark： This right to insight of this kind entails the complete； or almost complete；
irresponsibility of children； imbeciles； lunatics； &c。； for their actions。 But just as actions on their
external side as events include accidental consequences； so there is involved in the subjective
agent an indeterminacy whose degree depends on the strength and force of his self…consciousness
and circumspection。 This indeterminacy； however； may not be taken into account except in
connection with childhood or imbecility； lunacy； &c。； since it is only such well marked states of
mind that nullify the trait of thought and freedom of will； and permit us to treat the agent as devoid
of the dignity of being a thinker and a will。
§ 121。
The universal quality of the action is the manifold content of the action as such；
reduced to the simple form of universality。 But the subject； an entity reflected
into himself and so particular in correlation with the particularity of his object； has
in his end his own particular content； and this content is the soul of the action and
determines its character。 The fact that this moment of the particularity of the
agent is contained and realised in the action constitutes subjective freedom in its
more concrete sense； the right of the subject to find his satisfaction in the action。
Addition： In my own eyes； reflected into myself； I am a particular in correlation with the
externality of my action。 My end constitutes the content of the action； the content determinant of
the action。 Murder and arson； for example； are universals and so are not the positive content of
my action qua the action of a subject。 If one of these crimes has been committed； its perpetrator
may be asked why he committed it。 The murder was not done for the sake of murdering； the
murderer had in View some particular positive end。 But if we were to say that he murdered for the
mere pleasure of murdering； then the purely positive content of the subject would surely be
pleasure； and if that is the case then the deed is the satisfaction of the subject's will。 Thus the
motive of an act is； more particularly； what is called the 'moral' factor； and this has in that case the
double meaning of the universal implicit in the purpose and the particular aspect of the intention。
It is a striking modem innovation to inquire continually about the motives of men's actions。
Formerly； the question was simply： 'Is he an honest man？ Does he do his duty？' Nowadays we
insist on looking into men's hearts and so we presuppose a gulf between the objectivity of actions
and their inner side； the subjective motives。 To be sure； the subject's volition must be considered；
he wills something and the reason for what he wills lies within himself； he wills the satisfaction of his
desire； the gratification of his passion。 None the less； the good and the right are also a content of
action； a content not purely natural but put there by my rationality。 To make my freedom the
content of what I will is a plain goal of my freedom itself。 Therefore it is to take higher moral
ground to find satisfaction in the action and to advance beyond the gulf between the
self…consciousness of a man and the objectivity of his deed； even though to treat action as if it
involved such a gulf is a way of looking at the matter characteristic of certain epochs in world
history and in individual biography。
§ 122。
It is on the strength of this particular aspect that the action has subjective worth
or interest for me。 In contrast with this end … the content of the intention … the
direct character of the action in its further content is reduced to a means。 In so
far as such an end is something finite； it may in its turn be reduced to a means to
some further intention and so on ad infinitum。
§ 123。
For the content of these ends nothing is available at this point except ＇a＇ pure
activity itself； i。e。 the activity present owing to the fact that the subject puts
himself into whatever he is to look upon and promote as his end。 Men are willing
to be active in pursuit of what interests them； or should interest them； as
something which is their own。 ＇b＇ A more determinate content； however； the still
abstract and formal freedom of subjectivity possesses only in its。 natural。
subjective embodiment； i。e。 in needs； inclinations； passions； opinions； fancies； &c。
The satisfaction of these is welfare or happiness； both in general and in its
particular species … the ends of the whole sphere of finitude。
Remark： Here … the standpoint of relation （see § 108）； when the subject is characterised by his
self…difference and so counts as a particular … is the place where the content of the natural will （see
§ 11）。 comes on the scene。 But the will here is not as it is in its immediacy； on the contrary； this
content now belongs to a will reflected into itself and so is elevated to become a universal end； the
end of welfare or happiness； this happens at the level of the thinking which does not yet apprehend
the will in its freedom but reflects on its content as on one natural and given … the level； for
example； of the time of Croesus and Solon。
Addition： Since the specifications of happiness are given； they are not true specifications of
freedom； because freedom is not genuinely free in its own eyes except in the good； i。e。 except
when it is its own end。 Consequently we may raise the question whether a man has the right to set
before himself ends not freely chosen but resting solely on the fact that the subject is a living being。
The fact that man is a living being； however； is not fortuitous； but in conformity with reason； and to
that extent he has a right to make his needs his end。 There is nothing degrading in being alive； and
there is no mode of intelligent being higher than life in which existence would be possible。 It is only
the raising of the given to something self…created which yields the higher orbit of the good； although
this distinction implies no incompatibility between the two levels。
§ 124。
Since the subjective satisfaction of the individual himself （including the
recognition which he receives by way of honour and fame） is also part and parcel
of the achievement of ends of absolute worth； it