the six enneads- 第142部分

e　principles　being　also　genera；　and　some　genera　also　principles？　And　do　both　the　sets　of　categories　we　have　been　examining　imply　that　only　some　principles　are　genera　and　some　genera　principles？　or　does　one　of　them　presuppose　that　all　that　belongs　to　the　class　of　genera　belongs　also　to　the　class　of　principles？　　　　　Since；　however；　we　affirm　that　Being　is　not　a　unity…　the　reason　for　this　affirmation　is　stated　by　Plato　and　others…　these　questions　become　imperative；　once　we　are　satisfied　as　to　the　number　of　genera　to　be　posited　and　the　grounds　for　our　choice。　　　　　The　subject　of　our　enquiry；　then；　is　the　Existent　or　Existents；　and　it　presents　immediately　two　problems　demanding　separate　analysis：　　　　　What　do　we　mean　by　the　Existent？　This　is　naturally　the　first　question　to　be　examined。　　　　　What　is　that　which；　often　taken　for　Being　＇for　the　Existent＇；　is　in　our　view　Becoming　and　never　really　Being？　Note　however　that　these　concepts　are　not　to　be　taken　as　distinguished　from　each　other　in　the　sense　of　belonging　to　a　genus；　Something；　divided　into　Being　and　Becoming；　and　we　must　not　suppose　that　Plato　took　this　view。　It　would　be　absurd　to　assign　Being　to　the　same　genus　as　non…Being：　this　would　be　to　make　one　genus　of　Socrates　and　his　portrait。　The　division　here　＇between　what　has　Being　and　what　is　in　Becoming＇　means　a　definite　marking…off；　a　setting　asunder；　leading　to　the　assertion　that　what　takes　the　appearance　of　Being　is　not　Being　and　implying　that　the　nature　of　True　Being　has　been　quite　misapprehended。　Being；　we　are　taught；　must　have　the　attribute　of　eternity；　must　be　so　constituted　as　never　to　belie　its　own　nature。　　　　　This；　then；　is　the　Being　of　which　we　shall　treat；　and　in　our　investigation　we　shall　assume　that　it　is　not　a　unity：　subsequently　we　ask　leave　to　say　something　on　the　nature　of　Becoming　and　on　what　it　is　that　comes　to　be；　that　is；　on　the　nature　of　the　world　of　Sense。　　　　　2。　In　asserting　that　Being　is　not　a　unity；　we　do　not　mean　to　imply　a　definite　number　of　existences；　the　number　may　well　be　infinite：　we　mean　simply　that　it　is　many　as　well　as　one；　that　it　is；　so　to　speak；　a　diversified　unity；　a　plurality　in　unity。　　　　　It　follows　that　either　the　unity　so　regarded　is　a　unity　of　genus　under　which　the　Existents；　involving　as　they　do　plurality　as　well　as　unity；　stand　as　species；　or　that　while　there　are　more　genera　than　one；　yet　all　are　subordinate　to　a　unity；　or　there　may　be　more　genera　than　one；　though　no　one　genus　is　subordinate　to　any　other；　but　all　with　their　own　subordinates…　whether　these　be　lesser　genera；　or　species　with　individuals　for　their　subordinates…　all　are　elements　in　one　entity；　and　from　their　totality　the　Intellectual　realm…　that　which　we　know　as　Being…　derives　its　constitution。　　　　　If　this　last　is　the　truth；　we　have　here　not　merely　genera；　but　genera　which　are　at　the　same　time　principles　of　Being。　They　are　genera　because　they　have　subordinates…　other　genera；　and　successively　species　and　individuals；　they　are　also　principles；　since　from　this　plurality　Being　takes　its　rise；　constituted　in　its　entirety　from　these　its　elements。　　　　　Suppose；　however；　a　greater　number　of　origins　which　by　their　mere　totality　comprised；　without　possessing　any　subordinates；　the　whole　of　Being；　these　would　be　first…principles　but　not　genera：　it　would　be　as　if　one　constructed　the　sensible　world　from　the　four　elements…　fire　and　the　others；　these　elements　would　be　first　principles；　but　they　would　not　be　genera；　unless　the　term　〃genus〃　is　to　be　used　equivocally。　　　　　But　does　this　assertion　of　certain　genera　which　are　at　the　same　time　first…principles　imply　that　by　combining　the　genera；　each　with　its　subordinates；　we　find　the　whole　of　Being　in　the　resultant　combination？　But　then；　taken　separately；　their　existence　will　not　be　actual　but　only　potential；　and　they　will　not　be　found　in　isolation。　　　　　Suppose；　on　the　other　hand；　we　ignore　the　genera　and　combine　the　particulars：　what　then　becomes　of　the　ignored　genera？　They　will；　surely；　exist　in　the　purity　of　their　own　isolation；　and　the　mixtures　will　not　destroy　them。　The　question　of　how　this　result　is　achieved　may　be　postponed。　　　　　For　the　moment　we　take　it　as　agreed　that　there　are　genera　as　distinct　from　principles　of　Being　and　that；　on　another　plane；　principles　＇elements＇　are　opposed　to　compounds。　We　are　thus　obliged　to　show　in　what　relation　we　speak　of　genera　and　why　we　distinguish　them　instead　of　summing　them　under　a　unity；　for　otherwise　we　imply　that　their　coalescence　into　a　unity　is　fortuitous；　whereas　it　would　be　more　plausible　to　dispense　with　their　separate　existence。　　　　　If　all　the　genera　could　be　species　of　Being；　all　individuals　without　exception　being　immediately　subordinate　to　these　species；　then　such　a　unification　becomes　feasible。　But　that　supposition　bespeaks　annihilation　for　the　genera：　the　species　will　no　longer　be　species；　plurality　will　no　longer　be　subordinated　to　unity；　everything　must　be　the　unity；　unless　there　exist　some　thing　or　things　outside　the　unity。　The　One　never　becomes　many…　as　the　existence　of　species　demands…　unless　there　is　something　distinct　from　it：　it　cannot　of　itself　assume　plurality；　unless　we　are　to　think　of　it　as　being　broken　into　pieces　like　some　extended　body：　but　even　so；　the　force　which　breaks　it　up　must　be　distinct　from　it：　if　it　is　itself　to　effect　the　breaking　up…　or　whatever　form　the　division　may　take…　then　it　is　itself　previously　divided。　　　　　For　these　and　many　other　reasons　we　must　abstain　from　positing　a　single　genus；　and　especially　because　neither　Being　nor　Substance　can　be　the　predicate　of　any　given　thing。　If　we　do　predicate　Being；　it　is　only　as　an　accidental　attribute；　just　as　when　we　predicate　whiteness　of　a　substance；　we　are　not　predicating　the　Absolute　Whiteness。　　　　　3。　We　assert；　then；　a　plurality　of　Existents；　but　a　plurality　not　fortuitous　and　therefore　a　plurality　deriving　from　a　unity。　　　　　But　even　admitting　this　derivation　from　a　unity…　a　unity　however　not　predicated　of　them　in　respect　of　their　essential　being…　there　is；　surely；　no　reason　why　each　of　these　Existents；　distinct　in　character　from　every　other；　should　not　in　itself　stand　as　a　separate　genus。　　　　　Is；　then；　this　unity　external　to　the　genera　thus　produced；　this　unity　which　is　their　source　though　it　cannot　be　predicated　of　them　in　respect　of　their　essence？　it　is　indeed　external；　the　One　is　beyond；　it　cannot；　therefore；　be　included　among　the　genera：　it　is　the　＇transcendent＇　source；　while　they　stand　side　by　side　as　genera。　Yet　surely　the　one　must　somehow　be　included　＇among　the　genera＇？　No：　it　is　the　Existents　we　are　investigating；　not　that　which　is　beyond　Existence。　　　　　We　pass　on；　then；　to　consider　that　which　is　included；　and　find　to　our　surprise　the　cause　included　with　the　things　it　causes：　it　is　surely　strange　that　causes　and　effects　should　be　brought　into　the　same　genus。　　　　　But　if　the　cause　is　included　with　its　effects　only　in　the　sense　in　which　a　genus　is　included　with　its　subordinates；　the　subordinates　being　of　a　different　order；　so　that　it　cannot　be　predicated　of　them　whether　as　their　genus　or　in　any　other　relation；　these　subordinates　are　obviously　themselves　genera　with　subordinates　of　their　own：　you　may；　for　example；　be　the　cause　of　the　operation　of　walking；　but　the　walking　is　not　subordinate　to　you　in　the　relation　of　species　to　genus；　and　if　walking　had　nothing　prior　to　it　as　its　genus；　but　had　posteriors；　then　it　would　be　a　＇primary＇　genus　and　rank　among　the　Existents。　　　　　Perhaps；　however；　it　must　be　utterly　denied　that　unity　is　even　the　cause　of　other　things；　they　should　be　considered　rather　as　its　parts　or　elements…　if　the　terms　may　be　allowed；…　their　totality　constituting　a　single　entity　which　our　thinking　divides。　All　unity　though　it　be；　it　goes　by　a　wonderful　power　out　into　everything；　it　appears　as　many　and　becomes　many　when　there　is　a　motion；　the　fecundity　of　its　nature　causes　the　One　to　be　no　longer　one；　and　we；　displaying　what　we　call　its　parts；　consider　them　each　as　a　unity　and　make　them　into　〃genera；〃　unaware　of　our　failure　to　see　the　whole　at　once。　We　display　it；　then；　in　parts；　though；　unable　to　restrain　their　natural　tendency　to　coalesce；　we　bring　these　parts　together　again；　resign　them　to　the　whole　and　allow　them　to　become　a　unity；　or　rather　to　be　a　unity。　　　　　All　this　will　become　clearer　in　the　light　of　further　consideration…　when；　that　is　to　say；　we　have　ascertained　the　number　of　the　genera；　for　thus　we　shall　also　discover　their　causes。　It　is　not　enough　to　deny；　we　must　advance　by　dint　of　thought　and　comprehension。　The　way　is　clear：　　　　　4。　If　we　had　to　ascertain　the　nature　of　body　and　the　place　it　holds　in　the　universe；　surely　we　should　take　some　sample　of　body；　say　stone；　and　examine　into　what　constituents　it　may　be　divided。　There　would　be　what　we　think　of　as　the　substrate　of　stone；　its　quantity…　in　this　case；　a　magnitude；　its　quality…　for　example；　the　colour　of　stone。　As　with　stone；　so　with　every　other　body：　we　should　see　that　in　this　thing；　body；　there　are　three　distinguishable　characteristics…　the　pseudo…substance；　the　quantity；　the　quality…　though　they　all　make　one　and　are　only　logically　trisected；　the　three　being　found　to　constitute　the　unit　thing；　body。　If　motion　were　equally　inherent　in　its　constitution；　we　should　include　this　as　well；　and　the　four