comprehends by itself nor by the showing of others； the first is the most
excellent； the second is good； the third is useless。 Therefore； it follows
necessarily that； if Pandolfo was not in the first rank； he was in the second；
for whenever one has judgment to know good and bad when it is said and
done； although he himself may not have the initiative； yet he can recognize
the good and the bad in his servant； and the one he can praise and the other
correct； thus the servant cannot hope to deceive him； and is kept honest。
But to enable a prince to form an opinion of his servant there is one
test which never fails； when you see the servant thinking more of his own
interests than of yours； and seeking inwardly his own profit in everything；
such a man will never make a good servant； nor will you ever be able to
trust him； because he who has the state of another in his hands ought never
to think of himself； but always of his prince； and never pay any attention
to matters in which the prince is not concerned。
On the other hand； to keep his servant honest the prince ought to study
him； honouring him； enriching him； doing him kindnesses； sharing with
him the honours and cares； and at the same time let him see that he cannot
stand alone； so that many honours may not make him desire more； many
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riches make him wish for more； and that many cares may make him dread
chances。 When； therefore； servants； and princes towards servants； are thus
disposed； they can trust each other； but when it is otherwise； the end will
always be disastrous for either one or the other。
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CHAPTER XXIII
HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED
I do not wish to leave out an important branch of this subject； for it is a
danger from which princes are with difficulty preserved； unless they are
very careful and discriminating。 It is that of flatterers； of whom courts are
full； because men are so self…complacent in their own affairs； and in a way
so deceived in them； that they are preserved with difficulty from this pest；
and if they wish to defend themselves they run the danger of falling into
contempt。 Because there is no other way of guarding oneself from
flatterers except letting men understand that to tell you the truth does not
offend you； but when every one may tell you the truth； respect for you
abates。
Therefore a wise prince ought to hold a third course by choosing the
wise men in his state； and giving to them only the liberty of speaking the
truth to him； and then only of those things of which he inquires； and of
none others； but he ought to question them upon everything； and listen to
their opinions； and afterwards form his own conclusions。 With these
councillors； separately and collectively； he ought to carry himself in such a
way that each of them should know that； the more freely he shall speak；
the more he shall be preferred； outside of these； he should listen to no one；
pursue the thing resolved on； and be steadfast in his resolutions。 He who
does otherwise is either overthrown by flatterers； or is so often changed by
varying opinions that he falls into contempt。
I wish on this subject to adduce a modern example。 Fra Luca； the man
of affairs to Maximilian；＇*＇ the present emperor； speaking of his majesty；
said： He consulted with no one； yet never got his own way in anything。
This arose because of his following a practice the opposite to the above；
for the emperor is a secretive manhe does not communicate his designs
to any one； nor does he receive opinions on them。 But as in carrying them
into effect they become revealed and known； they are at once obstructed
by those men whom he has around him； and he； being pliant； is diverted
from them。 Hence it follows that those things he does one day he undoes
the next； and no one ever understands what he wishes or intends to do； and
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no one can rely on his resolutions。
＇*＇ Maximilian I； born in 1459； died 1519； Emperor of the Holy
Roman Empire。 He married； first； Mary； daughter of Charles the Bold；
after her death； Bianca Sforza； and thus became involved in Italian
politics。
A prince； therefore； ought always to take counsel； but only when he
wishes and not when others wish； he ought rather to discourage every one
from offering advice unless he asks it； but； however； he ought to be a
constant inquirer； and afterwards a patient listener concerning the things of
which he inquired； also； on learning that any one； on any consideration；
has not told him the truth； he should let his anger be felt。
And if there are some who think that a prince who conveys an
impression of his wisdom is not so through his own ability； but through the
good advisers that he has around him； beyond doubt they are deceived；
because this is an axiom which never fails： that a prince who is not wise
himself will never take good advice； unless by chance he has yielded his
affairs entirely to one person who happens to be a very prudent man。 In
this case indeed he may be well governed； but it would not be for long；
because such a governor would in a short time take away his state from
him。
But if a prince who is not inexperienced should take counsel from
more than one he will never get united counsels； nor will he know how to
unite them。 Each of the counsellors will think of his own interests； and the
prince will not know how to control them or to see through them。 And
they are not to found otherwise； because men will always prove untrue to
you unless they are kept honest by constraint。 Therefore it must be
inferred that good counsels； whencesoever they come； are born of the
wisdom of the prince； and not the wisdom of the prince from good
counsels。
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CHAPTER XXIV
WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES
The previous suggestions； carefully observed； will enable a new prince
to appear well established； and render him at once more secure and fixed
in the state than if he had been long seated there。 For the actions of a new
prince are more narrowly observed than those of an hereditary one； and
when they are seen to be able they gain more men and bind far tighter than
ancient blood； because men are attracted more by the present than by the
past； and when they find the present good they enjoy it and seek no further；
they will also make the utmost defence of a prince if he fails them not in
other things。 Thus it will be a double glory for him to have established a
new principality； and adorned and strengthened it with good laws； good
arms； good allies； and with a good example； so will it be a double disgrace
to him who； born a prince； shall lose his state by want of wisdom。
And if those seigniors are considered who have lost their states in Italy
in our times； such as the King of Naples； the Duke of Milan； and others；
there will be found in them； firstly； one common defect in regard to arms
from the causes which have been discussed at length； in the next place；
some one of them will be seen； either to have had the people hostile； or if
he has had the people friendly； he has not known how to secure the nobles。
In the absence of these defects states that have power enough to keep an
army in the field cannot be lost。
Philip of Macedon； not the father of Alexander the Great； but he who
was conquered by Titus Quintius； had not much territory compared to the
greatness of the Romans and of Greece who attacked him； yet being a
warlike man who knew how to attract the people and secure the nobles； he
sustained the war against his enemies for many years； and if in the end he
lost the dominion of some cities； nevertheless he retained the kingdom。
Therefore； do not let our princes accuse fortune for the loss of their
principalities after so many years' pos
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