alcibiades i- 第6部分

nature　of　wood　and　stone？　are　they　not　agreed　if　you　ask　them　what　they

are？　and　do　they　not　run　to　fetch　the　same　thing；　when　they　want　a　piece　of

wood　or　a　stone？　　And　so　in　similar　cases；　which　I　suspect　to　be　pretty

nearly　all　that　you　mean　by　speaking　Greek。



ALCIBIADES：　　True。



SOCRATES：　　These；　as　we　were　saying；　are　matters　about　which　they　are

agreed　with　one　another　and　with　themselves；　both　individuals　and　states

use　the　same　words　about　them；　they　do　not　use　some　one　word　and　some

another。



ALCIBIADES：　　They　do　not。



SOCRATES：　　Then　they　may　be　expected　to　be　good　teachers　of　these　things？



ALCIBIADES：　　Yes。



SOCRATES：　　And　if　we　want　to　instruct　any　one　in　them；　we　shall　be　right　in

sending　him　to　be　taught　by　our　friends　the　many？



ALCIBIADES：　　Very　true。



SOCRATES：　　But　if　we　wanted　further　to　know　not　only　which　are　men　and

which　are　horses；　but　which　men　or　horses　have　powers　of　running；　would　the

many　still　be　able　to　inform　us？



ALCIBIADES：　　Certainly　not。



SOCRATES：　　And　you　have　a　sufficient　proof　that　they　do　not　know　these

things　and　are　not　the　best　teachers　of　them；　inasmuch　as　they　are　never

agreed　about　them？



ALCIBIADES：　　Yes。　　



SOCRATES：　　And　suppose　that　we　wanted　to　know　not　only　what　men　are　like；

but　what　healthy　or　diseased　men　are　likewould　the　many　be　able　to　teach

us？



ALCIBIADES：　　They　would　not。



SOCRATES：　　And　you　would　have　a　proof　that　they　were　bad　teachers　of　these

matters；　if　you　saw　them　at　variance？



ALCIBIADES：　　I　should。



SOCRATES：　　Well；　but　are　the　many　agreed　with　themselves；　or　with　one

another；　about　the　justice　or　injustice　of　men　and　things？



ALCIBIADES：　　Assuredly　not；　Socrates。



SOCRATES：　　There　is　no　subject　about　which　they　are　more　at　variance？



ALCIBIADES：　　None。



SOCRATES：　　I　do　not　suppose　that　you　ever　saw　or　heard　of　men　quarrelling

over　the　principles　of　health　and　disease　to　such　an　extent　as　to　go　to　war

and　kill　one　another　for　the　sake　of　them？



ALCIBIADES：　　No　indeed。



SOCRATES：　　But　of　the　quarrels　about　justice　and　injustice；　even　if　you

have　never　seen　them；　you　have　certainly　heard　from　many　people；　including

Homer；　for　you　have　heard　of　the　Iliad　and　Odyssey？



ALCIBIADES：　　To　be　sure；　Socrates。



SOCRATES：　　A　difference　of　just　and　unjust　is　the　argument　of　those　poems？



ALCIBIADES：　　True。



SOCRATES：　　Which　difference　caused　all　the　wars　and　deaths　of　Trojans　and

Achaeans；　and　the　deaths　of　the　suitors　of　Penelope　in　their　quarrel　with

Odysseus。



ALCIBIADES：　　Very　true。



SOCRATES：　　And　when　the　Athenians　and　Lacedaemonians　and　Boeotians　fell　at

Tanagra；　and　afterwards　in　the　battle　of　Coronea；　at　which　your　father

Cleinias　met　his　end；　the　question　was　one　of　justicethis　was　the　sole

cause　of　the　battles；　and　of　their　deaths。



ALCIBIADES：　　Very　true。



SOCRATES：　　But　can　they　be　said　to　understand　that　about　which　they　are

quarrelling　to　the　death？



ALCIBIADES：　　Clearly　not。



SOCRATES：　　And　yet　those　whom　you　thus　allow　to　be　ignorant　are　the

teachers　to　whom　you　are　appealing。



ALCIBIADES：　　Very　true。



SOCRATES：　　But　how　are　you　ever　likely　to　know　the　nature　of　justice　and

injustice；　about　which　you　are　so　perplexed；　if　you　have　neither　learned

them　of　others　nor　discovered　them　yourself？



ALCIBIADES：　　From　what　you　say；　I　suppose　not。



SOCRATES：　　See；　again；　how　inaccurately　you　speak；　Alcibiades！



ALCIBIADES：　　In　what　respect？



SOCRATES：　　In　saying　that　I　say　so。



ALCIBIADES：　　Why；　did　you　not　say　that　I　know　nothing　of　the　just　and

unjust？



SOCRATES：　　No；　I　did　not。



ALCIBIADES：　　Did　I；　then？



SOCRATES：　　Yes。



ALCIBIADES：　　How　was　that？



SOCRATES：　　Let　me　explain。　　Suppose　I　were　to　ask　you　which　is　the　greater

number；　two　or　one；　you　would　reply　'two'？



ALCIBIADES：　　I　should。



SOCRATES：　　And　by　how　much　greater？



ALCIBIADES：　　By　one。



SOCRATES：　　Which　of　us　now　says　that　two　is　more　than　one？



ALCIBIADES：　　I　do。



SOCRATES：　　Did　not　I　ask；　and　you　answer　the　question？



ALCIBIADES：　　Yes。



SOCRATES：　　Then　who　is　speaking？　　I　who　put　the　question；　or　you　who　answer

me？



ALCIBIADES：　　I　am。



SOCRATES：　　Or　suppose　that　I　ask　and　you　tell　me　the　letters　which　make　up

the　name　Socrates；　which　of　us　is　the　speaker？



ALCIBIADES：　　I　am。



SOCRATES：　　Now　let　us　put　the　case　generally：　　whenever　there　is　a　question

and　answer；　who　is　the　speaker；the　questioner　or　the　answerer？



ALCIBIADES：　　I　should　say；　Socrates；　that　the　answerer　was　the　speaker。



SOCRATES：　　And　have　I　not　been　the　questioner　all　through？



ALCIBIADES：　　Yes。



SOCRATES：　　And　you　the　answerer？



ALCIBIADES：　　Just　so。



SOCRATES：　　Which　of　us；　then；　was　the　speaker？



ALCIBIADES：　　The　inference　is；　Socrates；　that　I　was　the　speaker。



SOCRATES：　　Did　not　some　one　say　that　Alcibiades；　the　fair　son　of　Cleinias；

not　understanding　about　just　and　unjust；　but　thinking　that　he　did

understand；　was　going　to　the　assembly　to　advise　the　Athenians　about　what　he

did　not　know？　　Was　not　that　said？



ALCIBIADES：　　Very　true。



SOCRATES：　　Then；　Alcibiades；　the　result　may　be　expressed　in　the　language　of

Euripides。　　I　think　that　you　have　heard　all　this　'from　yourself；　and　not

from　me'；　nor　did　I　say　this；　which　you　erroneously　attribute　to　me；　but

you　yourself；　and　what　you　said　was　very　true。　　For　indeed；　my　dear　fellow；

the　design　which　you　meditate　of　teaching　what　you　do　not　know；　and　have

not　taken　any　pains　to　learn；　is　downright　insanity。



ALCIBIADES：　　But；　Socrates；　I　think　that　the　Athenians　and　the　rest　of　the

Hellenes　do　not　often　advise　as　to　the　more　just　or　unjust；　for　they　see　no

difficulty　in　them；　and　therefore　they　leave　them；　and　consider　which

course　of　action　will　be　most　expedient；　for　there　is　a　difference　between

justice　and　expediency。　　Many　persons　have　done　great　wrong　and　profited　by

their　injustice；　others　have　done　rightly　and　come　to　no　good。



SOCRATES：　　Well；　but　granting　that　the　just　and　the　expedient　are　ever　so

much　opposed；　you　surely　do　not　imagine　that　you　know　what　is　expedient　for

mankind；　or　why　a　thing　is　expedient？



ALCIBIADES：　　Why　not；　Socrates？But　I　am　not　going　to　be　asked　again　from

whom　I　learned；　or　when　I　made　the　discovery。



SOCRATES：　　What　a　way　you　have！　　When　you　make　a　mistake　which　might　be

refuted　by　a　previous　argument；　you　insist　on　having　a　new　and　different

refutation；　the　old　argument　is　a　worn…our　garment　which　you　will　no　longer

put　on；　but　some　one　must　produce　another　which　is　clean　and　new。　　Now　I

shall　disregard　this　move　of　yours；　and　shall　ask　over　again；Where　did

you　learn　and　how　do　you　know　the　nature　of　the　expedient；　and　who　is　your

teacher？　　All　this　I　comprehend　in　a　single　question；　and　now　you　will

manifestly　be　in　the　old　difficulty；　and　will　not　be　able　to　show　that　you

know　the　expedient；　either　because　you　learned　or　because　you　discovered　it

yourself。　　But；　as　I　perceive　that　you　are　dainty；　and　dislike　the　taste　of

a　stale　argument；　I　will　enquire　no　further　into　your　knowledge　of　what　is

expedient　or　what　is　not　expedient　for　the　Athenian　people；　and　simply

request　you　to　say　why　you　do　not　explain　whether　justice　and　expediency

are　the　same　or　different？　　And　if　you　like　you　may　examine　me　as　I　have

examined　you；　or；　if　you　would　rather；　you　may　carry　on　the　discussion　by

yourself。



ALCIBIADES：　　But　I　am　not　certain；　Socrates；　whether　I　shall　be　able　to

discuss　the　matter　with　you。



SOCRATES：　　Then　imagine；　my　dear　fellow；　that　I　am　the　demus　and　the

ecclesia；　for　in　the　ecclesia；　too；　you　will　have　to　persuade　men

individually。



ALCIBIADES：　　Yes。



SOCRATES：　　And　is　not　the　same　person　able　to　persuade　one　individual

singly　and　many　individuals　of　the　things　which　he　knows？　　The　grammarian；

for　example；　can　persuade　one　and　he　can　persuade　many　about　letters。



ALCIBIADES：　　True。



SOCRATES：　　And　about　number；　will　not　the　same　person　persuade　one　and

persuade　many？



ALCIBIADES：　　Yes。



SOCRATES：　　And　this　will　be　he　who　knows　number；　or　the　arithmetician？



ALCIBIADES：　　Quite　true。



SOCRATES：　　And　cannot　you　persuade　one　man　about　that　of　which　you　can

persuade　many？



ALCIBIADES：　　I　suppose　so。



SOCRATES：　　And　that　of　which　you　can　persuade　either　is　clearly　what　you

know？



ALCIBIADES：　　Yes。



SOCRATES：　　And　the　only　difference　between　one　who　argues　as　we　are　doing；

and　the　orator　who　is　addressing　an　assembly；　is　that　the　one　seeks　to

persuade　a　number；　and　the　other　an　individual；　of　the　same　things。



ALCIBIADES：　　I　suppose　so。



SOCRATES：　　Well；　then；　since　the　same　person　who　can　persuade　a　multitude

can　persuade　individuals；　try　conclusions　upon　me；　and　prove　to　me　that　the

just　is　not　always　expedient。



ALCIBI