recognition which he receives by way of honour and fame） is also part and parcel
of the achievement of ends of absolute worth； it follows that the demand that
such an end alone shall appear as willed and attained； like the view that； in willing；
objective and subjective ends are mutually exclusive； is an empty dogmatism of
the abstract Understanding。 And this dogmatism is more than empty； it is
pernicious if it passes into the assertion that because subjective satisfaction is
present； as it always is when any task is brought to completion； it is what the
agent intended in essence to secure and that the objective end was in his eyes
only a means to that。 — What the subject is； is the series of his actions。 If ；these
are a series of worthless productions； then the subjectivity of his willing is just as
worthless。 But if the series of his deeds is of a substantive nature； then the same
is true also of the individual's inner will。
Remark： The right of the subject's particularity； his right to be satisfied； or in other words the
right of subjective freedom； is the pivot and centre of the difference between antiquity and modern
times。 This right in its infinity is given expression in Christianity and it has become the universal
effective principle of a new form of civilisation。 Amongst the primary shapes which this right
assumes are love； romanticism； the quest for the eternal salvation of the individual； &c。； next come
moral convictions and conscience； and； finally； the other forms； some of which come into
prominence in what follows as the principle of civil society and as moments in the constitution of
the state； while others appear in the course of history； particularly the history of art； science； and
philosophy。
Now this principle of particularity is； to be sure； one moment of the antithesis； and in the first place
at least it is just as much identical with the universal as distinct from it。 Abstract reflection；
however； fixes this moment in its distinction from and opposition to the universal and so produces
a view of morality as nothing but a bitter； unending； struggle against self…satisfaction； as the
command： 'Do with abhorrence what duty enjoins。'
It is just this type of ratiocination which adduces that familiar psychological view of history which
understands how to belittle and disparage all great deeds and great men by transforming into the
main intention and operative motive of actions the inclinations and passions which likewise found
their satisfaction from the achievement of something substantive； the fame and honour； &c。；
consequential on such actions； in a word their particular aspect； the aspect which it has decreed in
advance to be something in itself pernicious。 Such ratiocination assures us that； while great actions
and the efficiency which has subsisted through a series of them have produced greatness in the
world and have had as their consequences for the individual agent power； honour； and fame； still
what belongs to the individual is not the greatness itself but what has accrued to him from it； this
purely particular and external result； because this result is a consequence； it is therefore supposed
to have been the agent's end and even his sole end。 Reflection of this sort stops short at the
subjective side of great men； since it itself stands on purely subjective ground； and consequently it
overlooks what is substantive in this emptiness of its own making。 This is the view of those valet
psychologists 'for whom there are no heroes； not because there are no heroes； but because these
psychologists are only valets'。
Addition： In magnis 。。。 voluisse sat est ＇In great things to have willed is enough＇ is right in the
sense that we ought to will something great。 But we must also be able to achieve it； otherwise the
willing is nugatory。 The laurels of mere willing are dry leaves that never were green。
§ 125。
The subjective element of the will； with its particular content … welfare； is
reflected into itself and infinite and so stands related to the universal element； to
the principle of the will。 This moment of universality； posited first of all within
this particular content itself； is the welfare of others also； or； specified completely；
though quite emptily； the welfare of all。 The welfare of many other unspecified
particulars is thus also an essential end and right of subjectivity。 But since the
absolutely universal； in distinction from such a particular content； has not so far
been further determined than as 'the right'； it follows that these ends of
particularity； differing as they do from the universal； may be in conformity with it；
but they also may not。
§ 126。
My particularity； however； like that of others； is only a right at all in so far as I
am a free entity。 Therefore it may not make claims for itself in contradiction to
this its substantive basis； and an intention to secure my welfare or that of others
（and it is particularly in this latter case that such an intention is called moral'）
cannot justify an action which is wrong。
Remark： It is one of the most prominent of the corrupt maxims of our time to enter a plea for
the so…called 'moral' intention behind wrong actions and to imagine bad men with well…meaning
hearts； i。e。 hearts willing their own welfare and perhaps that of others also。 This doctrine is rooted
in the 'benevolence' （guten Herzens） of the pre…Kantian philosophers and constitutes； e。g。； the
quintessence of well…known touching dramatic productions； but today it has been resuscitated in a
more extravagant form； and inner enthusiasm and the heart； i。e。 the form of particularity as such；
have been made the criterion of right； rationality； and excellence。 The result is that crime and the
thoughts that lead to it； be they fancies however trite and empty； or opinions however wild； are to
be regarded as right； rational； and excellent； simply because they issue from men's hearts and
enthusiasms。 （See the Remark to § 140； where more details are given。） ； Incidentally； however；
attention must be paid to the point of view from which right and welfare are being treated here。
We are considering right as abstract right and welfare as the particular welfare of the single agent。
The so…called 'general good'； the welfare of the state； i。e。 the right of mind actual and concrete； is
quite a different sphere； a sphere in which abstract right is a subordinate moment like particular
welfare and the happiness of the individual。 As was remarked above； it is one of the commonest
blunders of abstract thinking to make private rights and private welfare count as absolute in
opposition to the universality of the state。
Addition： The famous answer： Je n'en vois pas la nécessité； given ＇by Richelieu＇ to the
lampooner who excused himself with the words： Il faut donc que je vive； is apposite at this point。
Life ceases to be necessary in face of the higher realm of freedom。 When St。 Crispin stole leather
to make shoes for the poor； his action was moral but wrong and so inadmissible。
§ 127。
The particularity of the interests of the natural will； taken in their entirety as a
single whole； is personal existence or life。 In extreme danger and in conflict with
the rightful property of someone else； this life may claim （as a right； not a mercy）
a right of distress； because in such a situation there is on the one hand an infinite
injury to a man's existence and the consequent loss of rights altogether； and on
the other hand only an injury to a single restricted embodiment of freedom； and
this implies a recognition both of right as such and also of the injured man's
capacity for rights； because the injury affects only this property of his。
Remark： The right of distress is the basis of beneficium competentiae whereby a debtor is
allowed to retain of his tools； farming implements； clothes； or； in short； of his resources； i。e。 of his
creditor's property； so much as is regarded as indispensable if he is to continue to support life … to
support it； of course； on his own social level。
Addition： Life as the sum of ends has a right against abstract right。 If for example it is only by
stealing bread that the wolf can be kept from the door； the action is of course an encroachment on
someone's property； but it would be wrong to treat this action as an ordinary theft。 To refuse to
allow a man in jeopardy of his life to take such steps for self…preservation would be to stigmatise
him as without rights； and since he would be deprived of his life； his freedom would be annulled
altogether。 Many diverse details have a bearing on the preservation of life； and when we have our
eyes on the future we have to engage ourselves in these details。 But the only thing that is necessary
is to live now； the future is not absolute but ever exposed to accident。 Hence it is only the
necessity of the immediate present which can justify a wrong action； because not to do the action
would in turn be to commit an offence； indeed the most wrong of all offences； namely the complete
destruction of the embodiment of freedom。 Benefic